FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

DECEMBER 15, 1923

The Senate and Our Foreign Relations . *George W. Wickersham* 177
Versailles—Before and After . . . . . *Kepi* 193
Greater France . . . . . *Henri Hauser* 211
The Area and Population of Greater France: Map and Tables . . 230
The World's Crisis in Cotton . . . . . *John A. Todd* 232
Peace Agencies and Politics . . . . . *Walker D. Hines* 244
The Indian Question in Kenya . . . . . *Stanley Rice* 258
Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe *Oscar Jászi* 270
The British Flag on the Caspian . . *Brig. Gen. Sir Percy Sykes* 282
Again the Yellow Peril . . . . . *Raymond W. Buell* 295
Some Statistics on the Japanese in Hawaii . . *Romanzo Adams* 310
Recent Irish History . . . . . *Ernest Boyd* 319
The Ulster Boundary: Map and Explanatory Text 328
Some Recent Books on International Affairs . *Harry E. Barnes* 330
Source Material . . . . . *Denys P. Myers* 338

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Subscription, $5.00 a year, post-free to any address in the world. Subscriptions, and inquiries regarding advertising, should be addressed to the Business Manager, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, N. Y.

The Editors will be glad to consider manuscripts offered for publication, but no manuscript will be returned unless it is accompanied by a stamped and addressed envelope, and the Editors will take no responsibility for manuscripts that may be lost.

Entered as second-class matter September 12, 1922, at the post-office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879

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The Editors.

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THE SENATE AND OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS

By George W. Wickersham

WITH the assembling of Congress at Washington, speculation is rife concerning the foreign policy which shall be recommended by President Coolidge and adopted by Congress; or rather, by the Senate, for the latter body since the consideration and rejection of the Peace Treaty of Versailles practically has assumed to control not merely the ratification but even the negotiation of treaties. This control, although in defiance of the practice and the declared principles of a century or more of constitutional government, was acquiesced in by President Harding's administration. Apparently the whole policy of the Department of State since March, 1921, has been dominated by the general desire not only to avoid any action which might invite adverse criticism on the part of the Senate, but studiously to avoid any act or expression which might indicate either sympathy or coöperation with that great international organization for the preservation of world peace, the League of Nations, which is anathema to certain Senatorial minds. This undoubtedly was a counsel of prudence. But it inevitably led to the abandonment of the highest avowed ideals with which the administration assumed control of the government.

Mr. George Harvey, in his farewell address recently delivered in London, after stating that his earlier declaration before a similar audience that it was no part of his official task to formulate policies "was a joke," thereupon proceeded to declare that "the national American foreign policy is to have no foreign policy." One cannot but wonder if President Coolidge or Mr. Hughes had commissioned the Ambassador to make such a statement as a part of the American Government's joint pronouncement with the British Government regarding possible methods of dealing with present European conditions.

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However that may be, as a matter of history, the foreign policy of the United States—at least until 1921—was not one of aimless opportunist drifting, as Mr. Harvey's statement suggests. We have had certain national foreign policies, in the sense of well-defined principles which have governed our international relations and have been respected by successive national administrations, even when dominated by different political parties. The most notable of these, of course, is the "Monroe policy." "Never for a moment," said Senator Root in addressing the American Society of International Law, in April, 1914, "have the responsible and instructed statesmen in charge of the foreign affairs of the United States failed to consider themselves bound to insist upon this policy. . . . Almost every President and Secretary of State has re-stated the doctrine with vigor and emphasis in the discussion of the diplomatic affairs of his day." Secretary Hughes is the latest of this line. In his address before the American Bar Association, in August last, he restated the Monroe policy as "a distinctively American policy." In that same address, the Secretary declared that the "establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice, which might make available the facilities of a permanent tribunal (instead of the less satisfactory provision of temporary tribunals of arbitration) to governments desiring to submit their controversies to it, *has been a distinct feature of the policy of the Government of the United States for many years*." Evidently our recent Ambassador to Great Britain is not in accord, on this point at least, with the opinion of the Secretary of State.

Another American national policy, based upon Washington's farewell advice, has been to avoid "entangling alliances" with other nations. Surely, Mr. Harvey can hardly have forgotten the changes rung upon this policy by him and those with whom he was associated in the conduct of the campaign against membership in the League of Nations. The bogey of "entangling alliances" lurks in the corner of almost every treaty the Senate has had to consider in recent years. It was only by engrafting upon the resolution of ratification a declaration that "the United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of this treaty there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense," that enough votes were secured in the Senate to ratify the Four Power Pacific Pact in February, 1922. The proposal to accept member-

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ship in the League of Nations clearly was a departure from what had been for a century the policy of the United States. The entry of the United States into the World War entailed many departures from what previously had been American policy. The most notable of such departures was the adoption of a universal conscription law. The struggle over the League of Nations was between those who, on the one hand, desired to adhere to the old policy, and those who, on the other hand, maintained that our participation in the war entailed certain responsibilities which we could not in honor disregard, among them the duty to aid in restoring and maintaining the peace of the world, that this could be done only by coöperation with our associates in the war, and that such association must be continuous in order to be effective.

The opposition to this departure from previous American policy prevailed, partly by reason of the bitter partisan attitude of certain Republican Senators, partly by reason of the stubborn unwillingness of President Wilson to yield anything of what he had formulated in order to secure favorable action by the Senate.

The rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was followed by the adoption, a few months after the advent of the new administration, of a joint resolution of Congress declaring the state of war with Germany at an end; and on August 25, 1921, there was signed a separate treaty of peace between the United States and Germany which was ratified by the Senate on October 18, 1921. By this treaty it was sought to secure to the United States all the benefits which would have been derived from the Versailles treaty, without assuming any of its obligations. This was expressed on the face of the document, which, after the general provision referred to, specified the parts of the Versailles treaty under which the United States should retain the same rights and privileges it would have possessed had it ratified that treaty. The parts so indicated were those dealing with the German Colonies (Part IV); Military, Naval and Air matters (Part V); Prisoners of War and Graves (Part VI); Reparations (Part VIII); Financial Matters (Part IX); Economic Matters (Part X); Aerial Navigation (Part XI); Ports, Waterways and Railways (Part XII); Guarantees (Part XIV); and Miscellaneous Matters (Part XV).

Almost every one of these Parts provided for the appointment of a commission of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to supervise its execution. But while stipu-

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lating with Germany that the United States should retain the benefit of all of these provisions, the Senate made its ratification of the separate treaty subject to the understanding "that the United States shall not be represented or participate in any body, agency or commission, nor shall any person represent the United States as a member of any body, agency or commission in which the United States is authorized to participate by this treaty, unless and until an act of Congress of the United States shall provide for such representation or participation."

A similar separate treaty of peace with Austria containing similar provisions was negotiated and ratified at the same time as the German treaty.

The Constitution provides that not only the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, but "all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." But this provision relates to those matters which are the proper subjects of international compact and no precedent has been found to warrant the Senate in assuming to control executive action with respect to the execution of treaty provisions, by means of a reservation added by the Senate to the resolution of advice and consent to the execution of a treaty. The provisions of the treaty being a part of the supreme law of the land, their execution becomes the duty of the President. The Constitution declares that the President—not the Senate—"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." By what authority the Senate assumes to tell the President he shall not discharge a constitutional duty until authorized by act of Congress has not been revealed.

The reservation contained in the ratification of the German and Austrian peace treaties was an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power by the Senate. Its adoption was one of the significant steps recently taken by the Senate in assuming an extra-constitutional control of our international relations.

The making of the separate peace treaties with Germany and Austria did not allay the widespread feeling in the minds of the people that an obligation was incumbent upon the American nation to take some definite step towards the future security of the world.

The League of Nations had been rejected, but was there nothing else that could be proposed? All of President Harding's

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utterances at this time showed that he was troubled with this thought. He yearned to bring about some effective measure which would fulfill the promises of the party platform and of his own messages and speeches.

Not very long before his death, Mr. Harding wrote to Bishop Gailor of the Protestant Episcopal Church, recalling an observation he had made some days previously to his newspaper callers, "that I did not believe any man could confront the responsibility of a President of the United States and yet adhere to the idea that it was possible for our country to maintain an attitude of isolation and aloofness in the world." He stated it to be his concern that there should be an effective recognition of this fact, so that those who because of their position were earliest compelled to realize this situation might be assured of the understanding and sympathetic support of the great intelligent public opinion of our country. Mr. Harding added: "After much thought and study and conference I reached the conclusion that our adherence to the program of the International Court represented a compliance with these conditions. It is a longer step than some would wish us to take in this direction. On the other hand, it is a less advance than some others would wish us to take. But to me it seems to meet the requirements of our peculiar situation, and permits us to say to the world that we are ready for our part in furthering peace and stability without entanglements or surrender of cherished policy to which we are long and strongly committed."

Thus the sorely tried and harassed President, buffeted between the "isolationist" party leaders, on the one hand, and on the other his deep conscientious appreciation of the obligations of America to make an effective move towards the maintenance of world peace, came at last to the World Court as the one tangible accomplishment to which he might adhere without danger of the reproach of inviting "entangling alliances."

"It is one thing to talk about the ideals of peace," President Harding said at the time of the Conference on Naval Disarmament, "but the bigger thing is to seek the actuality." His nomination for the presidency followed a bitter partisan contest between President Wilson and his followers and the exasperated Republican Senators, which had resulted in the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty carried down with it the Covenant of the League of Nations, so far as the Senate as then

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composed was concerned. But in the platform of the Republican party adopted at Chicago in June, 1920, it was deemed necessary to placate a recognized pro-League sentiment then existing.

The platform declared that the Republican Party stands for agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. "We believe," it said, "that such an international association must be based upon international justice and must provide methods which shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of impartial courts and which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action, so that the nations, pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair, may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war."

Mr. Harding, in his speech of acceptance, interpreted this as the "Republican committal for an Association of Nations, cooperating in sublime accord, to attain and preserve peace through justice rather than force, determined to add to security through international law, so clarified that no misconstruction can be possible without affronting world honor." No effort ever was made by the Harding Administration, so far as public knowledge goes, either to form such an Association, or to bring about a modification of the League of Nations which would fit the requirements of such an Association. The reason for such a reaction lay in the known opposition of the Senate to any such movement.

On the other hand, other efforts at international agreement for particular purposes were undertaken, the most notable of them being the Naval Limitation Conference which opened at Washington November 12, 1921. The treaties there negotiated met with robust opposition from some of those Republican Senators who had most strongly opposed the ratification of the Versailles treaty. The tact and foresight shown by the President in appointing leading Senators of both political parties as Commissioners to the Conference undoubtedly greatly helped to secure ratification of the treaties. As it was, however, the crucial treaty of the set—the so-called "Four Power Pacific Pact"—as already stated, was approved by but four votes more than the requisite two thirds, and its ratification only was secured by placating the "alliance" bogey. This treaty contained an agreement by the signatory powers to respect each other's rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, and provided that in case any

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controversy arises involving such rights, which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and which is likely to disturb the harmonious accord subsisting between them, they shall invite the other parties to the treaty to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment. It was further provided that if said rights are threatened by the aggression of any other power, the parties to the treaty shall communicate with each other fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

These provisions were attacked as being open to the same objections as those successfully urged against the League of Nations. Conference and the exchange of views suggested the purposes of the League. Senator Borah saw in this treaty the same danger to American sovereignty that lurked in the Covenant of the League. It was to overcome such objections that, in reporting the treaty to the Senate, the President cried out:

"Frankly, Senators, if nations may not safely agree to respect each others rights, and may not agree to confer if one party to the compact threatens trespass, or may not agree to *advise* if one party to the pact is threatened by an outside power, then all concerted efforts to tranquilize the world and stabilize peace must be flung to the winds. *Either these treaties must have your cordial sanction, or every proclaimed desire to promote peace and prevent war becomes a hollow mockery.*"

The vision expressed in the Republican platform of 1920 of an "international association . . . based upon international justice," "coöperating in sublime accord," and providing methods to maintain the rule of public right and to secure instant and general international conference whenever peace should be threatened, had, by the spring of 1922, wholly faded from the eyes of certain Republican Senators, and those who opposed ratification of the Four Power Pacific Pact apparently were quite willing that "every proclaimed desire to promote peace and prevent war should become a hollow mockery."

After the execution of the treaties formulated at the Naval Limitation Conference, no further move toward international coöperation to aid in the restoration of normal conditions in Europe was made by the administration until February 24, 1923, when, without previous warning, the President transmitted to the Senate, with a recommendation that it be adopted,

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a proposal from the Secretary of State that the United States give its adhesion to the Permanent Court of International Justice established pursuant to the provisions of Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The President pointed out that by adopting the proposed agreement the United States would not become a member of the League of Nations. He said there was good reason to believe that the conditions proposed for American participation would be acceptable to the signatory powers, "though nothing definite can be done until the United States tenders adhesion with these reservations." Manifestly, he said, the Executive could not make this tender without the approval of the Senate. Therefore he earnestly urged favorable advice and consent.

"It is not a new problem in international relationship," he pointed out, "it is wholly a question of accepting an established institution of high character, and making effective all the fine things which have been said by us in favor of such an agency of advanced civilization." He therefore earnestly urged the favorable advice and consent of the Senate. "I would rejoice," he added, "if some action could be taken even in the short period which remains of the present session."

But the Senate was in no mood to facilitate such rejoicing. The Permanent Court was the creation of the League of Nations. Therefore let it be anathema! Mr. Root declared that it was the fulfilment of twenty-five years of Republican advocacy. What was that fact to Senators who agree with Mr. Harvey that the United States never had a foreign policy and therefore that neither the party nor the nation was committed by past custom to any line of action! The President's proposal was left as unfinished business in the hands of the Senate when it adjourned on March 4, 1923.

Secretary Hughes had made plain in the communication to the President, which the latter transmitted to the Senate with his hearty recommendation on February 24, 1923, that the organization of the Court and the method provided for the selection of its judges by making use of the machinery of the League of Nations avoided the objections which had prevented the adoption of the proposals for such a court made by the United States to the Second Hague Conference in 1907. The method proposed by Mr. Hughes for adherence to the Court by the United States secured to it a voice in the selection of the judges—without

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which, Mr. Hughes pointed out, the United States could not accept the Court,—as fully as though it were a member of the League of Nations, while carefully avoiding the acceptance of membership in the League.

The power exercised by Senatorial opposition upon Mr. Harding's mind never was more strikingly exhibited than in his speech at St. Louis on June 21, 1923. After extolling the Permanent Court as a true judicial tribunal of the highest order, he adverted to the difficulties in the way of securing the Senate's approval of it. "I am not wedded irrevocably to any particular method," he said. "I would not assume for a moment that the readjustment of the existing arrangement which appears to my mind as feasible is the best, much less the only, one. . . . Granting the noteworthy excellence—of which I, for one, am fully convinced—of the Court as now constituted, why not proceed in the belief that it may be made self-perpetuating? This could be done in one of two ways: (1) by empowering the Court itself to fill any vacancy arising from the death of a member or retirement from whatever cause, without interposition from any other body; or (2) by continuing the existing authority of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to nominate, and by transferring the power to elect from the Council and Assembly of the League to the remaining members of the Court of Justice."

Thus the whole carefully worked out plan by which Senator Root had overcome the obstacles which in the past always had prevented acceptance of the Court idea by the small nations, and the method so ably formulated by Secretary Hughes to enable the United States to make use of the League machinery without membership in the League, were sacrificed to fear of Senatorial opposition, based upon Senatorial hostility to the League of Nations.

One could not but wonder what Mr. Root thought when he read this proposal, and what were Mr. Hughes' reflections when his well-conceived plan, considered during "a long period, indeed ever since the international Conference on the Limitation of Armament," as Mr. Harding had informed the Senate, was thus thrown overboard.

Probably no more extraordinary proposition ever was made by a President to the American people than that our Government should agree to submit questions of difference with other nations to a self-perpetuating judicial tribunal, and one in the selection

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of whose judges we had no voice. A moment's reflection upon the history of the Court—the fact that only through the machinery of the League, which secured a voice for great and small nations alike in the selection of the judges, had it been made a possibility—should have led the President to discard this plan for avoiding Senatorial opposition, no doubt suggested to him by some unofficial adviser, as wholly impracticable of acceptance by other nations, even if it could be assumed that our own Congress would approve such an unprecedented arrangement. It almost seems as if Mr. Harding might have meant the suggestion as the *reductio ad absurdum* of any plan for American adherence to the Court other than that formulated by Mr. Hughes. But if the suggestion were made seriously, it is impossible to believe that Mr. Harding, had he lived, would not have seen its impracticability and reverted to the original plan. The President had very deeply at heart the necessity of doing something tangible for the maintenance of international peace. But the imperious Senate haunted his dreams and troubled his will.

President Harding reverted to the subject in the address he prepared for delivery in San Francisco, which because of his illness was not delivered, but was made public by his secretary on August 1, 1923. He said: "I would be insensible to duty and violate all the sentiments of my heart and all my convictions if I failed to urge American support of the Permanent Court of International Justice. I do not know that such a Court will be unfailing in the avoidance of war, but I know it is a step in the right direction, and will prove an advance toward international peace for which the reflective conscience of mankind is calling."

And yet there was the Senate!

"No matter what the critics may say," he continued, "we have the obligation of duly recognized and constituted authority, and I had rather have the Senate grant its support and have the United States whole heartedly favor the Permanent Court, than prolong a controversy and defeat the main purpose. As President, speaking for the United States, I am more interested in adherence to such a tribunal in the best form attainable than I am concerned about the triumph of Presidential insistence. The big thing is the firm establishment of the Court and our cordial adherence thereto. All else is mere detail."

But the trouble with this is that the question is not how a new

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Court shall be organized, but how the United States shall adopt an existing tribunal organized pursuant to an agreement to which forty odd nations are parties. What Mr. Harding called "mere detail" was the essential provision under which the United States might accept the Court, participate in the election of the judges and share in the expense, yet avoid membership in the League. Mr. Hughes had submitted a plan which he stated he had reason to believe would be accepted by these nations, and which had been for months under consideration. Is the Senate itself to negotiate a new plan, or is it likely that it will state in advance some new and better proposal which the nations will accept without modification?

The proposition to adhere to the Permanent Court of International Justice lies on the table of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Will President Coolidge urge that it be acted upon favorably and put the whole power and prestige of his office behind the recommendation, or will he content himself with a general approval of the plan and allow the Senate to kill it by some alternative suggestions which will be wholly impossible of acceptance by the nations parties to the agreement under which the Court exists?

President Coolidge's initial message to Congress will probably have answered this question before this article appears. The writer indulges in the hope that Mr. Coolidge will speak in no uncertain terms in support of the Hughes plan.

The conduct of foreign relations will be almost impossible of satisfactory direction if the Senate shall continue in future to interfere with and hamper the Executive as it has done the last four years.

A striking example of that fact is furnished by the negotiations at present going forward concerning the settlement of the reparations obligations of Germany. Mr. Hughes has accepted the prohibition, imposed by the Senate in the reservation to the ratification of the separate peace treaties with Germany and Austria, against appointing a representative of the United States upon the Reparation Commission or of uniting with any other international body to deal with economic conditions in Europe. In his speech at New Haven in December last he referred to the limitations imposed upon his freedom to act. In his recent communication to the British Government, he says "that the Government of the United States is not in position to appoint a

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member of the Reparation Commission, inasmuch as such an appointment cannot be made without the consent of Congress." After this avowal of executive impotence, the best he can offer is the belief "that competent American citizens would be willing to participate in an economic inquiry for the purposes stated, through an advisory body *appointed by the Reparation Commission* to make recommendations, in case that course after further consideration should be deemed advisable."

Without minimizing in any degree the broad statesmanship and adroit handling of a most difficult international question by the Secretary of State, it is none the less a subject of criticism and regret that the Senate should so tie the hands of the Executive in dealing with a matter of vast importance to America and to the world that the President does not feel free to appoint commissioners to act even as *an advisory body* to the Reparation Commission, and that the best that can be done is to suggest that the Reparation Commission itself shall select a number of American citizens, whose personnel undoubtedly will be satisfactory to the Secretary of State, but who will have no official relation to the United States Government. This is one of the results of Senatorial interference with the executive function not within the contemplation of the Constitution.

In still one other important field has the legislative power interfered with executive action, namely, regarding the settlement of the debts of the European powers, lately our associates in the Great War.

Pursuant to acts of Congress passed shortly after the United States entered the war against Germany, the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, was authorized, "for the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security and defense and prosecuting the war," to establish credits in the United States for "the foreign governments then engaged in war with the enemies of the United States." These credits were opened and amounts advanced which were expended within the United States for the purchase of supplies and war material. The advances so made aggregate several billion dollars.

On February 9, 1922, Congress passed an act creating a "World War Foreign Debt Commission" of five members, including the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of refunding, converting or extending the time of payment of obligations of foreign governments to the United States, but restricting the

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authority of the committee to extend the time of such payment beyond June 15, 1947, or to fix the rate of interest below 4¼ per cent. It further provided that the act should not be construed to authorize the exchange of bonds or other obligations of any foreign government for those of any other foreign government, or the cancellation of any part of such indebtedness, except through payment thereof. The President appointed as members of this commission, besides the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, Senator Smoot, Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Senate, and Mr. Burton, a member of the House of Representatives.

This commission negotiated an agreement with Great Britain under which the amount of its indebtedness was settled at $4,600,000,000, the time of payment being extended over a period of sixty-two years and the rate of interest reduced to 3 per cent for the first ten years and 3½ per cent thereafter. These departures from the original authority were authorized by an amending act of Congress passed February 28, 1923.

These modifications, however, only were approved in the case of the settlement of the British debt. With respect to the other debtor nations the limitations imposed by the act of February 9, 1922, remain.

The ability of France and Italy to pay their debts to the United States depends largely, if not wholly, upon the amount they shall recover from Germany in reparation for the destruction of their property during the war. But our Government has steadily refused to consider this circumstance as affecting our demands for a settlement of the debts. In the recent note of the Secretary of State he reiterates this position, while adding that "the Government of the United States has no desire to be oppressive or to refuse to make reasonable settlements as to time and terms of payment in full consideration of the circumstances of the Allied debtors"—which does not seem a lavish offer, when it is remembered that these debts were incurred, in the language of Congress, "for the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security and defense and prosecuting the war" by the nations "then engaged in war with the enemies of the United States." But in view of the provisions of the acts creating the World War Foreign Debt Commission, the Secretary of State could make no more generous suggestion of American action. Even that much was merely the expression of a personal opinion,

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based upon the precedent of the terms approved by Congress in the funding of the British debt.

The experience in the cases above referred to would indicate that the only practical means of securing any treaty or international agreement between the United States and a foreign nation under present conditions is through a conference or commission in which one or more Senators, preferably one from each political party, shall be members, which shall meet in Washington, keeping closely in touch with other influential members of the Senate, and which shall not commit itself to any agreement until it has been canvassed with enough members of the Senate to make its approval reasonably certain.

Mr. John W. Davis, in his recent address at Minneapolis as President of the American Bar Association, dwelt upon the destructive effect of the constitutional provision requiring a two-thirds vote in the Senate to the ratification of treaties, and observed: "Nor does it contribute to national influence or prestige or safety that the process of ratifying or rejecting treaties should degenerate into an effort to discover some qualifying formula acceptable to a minority. There is grave danger in forgetting that, whether in matters domestic or foreign, the business of government is to govern."

The League of Nations furnishes adequate and instantly available machinery for the discussion and consideration of questions affecting the peace and stability of the world. But the Senate rejected it.

The Permanent Court of International Justice provides a tribunal of impeccable dignity and independence for the determination of questions between nations susceptible of judicial decision. It is not a substitute for either the League of Nations, such as President Wilson conceived, or for an Association of Nations, such as President Harding conceived. A court provides no machinery for conference and the coöperation of nations "in sublime accord to attain and preserve peace through justice rather than force." A court exists to determine controversies, which have proved incapable of adjustment by diplomatic methods, by the application of rules of law. The purpose of the League of Nations is to provide machinery for averting controversy, through conference and by the force of informed opinion acting upon nations involved in differences. But the adoption of the Permanent Court by the United States will be an earnest of its

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willingness to take some effective step towards a continuous effort to maintain peace by providing a method of settling judicially questions which otherwise might result in war. It is to be hoped that President Coolidge may press the Senate to act and use all the great influence of his office to secure approval of Secretary Hughes' plan for American adhesion to the Court.

The assumption by the Senate of powers of original negotiation of agreements with foreign nations must increasingly interfere with the discharge by the Executive of the powers invested in him by the Constitution.

The practice has been growing. The first significant step was taken in 1871, when Secretary of State Hamilton Fish submitted a proposed treaty with Great Britain to Mr. Sumner, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and asked his opinion concerning it. At the close of the Spanish War, in 1898, President McKinley appointed five Commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace with Spain, three of whom were members of the Senate and of its Committee on Foreign Affairs, a procedure which Mr. Crandall in his work on Treaties says was without precedent.

As above stated, President Harding appointed as members of the Commission to negotiate the refunding, conversion or extension of time of payment of the obligations of foreign governments to the United States, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and a prominent member of the House of Representatives. He also appointed as members of the Commission to negotiate the treaties relating to the limitation of naval armament and the problems of the Pacific, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the leading Democratic member of the Senate.

Despite such conciliatory efforts as the appointment of leading Senators to membership in commissions created to negotiate treaties, as Lord Bryce says in "The American Commonwealth," "the Senate increasingly has exercised its power by refusing to approve treaties negotiated by the President, unless amended as it has prescribed, or with 'reservations' stating its understanding with respect to provisions in the agreement."

The fact is, that the treaty-making machinery of the United States has become so complicated as to be almost unworkable. Only by the exercise of great powers of conciliation or of domination by the President, or by awakening and directing upon the

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Senate a vigorous public opinion, can any progress be made in international relations. A body of ninety-six men of such diverse characteristics and opinions as the members of the Senate is almost hopeless as an executive force. But it is ideal for purposes of obstruction. If the United States is to move forward in helpful coöperation with the other nations of the world towards the attainment of international peace, it will only be through the expression of a widespread and strongly expressed public opinion, which the Senate may apprehend is to be translated into votes.

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VERSAILLES—BEFORE AND AFTER

By Kepi

I

A FEW weeks ago M. Clemenceau is said to have remarked, "Everybody says that Wilson, Lloyd George and I are responsible for all the troubles of the world today. It is not true. The only thing the matter is that we made the Treaty of Versailles twenty-five years too soon." Now that it looks as if the Paris settlement had largely broken down, it is worth while to examine whether there is not something in what M. Clemenceau says. Such an examination may at any rate give us a hint as to why things have gone so badly since 1919, and as to the foundations on which we must build in the future.

It is not possible, however, to get a true perspective without first considering how peace was maintained before the war. For until we have some idea of the merits and demerits of the pre-war system we cannot judge fairly of what was done at Paris.

From the failure of the pretensions of the Holy Roman Empire, or more exactly from the overturning of the Roman Empire itself, the world has had no central authority, no constitution, and no law in the real sense of that term. It has consisted of a number of sovereignties, sometimes governed by absolute monarchs, sometimes democratically controlled, entirely independent of one another, and each a law unto itself. The world has been organized, if the word is not a contradiction in terms, on the basis of what Bryce called the state of nature, or in other words on the system of the Jungle. Each state in the last resort has had to rely for its safety, its rights, and the rights of its nationals, not upon an appeal to law, but upon its own physical strength, upon armaments, and upon a diplomacy founded on force. We may not like to admit that this is true. But it is true none the less. It was true before the war. It was true in 1914. It is true today, and if we are to understand anything about the realities of the international problem, it is the first fact to grasp. People are groping about in the dark because they do not start their thinking from the basis of this fact.

In the international Jungle there has never been lasting peace. I doubt if you can find ten consecutive years in the last five hundred without a war of some kind, or a generation in which

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there has not been a fairly serious war, with a general world war every fifty or hundred years. Nevertheless, the Jungle has developed two means of protecting itself from the worst effects of chronic lawlessness. One method has been for either a single state or a combination of the more powerful states to develop such a preponderance of power that nobody else dares make war. The other method has been the creation of a balance of power, whereby two or more groups maintain such an equilibrium that the expense of war and the uncertainty of the outcome act as an effective deterrent.

Both these methods have served to mitigate for a time the chronic fear and ferocity of the international Jungle. They have proved the best means hitherto devised for bringing about a temporary peace in a lawless world. But they have never kept the peace for very long. Old states have declined in power, new states have risen to power, combinations and alliances have begun to disagree, and violence has broken out once more.

Let us now look at the pre-war world in the light of these facts, and let us examine Europe first. The peace was maintained in Europe from 1815 to 1848 by the first method, by the régime of the Holy Alliance; and from 1870 to 1911 (after the warlike and revolutionary transitional period), substantially by the second method, which was inaugurated by Bismarck in order to give newly united Germany time to consolidate its position. During the war it became the fashion to heap unmitigated scorn and abuse upon both the settlement of Vienna and the balance of power. There was nothing too bad to be said about them. Yet the fact remains that they were the means of preserving peace in Europe for thirty and forty years respectively. They did so at very considerable cost to human progress. The Holy Alliance system was designed not only to maintain international peace, but to suppress democracy—"to put an end to this system of representative government"—which the absolute emperors, reading from the experience of the French Revolution and its wars, regarded as the root of all evil. Hence it ended in the revolution of 1848. The Bismarckian system was designed not only to stabilize Europe, but to maintain the authority of autocracy and to keep the divided and oppressed nationalities of Central Europe in subjection. So it ended in the Great War. None the less, for all their defects, these methods did prevent war in the European Jungle for a very considerable period of time.

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What of the rest of the world? How was peace preserved there? It was preserved by the first method, applied more intelligently and more benevolently, by two powers, Great Britain and the United States. By 1822 Great Britain had dissociated herself from the European concert which had won the Napoleonic war, because she could not approve of the absolutist policy of the Holy Alliance, and had returned to her policy of isolation. For nearly a century she avoided any permanent political association with Europe and concerned herself with the development and government of the vast possessions which had fallen under her control during the desperate struggles of the Napoleonic era. Throughout the whole of that Empire she has for a century maintained almost uninterrupted peace—the Pax Britannica—and she has introduced good government, law, and some degree of material progress. In more recent times she has encouraged self-government and education, until today the Empire has been officially renamed a Commonwealth of Nations. Yet ultimately the peace and progress of that quarter of humanity which has lived under the British flag has depended upon the strength and efficiency of the British Navy.

The United States has done practically the same thing in a somewhat different way. In 1823 she promulgated the Monroe Doctrine, which was tantamount to a declaration that the affairs of the two Americas were no longer the concern of Europe and that the United States intended to make that declaration effective, if need be, by force. In other words, she enveloped the Americas in a Pax Americana, and (until quite recently in Central America,) it has never been necessary for her to take any steps towards the maintenance of law and order. Yet in this case also the ultimate sanction for the Pax Americana has been the United States Navy.

Thus during the nineteenth century peace was maintained in the world by what may be called three peace systems, the European, the British, and the American. The rest of the world was practically undiscovered or was still inert in the sleep of ages. Each of the three systems was practically self contained. Each was independent of the others. Each rested upon the presence of armed power somewhere—in the case of the American and British systems upon naval power—in the case of Europe, first of all upon the preponderance of power in the hands of four military autocracies leagued together to repress democracy, and

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later upon the balance of power between a powerful Germanic combination and a weaker Franco-Russian alliance.

What was it that broke down the peace of the world, thus maintained for almost a century from 1815, and produced the World War of 1914? The main cause was the shrinking of time and space upon the earth through modern invention, and the discovery by all nations, especially Germany, of the importance to themselves of the rapidly developing resources of the outside world. It had been the discovery of the new world and its resources which had largely precipitated the wars of Spain, France, England, and Holland of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wars which ended in the almost complete triumph of the more liberal and democratic English-speaking civilization. So it was again now.

Bismarck, after 1870, had based his plans for European peace on a Central European bloc—the Triple Alliance of the three great military autocracies, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—which though it did not dominate the whole continent was impregnable against attack, while he kept Russia friendly by dexterous diplomacy and by playing upon the anti-democratic instincts of the Tsar. In order to distract the attention of France and Russia from Germany, he had encouraged the expansion of the one over North Africa and the other to the East. With the fall of Bismarck, however, in 1890, a change set in. William II was ambitious and impetuous. United Germany had effected an immense industrial expansion. The need for raw materials and foreign markets began to be acute. If trade and raw materials had been the only consideration all probably could have been peacefully arranged, for the British Empire was faithful to the system of the "open door." But ahead of trade came the question of power. If peace and Germany's position in Europe both depended upon the maintenance of her relative military and economic strength, was it not necessary that she should have both raw materials and markets under her own control? Bismarck had not cared about these things. But when he went to Hamburg in his old age and saw the shipping, he exclaimed, "We are living in a new world."

William II and his military and economic advisers realized the new situation, but they did not have the practical wisdom of Bismarck. They could see no way of "getting their place in the sun" save through the possession of overwhelming force. They

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allowed Russia's friendship to cool—with the result that in 1893 the Dual Alliance between France and Russia was signed, thus establishing that open rivalry which Bismarck had endeavored to prevent. They strengthened their military armaments. And then they began the final step of trying to create a navy which was to win for them in the outside world what the army of Moltke had won for them in Europe.

By 1904 the world political system that had lasted since 1815 had begun to dissolve. First Great Britain was forced to abandon her traditional isolation. In 1902 she made the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order to prevent the impending struggle between Russia and Japan for the control of Korea and the Far East from spreading into a general war. Then came the Entente with France, which began to become a reality in 1908 when Germany, refusing all compromise during the disarmament negotiations of 1906, formulated her program for not only the largest army but the greatest navy in the world. From that time the competition in armaments steadily increased until by 1914 all Europe was an armed camp, with every army alert to see that it was not caught unprepared. Only a match was needed to start the fire. The match was applied, whether deliberately or accidentally we need not pause to inquire, and all Europe was ablaze. Within a few days the whole British political system was involved. Within two and a half years the conflagration had spread so far and the result appeared so much in doubt that the third great political system, the American, was forced to intervene in order that the political ideals upon which its own society was based might survive. By 1918 practically every country in the world was at war, and not until then did the war end with the complete triumph of the Allies.

II

How did the Paris Conference deal with the problems left to it by the Allied victory? In two ways. On the one hand it tried to resettle Europe so that the internal causes of war in that distracted continent should be reduced to a minimum. On the other hand it attempted to prevent a repetition of the catastrophe of 1914 by creating a new political method for handling international problems.

So far as Europe was concerned, the peace settlement was substantially determined by the attitude of the three powers

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and the three men predominant at Paris. President Wilson naturally set out to apply to Europe so far as he could the ideas and methods which had been successfully applied to the problems of America, the ideas embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the liberal political traditions of the English-speaking world. Mr. Lloyd George was in general sympathy with the American program, but owing to the fact that Great Britain had been actively engaged in dealing with international problems for centuries and was the center of a world-wide Commonwealth, he had a clearer sense of the practical difficulties in the way. M. Clemenceau entered the conference with but little faith in the practical efficacy of the Wilsonian program and a firm conviction that the only way of solving the European problem was to have the military and naval preponderance on one's own side.

The result, of course, was a compromise. It is important, however, to realize the nature of the compromise. In permanent fundamentals the Anglo-Saxon program, as it was often called in Paris, prevailed. But large temporary concessions were made to war passion and to the traditional European point of view, concessions which were to be gradually eliminated as a better international order was developed in later years.

The fundamentals of the settlement were these: The frontiers of Europe were to be drawn on the basis of nationality; every nationality was to be given independence; minorities were to be protected; democracy was to be the basis of government; conscription was to be abolished among the enemy powers, as the first step towards its abolition everywhere; and discrimination in the matter of railway and river rates was to be forbidden.

It was impossible, however, to expect the nations of Europe immediately after a four years' war in which ten million men had been killed and tens of millions more had been wounded or starved or injured, to advance instantly to perfect harmony and peace. It took ten years for the United States to return to normal conditions of political life after the Civil War, and the two most extreme reconstruction measures were passed over the veto of the responsible executive of the nation. The treaties of Paris, therefore, contained a number of temporary provisions, designed to insure Germany's performance of her obligations and justified by the exceptional conditions of the time. The most important of these were the provisions relating to the

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military occupation of the Rhineland, the administration of the Saar Valley, certain of the economic clauses, and the arrangements about reparations. The cumulative effect of these features of the treaty was very stiff. But the settlement contained within itself the remedy for nearly all the extreme features —provided it had been carried out in the spirit in which it had been conceived. The occupation of Germany and of the Saar was to be terminated in fifteen years, and the Reparation Commission was instructed not only to assess Germany's liability under the terms of the treaty but also to estimate her capacity to pay, and to advise the Allies accordingly.

There are few people really acquainted with the facts who do not recognize that this settlement of Europe was substantially as good as could have been expected in the circumstances. There are some blemishes in the permanent features, notably in the case of the Tyrol. There were objectionable features in the temporary settlement. But in the main the settlement was sound. It gave Europe incomparably the best basis for unity and reconstruction it had ever known and the defects were such as could have been remedied in later years by peaceful agreement had the vision of a new and better international order been realized.

But the European settlement was only one-half of the peace settlement. The other was the League of Nations. The fundamental idea of the League in the minds of its founders was simple. To them the root of the evil of the pre-war system had been secret diplomacy, aggressive imperialism, the balance of power, and militaristic ambition promoted by autocratic cliques. Moreover, if Europe was to be settled on the basis of self-determination, some method of association was essential. So the Covenant of the League of Nations was drawn up to secure two principal ends. In the first place it provided against the restoration of the old system of competitive diplomacy by bringing all nations together in an assembly, and the leading powers in a council, in order that all international problems which involved the risk of international disturbances should be considered from a collective standpoint. In the second place it provided against the risk of war by requiring each of its members to permit inquiry for a period of at least three months into any dispute with another member, before it started warlike operations, and obliging all members to take action against any member which violated this rule. In addition, the League was

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given certain supervisory and administrative functions of a minor character.

This alternative system to the old diplomacy was doubtless a compromise. It is an open secret that Mr. Lloyd George thought that it was too ambitious and that he would have preferred a looser form providing mainly for regular international conferences and that M. Clemenceau, having no sea frontier to protect France, thought it was too weak because it did not provide for a military combination strong enough to overawe Germany in perpetuity. What Mr. Wilson really thought nobody knows, for it was his task as the principal protagonist of the idea to champion his own child. But we need not now pause to consider whether the plan was good or bad. The central fact today is that the attempt, the first attempt ever made, to substitute for the older methods which before had always ended in a world war an international system based on collective conference between all nations and collective action against impetuous war, has broken down. Successful as much of the work of the League is, it is patently not functioning as the universal clearing house of all international problems and as the machinery for nursing Europe back to unity and peace. Three of the greatest powers in the world are not in the League, and it is upon the extreme and temporary clauses and not the permanent features of the settlement that the political system of Europe at the moment rests. What is the reason for this failure to realize the expectations of 1919?

Some people explain the failure by attributing blindness or malice to the framers of the treaties. Others attribute it to the action of Mr. Lloyd George in inflating the reparations demands on Germany to an impossible height, in order to fulfil election pledges, thus making it impossible for the Allies to reduce their demands on Germany to any figure which Germany could pay and thereby forcing Germany to ruin her currency and move steadily to default. Others attribute it to the action of the United States in withdrawing from all association with the rest of the world, with the result that the Reparation Commission was never able to fulfil its functions, that the League of Nations was deprived of half its influence for peace, and that interallied debts could not be considered, which was an essential ingredient in any reparations settlement. Others again urge that Germany alone is to blame because she made no effort to fulfil the treaty or pay reparations and because her weak government and her strong

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industrialists have been playing a deliberate game of international sabotage from the start. Others put all the blame on France on the ground that she never really wanted the peace as drawn, and sought the earliest moment to use the treaty and her military power to break up Germany or at least to establish a permanent military strangle-hold over her.

I am not concerned to consider whether any of these accusations are true. No doubt there is some truth in all of them. But if you come to consider it, they none of them deal with the fundamental cause of the state of affairs in which we now stand. We are suffering from something deeper, which is the ultimate cause of all these effects.

The fundamental assumption which underlay the Wilsonian program and most of the idealism of the latter part of the war was that the point of view of nations towards one another had changed. It was a "war to end war," to abolish the "old order" with its secret diplomacy, balance of power, reliance on armaments and so on. It was a people's war, and the people were determined to do away with the bad old ways, to destroy the sinister and malignant forces which separated them and to live in peace and harmony together for the future. This assumption was an utter delusion, in the sense that the people never understood what the war slogans really implied and had never made up their minds to stand for them. They had understood what political freedom meant and what democracy meant; but the rest was a vague aspiration. They had no real idea how war was to be ended or the bad old ways abolished, and during the war they gave no thought to the subject. Hence, directly the war was over, every one of the peoples returned to its pre-war point of view. Not a single nation was willing to abate a single iota of its absolute independence. Not a single nation made a single voluntary sacrifice of what it regarded as its own vital, separate, national interest. Where other people's affairs were concerned, idealism had some scope; but where a nation's own essential interests were concerned, none was voluntarily given. Whether it was a question of disposing of territory, or of colonies, or of oil rights, or of coal, or of reparations, or of interallied debts, or of German ships or cables, the story was exactly the same. Every nation, whether great or small, whether advanced or backward, stood unyielding for its own political and economic security and was ready to make no sacrifice that it could possibly avoid.

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This indeed was inevitable so long as every nation had to rely upon itself for its security and future. How could one nation be expected to yield vital assets to another nation, which might use them against it? Nobody had pointed out that, if nations were to end war, secret diplomacy and armament manufacturers and imperialists and international financiers and the other bogeys of the political platform were not the only forces to be combatted, but even more the fact that people wanted to be completely independent, completely self-contained—to go on living, in fact, in an international Jungle, where neither right nor law nor coöperation prevailed; so back to the Jungle we have all gone. Some nations have chosen an isolation which tries to ignore their neighbors. Some have chosen an isolation which involves hatred of their neighbors. Some were for a feeble form of coöperation because they hoped thereby to mitigate some of the inevitable consequences of the return to international Jungle life. But they have, one and all, voted for a return to the Jungle. And this failure to maintain any sort of genuine coöperation, and not the mistakes of the peace makers, is the fundamental reason why peace is not with us and why we have not lived up even to the moderate beginnings made at Paris.

M. Clemenceau was right. The Three were twenty-five years ahead of their times.

III

If the dreams of the idealists of 1919 of a "new and better international order" have failed, where are we going? It is perfectly obvious that we are moving as rapidly as we can back to the system which preserved the peace of the world during the nineteenth century.

The United States already has practically reached that point. The Monroe Doctrine is once more the head and front of American foreign policy. Conferences have been held to endeavor to strengthen Pan-American solidarity. Entanglement with Europe has not a single friend.

Exactly the same process has been going on with the British Commonwealth, though not so rapidly. There is a steady movement back towards the policy of isolation. Just as was the case a century ago, Great Britain is finding it difficult to coöperate in the policy of any of the continental powers, and she and the Dominions are becoming preoccupied once more with the affairs

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of their enormous Commonwealth. The process is delayed because the economic restoration of Europe is of paramount importance to Great Britain in order to relieve her million and a half unemployed, and because, owing to her obligation to pay her debt to the United States, she is being driven to demand an equivalent in reparations from Germany. Her detachment from Europe may never be so complete as it was during the last century. But the process in that direction is steadily taking place none the less.

Thirdly, France has completely abandoned the permanent basis of the Versailles settlement. The real basis of that settlement was the combination between France, the United States and Great Britain, embodied in the Treaty of Guarantee. So long as France had the guarantee of the United States and Great Britain and could count on their assistance in obtaining reparations, she was at the same time secure from German aggression and could afford to be moderate towards Germany and even to contemplate the abolition of the extremer features of the treaty at the end of fifteen years. Her confidence was badly shattered by the rejection by the United States of the treaties. France nevertheless carried on for a while with Great Britain. But by May, 1922, she had come to the conclusion that Great Britain was more concerned with the restoration of world trade than with reparations or with the security of France; she overturned M. Briand, who stood for coöperation; and she placed in power M. Poincaré, who stood for independent action.

M. Poincaré's policy was simple. The first step was to get rid of the Entente, in fact if not in name—that is to say, to free France from the necessity of securing the coöperation of Great Britain in every act against Germany. So he repudiated the draft of the Lloyd George-Briand Cannes agreement, which proffered a moderate settlement of the reparation question in return for a renewal of the British guarantee against German aggression; he blocked in every possible way the success of the Genoa Conference; and he jumped at Mr. Bonar Law's statement that Great Britain could not march into the Ruhr, but would raise no opposition to France going in alone if she wished to do so. His second step was to establish a strangle-hold over Germany by the seizure of the Ruhr, so as to make France, for the time being, militarily paramount in Europe.

We have, therefore, come full circle back to the pre-war world

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system. The United States and the British Empire are once more practically independent political systems, maintaining a Pax Americana and a Pax Britannica of their own, while Europe is stabilized, not by a balance of power, but by the military preponderance of the French army and the armies of the Little Entente in alliance with France. The world is once more temporarily stabilized by the only stabilizing methods known to the Jungle.

But there are two fundamental differences between the system today and the system which stabilized the world during the nineteenth century. The first of these is that the primary cause which upset the nineteenth century system and produced the World War is operating more strongly today than ever. The world is still shrinking in terms of time and space, and access to its raw materials and markets is of increasing importance to all the great powers. We can see the consequence of this in the Washington treaties. The British and American political systems were no longer able to remain in political isolation. They had to find a basis upon which to live together in a shrunken world, and the basis they found was fundamentally that of the balance of power—expressed in the arrangement that there should be no competitive naval armaments, though in other matters there should be complete independence between the two systems. Then, again, Japan had to be provided for. The Washington treaties did this by a naval agreement which made it impossible for the Japanese or American fleets to attack one another without long delay, but on the understanding that Japan refrained from attempting to establish her political or economic domination over China. We can see the change illustrated also in the fact that the United States, while politically detached from the non-American world, is becoming increasingly concerned to find markets abroad for her food stuffs, cotton, and mass production products, and in turn to make sure of the supplies of rubber, sugar, nitrates, fibres, and oil which she has to purchase abroad. Finally, the British Commonwealth is finding it very difficult, for reasons already given, to disentangle itself from European complications as easily as it did a century ago. All these facts constitute the first breach in the nineteenth century world system. The isolation of the main groups is nothing like as great as it was. They have each had to make agreements with the others in order to arrive at a basis for

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stability. And it is only a question of time before a similar basis for contact with Europe will be made in order to solve the still unsettled problems of reparations, interallied debts, and armaments. For the Poincaré method, if it gives France security for the time being, is lowering the general economic life of the world, as everybody will find out ere long.

The second great difference between the system today and that existing before the war is the instability of Europe. Europe was stabilized by the Holy Alliance and by the Bismarckian system. Nobody can think she is stabilized today. Look at the facts. A century ago France next to Russia had the largest population of any country in Europe. Now she stands numerically fourth on the continent. Russia, Germany and Italy are all more populous, and their populations are increasing while France's is falling off. She cannot permanently rely upon the black army from Africa to make up the difference. The occupation of the Ruhr and the support of the Little Entente enable her to coerce Germany for the time being, but her continued success depends upon certain factors over which she has no control. First, she must have the acquiescence of Italy and Russia. Either of them can in time convert her preponderance into a balance of power, and then Germany can revive. Second, the Little Entente must continue to be dominant in Eastern Europe. That also is uncertain. The action of either Italy or Russia, or a national revival in Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria may bring about a change in this respect. Third, Germany must not fall into such chaos as to become an economic menace to the rest of the world. Fourth, there must be no national revival of Germany such as to enable her to repeat her success of a century ago.

Surely it is manifest that Europe has not reached stability under the Poincaré régime. And it will not be stabilized until there is developed a system in which Italy and Russia, to say nothing of Germany, have a place comparable to their fundamental importance and strength—until there is a true balance of power, or something approaching a League or federation of the European states.

IV

It must be obvious to everybody that the world is neither politically nor economically stable today. The attempt made in 1919 to create a new and better international system has broken

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down. Armaments have never been so immense as they are today. International hatred or indifference, not international brotherhood, are the rule. Yet is there any real prospect of permanently stabilizing the world on the basis of the American system of isolation, the British system of isolation, and the continued predominance of France or the creation of a new balance of power in Europe? There does not seem to be any such prospect. The world has become too small. Its common interests are too interwoven. The old system does nothing to regulate that cut throat competition between the great industrial states for world markets and world supplies, which is the chief menace to peace in the present age. The Washington treaties and the still unsettled condition of Europe prove that the method of dividing the world into three water-tight peace systems will no longer work, and that agreement in some form must supersede isolation. The condition of Europe will require international action ere long, in order to stabilize world trade. In any case, 1914 proved that the old method, if it preserved peace for a time, only ended in engulfing the whole world in a world war.

Can we, then, go back to the ideas of the Paris peacemakers? In twenty-five years, as M. Clemenceau believes, perhaps. Today, no. The nations are not yet ready for international coöperation on Wilsonian lines. The League of Nations can and will do much to help peace, but it cannot yet stabilize the world, partly because all the great powers are not in it, and many of the small ones were in it for their own advancement, and partly because it has no "teeth." The League will come into its own in time. But for the present we must look elsewhere for the fundamental guarantee of peace. The power of the League today is influence, and as George Washington said, "Influence is not government."

If, then, neither the pre-war system nor the 1919 system will work, what can be done to stabilize the Jungle? Gradually, no doubt, the quiet forces of international good-will will break down the fears and prejudices that keep nations apart today. But neither good-will nor treaties of a temporary kind deal with the fundamental point. They do not give security or assure peace, even for a time. If the nations cannot find peace in unity, they have still to rely upon force. Is there any power which can give the world that stability which before the war the United States gave to the Americas, Great Britain gave to the British Common-

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wealth, and the system of the balance of power gave to Europe, but which these three methods, used separately, cannot give today? I think there is.

The transcendent need of the world is protection from the risk of sudden war. It is not malignity so much as the fear of sudden attack which keeps alive international hatred and suspicion, which drives nations to multiply armaments, to seize strategic points, to demand supplies of raw materials under their own control, to enter into alliances and combinations, to start preventive wars, to rely upon the balance of power,—and which means that every local war, like a forest fire, tends to spread. If that fear could be eliminated or at least diminished the whole face of the international skies would be changed. Nations, for the first time, could begin to look at one another reasonably. They could afford to consider some agreed basis for the limitation of armaments. They could afford to admit that some form of enquiry or conference or mediation should precede a declaration of war.

Is there anything in the history of the growth of the reign of law which throws some light on how this could be accomplished? When the feudal barons in England and Europe were beginning to make life miserable by their quarrels, what happened? The king, acting for the community, began to amass sufficient strength to enable him to insist that the internecine war should cease. Little by little, and long before any effective reign of law was set up, he was able to force the quarrelsome lords to desist and come to his courts, and little by little a system of justice and a police system was built up, which gave peace and justice to the land. Is it not conceivable that by the same means it may be possible to introduce the beginnings of stable peace in the international Jungle?

It is primarily a question of power. Is there any such which could be used for purposes of international police? Is not sea power precisely suited to this? It cannot be used to seize territory. It cannot be used to destroy independence. It can only be used effectually when all the leading sea powers unite to use it. Sea power, too, has been the sanction behind the two most successful peace systems of modern times, the Pax Americana and the Pax Britannica. Admiral Mahan once said, "The function of force is to give moral ideas time to take root." May not sea power be the means of preventing sudden war and so of giving the moral idea of peace and brotherhood among nations time to take root?

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There is no doubt that the leading nations, by making it dangerous or unprofitable for any nation to embark on sudden war, could, if they used their sea power resolutely for the purpose, stabilize the world enough to prevent another general war and to stop or localize minor conflicts. In so doing they could count on the support of the other nations, as the number interested in keeping the peace is always overwhelmingly greater than the number interested in starting a war.

Sea power does not threaten the independence of any people. All it can do with success is the work of the policeman. The primary function of the policeman is not to decide upon the merits of a dispute but to stop the fighting in the streets because fighting, besides being a bad way of solving questions, does damage to the community as well as to the belligerents. If you can find a means of preventing or at least delaying war, it is not so difficult to find a means of settling a dispute reasonably and wisely by diplomacy or arbitration or in some other way. The trouble today is that in the excitement of the controversy one side or the other begins to think it can either avoid defeat or secure better terms by resorting to immediate violence, and that there is nobody to prevent it from doing so.

Take the case of the recent Greek-Italian dispute. What really ought to have happened there was this: The navies of all the other powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, etc.—should have proceeded instantly to the Mediterranean and said, "We are not here to decide on the merits of this dispute, of which we know nothing. But we do know that if you start fighting some of the shots are likely to come into our back yard, and further that the dispute is likely to spread first through the Balkans, and then through Europe, and then through the world. So we are here to see that no fighting takes place for three months, during which there shall be an impartial inquiry into the facts. At the end of that period, we may have some opinion about the merits of the case. Your own public opinion will be better informed than it is now, and you will probably agree to settle matters peacefully. In any event we shall have had time to make arrangements which will prevent your quarrel from damaging your neighbors and spreading over the rest of the world."

That, it seems to me, is a perfectly feasible thing to do—provided the nations once make up their minds that the greatest

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enemy not only to peace but to freedom and to economic prosperity is war and even rumors of war. Moreover, sea power is far more effective than might first appear to restrain a land power contemplating war. No country engaged in hostilities can afford to have its supplies interrupted by the concerted action of its neighbors. It knows that in the long run sea power is decisive. If by its precipitate conduct in making war, without inquiry, it incurs the common hostility of the civilized world—not on the merits of the dispute but as an international brawler—it is certain eventually to lose. If in July, 1914, sea power had been unanimously mobilized to insist on conference, there would have been conference and not war on August 1st. If sea power had been unanimously mobilized against Germany after the invasion of Belgium, she would have undertaken to evacuate it after the battle of the Marne. Even the present tangle in Europe would be infinitely more easy of solution if France knew that sea power would be immediately mobilized if Germany threatened war. What makes the policeman effective is not his truncheon, but the knowledge that the power which he represents is irresistible. If he is overwhelmed, behind him stands the rest of the police force, the army and in the last resort the whole body of the citizenry. It is the same with sea power. It is not very terrible at first but, as Admiral Mahan points out, it is ultimately invincible. It is not brutal. It is not destructive. But when used collectively it invariably prevails.

In conclusion let us look at what will be the inevitable result of drifting backwards or of letting matters go as they are. Nobody would accuse Secretary Hughes of being a militarist. Yet in the most important pronouncement on American foreign policy which he has made so far, his speech before the American Bar Association at Minneapolis on August 30, 1923, he gave his unqualified adherence to the doctrine of "preventive war"—the central doctrine of the German General Staff. He cited Mr. Elihu Root in his support, quoting as a "sound principle" Mr. Root's declaration that "it is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilization of an army by another power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other power may be in its own territory. Yet the country threatened by the state of

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affairs is justified in protecting itself by immediate war. The most common exercise of the right of self-protection outside a state's own territory and in time of peace is the interposition of objection to the occupation of territory of points of strategic military or maritime advantage to the indirect accomplishment of the effect of dynastic arrangement."

We need no expert to tell us where that doctrine leads. It is the primary code of the Jungle. Yet Mr. Hughes is right; so long as we live in the Jungle the law of self-preservation compels us to adopt the methods of the Jungle. Only let nobody pretend that it does not lead straight to war. Moreover, if that is the direction in which the policy of the strongest and most pacific nation in the world is set, what can be expected of peoples less civilized and less protected by natural advantages?

Yet with a slight change of direction the doctrine of preventive war is the key to peace in the Jungle—the preventive war that is waged by the policeman against violence. The civilized nations have in their hands at this moment the means of diminishing the risk and area of war and of creating conditions of comparative stability in which international fear and hate can subside and in which the building up of a true reign of law among the nations can be begun. It is surely worth while to consider whether they cannot find a way of making this policeman do his work.

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GREATER FRANCE

By Henri Hauser

IN THE present condition of the world one would obtain a false, or at any rate a very incomplete, notion of the power of any of the great European nations if one considered only its European territory, population and resources. If the United States constitutes a single territorial unit (and this, strictly speaking, is no longer true since the acquisition of Alaska, the annexation of Hawaii, and the events of the Spanish War), if pre-war Russia had in place of colonies vast territories that happened to be contiguous to the original domain of the Czars, the British Isles, on the other hand, are not in themselves a world power—it is the British Empire which is a world power.

The same is true of France. An American, accustomed to a conception of space and numbers very different from that of the European miscrocosm, might well be surprised at the place in the world which a nation possessing a territory of only 550,000 square kilometers and with a population which barely reaches 40,000,000, continues to hold. No matter how great the prestige of French civilization or the moral and intellectual value of the French individual, the material basis on which French power is constructed would be singularly meagre if it included only France in Europe. In the face of such giants as the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the reorganized Russia of tomorrow, European France would count for little.

I. TERRITORIES

But there is a greater France. To obtain an exact idea of the place which France occupies on this planet, an effort must be made to see as one unit all the territories which are French. With the old France these territories form what our forebears called—and the word for them had not the sinister connotation which has since been given it—the French Empire.[1]

The lack of complete geodetic data makes it difficult to state

[1]One reason why it is difficult to visualize this Empire is that its management is divided among several different authorities. Algeria is almost directly under the Central Administration. Tunisia and Morocco for diplomatic reasons are administered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Only the other protectorates and colonies come directly under the authority of the Minister of the Colonies. For this reason comprehensive statistics concerning the French Empire as a whole are difficult to obtain. Furthermore, in this article we leave out of account certain mandated territories.

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the exact size of the French Empire. It may be said, however, that it covers between 10 and 12 million square kilometers, that is to say a greater area than that of the United States. France, the historical cradle of the French Empire, does not constitute a twentieth part of this whole.

Of course, all these vast territories are not of equal value. Some contain deserts or great semi-arid plains, as for instance the Sahara, which is thrust in between Algeria and French West Africa. There are equatorial lands where forests and thick undergrowths offer even greater obstacles to the free movement of men than do the dunes and stony plateaus of the deserts. But aside from the privileged lands of France in Europe, where human beings during thousands of years have labored to perfect the handiwork of nature, Greater France also includes Berber Africa, where in the past have flourished the brilliant civilizations of Carthage, Rome, and Arabia. And it includes the Indo-Chinese delta, a land admirably suited to the task of sustaining great masses of human beings and in which the cultural movements of China and India have met.

The various segments of Greater France, like those of the British Empire, are scattered throughout the world. This is a cause of much inconvenience. Between Marseilles and Saïgon or Tamatave, for example, communications are slow and sometimes even precarious. They are even more so between various other parts of the Empire. Only Northern Africa constitutes a group of territories easily accessible to the homeland, being reached within 24 to 28 hours by sea from France's Mediterranean ports.

But this dispersion of territories also has its advantages. The various parts of Greater France have every range of climate. From Guinea to Tonkin, from St. Pierre and Miquelon near the mouth of the St. Lawrence to New Caledonia between Australia and New Zealand, every form of climate is encountered. One leaves the country of wheat for that of millet and rice, the country of flax for that of cotton.

The United States is proud that within her confines sugar beet and sugar cane can both be cultivated; the same is true of the plains of Picardy and of the Antilles and Réunion. In these days of economic struggle between producing peoples, such variety is a source of strength. Some greater empire of which all the component parts were situated in the same latitude would, while

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maintaining a cultural uniformity, possess less economic strength.

One can distinguish three great groups of French territories: First, there is the European-Mediterranean group, composed of the homeland and Northern Africa. In spite of the sea which separates the two portions of this group, they are intimately allied in character. If the dikes of Dunkerque seem separated by a whole world from the palm groves of Biskra, there is but a nuance between Provence and the Algerian littoral. There one finds the same clear sky over the same brown and green plains. With Gaul itself must be considered another Gaul of 700,000 square kilometers lying just across the Mediterranean.

Secondly, there is the territorial group of Western and Equatorial Africa, containing in all 8,000,000 square kilometers of plain and forest, a land of intense heat and heavy rains, of mighty rivers.

Thirdly, there is Indo-China, covering 700,000 square kilometers (about equal to Northern Africa), including little explored or exploited regions in the interior. This is a country of monsoons, of deltic low-lands of extraordinary fertility. It is through the possession of Indo-China that France has become one of the great powers of the Pacific.[2]

In addition to these three main groups, mention must be made of various subsidiary territories, among them the Island of Madagascar, which is greater than France itself (592,000 square kilometers) and which by reason of its position close to South Africa has a rich future. Then there are all the little colonies, the islands and islets sown across the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific on the route from Sydney to Panama, besides one of the Guianas in America and certain of the Antilles.

II. POPULATION

What of the population which all these territories support?

It is difficult to reply to this question precisely. Though the censuses are taken in France with due regard for the standards of modern statistical methods, though the same standards are reasonably well adhered to in the case of Algeria, and perhaps even of Tunis, they cannot be said to apply to the statistics collected in French Morocco, certain sections of which are not completely pacified while others are governed through native

[2]That fact seems to have been forgotten at first by some of the negotiators at the Washington Conference. The maps of the Pacific made at that time in America did not go in a westerly direction beyond 110 degrees east, and thus failed to show Indo-China.

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chiefs who have not the slightest interest in census taking. In Indo-China the census does not consider the individual but the taxpayer, *i.e.*, the family unit; only by empirical calculation can one arrive at a figure of population. In the case of tropical Africa, the statistics available are based on hypothetical estimates, which are arrived at by striking a mean between the exaggerated reports of enthusiastic travelers who have visited over-crowded villages and who are inclined to argue from the part to the whole, and those of pessimists who have chanced upon districts ravaged by former wars and present epidemics.

No longer are all the great French cities in France. To the fifteen cities of France proper which have over 100,000 inhabitants there must now be added Algiers, Oran, Tunis, Marrakech, Casablanca, Hanoi, and the Chinese suburbs of Saïgon.

There would be small error in adding to the forty million French of Europe over fifty million other people who live under the French flag. Let us set down, then, that Greater France consists of *twelve million square kilometers of territory and contains about a hundred million inhabitants*. Let us remember that Greater France, with an area considerably exceeding that of the American Union, has a somewhat smaller population. Numerically, however, the two are comparable.

But what of the differences existing between the different groups of these hundred million people?

I do not need to dwell on the 40,000,000 who live in Europe, and who, unfortunately, propagate their race very slowly.[3]

Turning to the rest, it is first necessary to classify separately the million Europeans who have settled in Northern Africa. They are not all French. There are important contingents of Spaniards and Italians among them. Even among those classified as French are included persons who have been naturalized and their children. But these different Mediterranean elements, if we except, perhaps, the Italians of Tunis, soon become French through the influence of the schools and the processes of civic life. Thus, less than one hundred years after the landing of the French at Algiers (July 4, 1830), we see the formation of a North African people of European origin but of French culture, just as

[3]The recovery of Alsace and of part of Lorraine has approximately compensated France for the losses in population caused by the war. It should be noted that the rate of increase among the population of French descent settled in Algeria is greater than it is among the French in France.

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the people of the United States, in spite of its mixed origin, bears the Anglo-Saxon imprint.

Side by side in Northern Africa with this population which bears the French stamp there lives a non-European white population. Of the ten million Mussulman natives of Northern Africa, the great majority are white and of Berber and Arab origin. The former practice of keeping domestic slaves, who were recruited in the Sudan, introduced black elements and caused cross-breeding. But on the whole this is a group whose civilization, although perhaps inferior to ours, nevertheless has attained a very fair development. The Islamic civilization of Northern Africa was one of the most brilliant of the Middle Ages—as the buildings of Kairouan and Tlemcem and of the Moroccan cities prove.

Indo-China, with a population totaling somewhat under 20,000,000, is peopled chiefly by Annamites, who in the delta lands attain a density of from two to three thousand per square kilometer. Like all of the yellow peoples, the Annamites possess a civilization which, although it differs radically from ours, is highly developed and boasts great refinement, and which it is our task to help develop further without there being any question of destroying or brutally assimilating it. In Cambodia, we find among the Khmers an outpost of the civilization of India. Madagascar, with 3,000,000 inhabitants, is still almost a deserted world, principally peopled by Malays. Further, there must be included a very few Creoles, Metis, and French negroes settled in the older colonies.

To complete our enumeration we must mention the twenty million negroes in Western and Equatorial Africa, who are of widely varying race, culture and capacity for progress. Those of the Sudanese desert and plain are converts to Islam, but to a deformed Islam, adapted to primitive mentalities and very different from the Islam of North Africa.[4] This mass of twenty million people whom it is necessary to protect from the ravages of internecine warfare, of slavery, of famine, of alcoholism, and of dangerous plagues, are to be considered as chiefly fitted for husbandry, and as a reserve of military manpower which should be tapped only with discretion.

[4]The effect of Christian missionaries on these populations, useful though it is from a humanitarian standpoint, is of little significance from that of religion. It is necessary to guard against enthusiastic statistics of conversions.

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III. RESOURCES

If Greater France, isolated suddenly from the rest of the world, were obliged to live on its own resources, could it do so?

Let us first consider foodstuffs.

GRAINS

European France before the war was essentially a wheat growing country, coming after the United States and Russia but almost ranking with India. Her production of wheat in some years was close to one hundred million metric quintals. The invasion of 1914, affecting as it did the regions in which the highest yield per hectare was obtained, caused a marked falling off in production. But the situation has so improved since 1918 that wheat production this year was well over 75,000,000 quintals. To this production must be added the steadily increasing output of Northern Africa. Even before the war, Algiero-Tunisian wheat furnished 30 per cent of all French imports of this product. In 1923, the Algierian crop is estimated as having been ten million quintals (of which five will go to France), while the crops of Morocco and Tunisia together equaled another ten millions.

French and North African Wheat Production, 1923

	Quintals
France	78,000,000
Algeria	10,000,000
French Morocco	7,100,000
Tunisia	2,500,000
Total	97,600,000

North African Barley Production, 1923

Algeria	7,500,000
French Morocco	7,100,000
Tunisia	1,700,000
Total	16,300,000

With this help from North Africa and the added potentialities of Annam, Greater France is in course of again becoming one of the leading producers of wheat, and it is even possible to foresee the time when she will be an exporter of this product. Already, in so far as barley is concerned (particularly brewery barley), Northern Africa meets all French requirements.[5]

[5]The production of rye, the cereal of poor countries, is diminishing both in France and in Northern Africa.

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At present an importer of maize, France will in increasing degree add to her insufficient production the excess arising from her colonies. The total French requirements of this cereal are in the neighborhood of 2,000,000 tons.

Production of Maize

	Metric Tons
French production	300,000
Forecast of Indo-Chinese production	960,000
" Madagascar production	112,000
" West African production	250,000
" North African production	130,000
Total	1,752,000

French Indo-China is becoming more and more important as one of the great world producers of rice, ranking in this respect immediately after British India. In spite of an enormous local consumption, Indo-China possesses large quantities of rice for export. Saïgon is, after Rangoon, the greatest rice exporting center in the world.

Indo-Chinese Rice

	Area of Fields, Hectares
Cochin China	3,000,000
Annam	1,300,000
Tonkin and Cambodia	700,000
Total	5,000,000

The average production of these fields is 5,000,000 metric tons. Exports in 1921 were 1,720,000 tons; in 1922 they were 1,260,000 tons. But Indo-China is not the only rice producer. Madagascar and Western Africa are also cultivators of this product.[6]

MEATS

The question of a meat supply is one which the war put before France in entirely new terms. French herds have considerably decreased, the while consumption has increased. The import of frozen meats, which it was planned should permit the reconstitution of the French herds on a pre-war basis, was quickly stopped by the fall in value of the franc. As for deliveries from Germany, they have been insufficient both in quantity and

[6]A note should be added about vegetables and fruits, particularly of the hothouse variety. Like the specialized sections of Southern France, Algeria and Tunisia have obtained important markets for the sale of these products, especially in London. Mention must also be made of the dates exported from the Saharan oases and of the tropical and exotic fruits exported from various colonies. A more rational method of cultivation and a better commercial organization would permit greatly increased production of bananas, pineapples, etc. Vanilla is produced in Réunion.

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quality. Nevertheless, thanks to the activity of the French breeders, the herds, particularly insofar as cattle are concerned, are gradually approaching pre-war levels.[7]

French Herds

	Millions of Heads		
	Cattle	*Sheep*	*Swine*
1913	15.	16.5	7.5
1916	12.7	12.	4.5
1923	13.5	8.7	5.

But it is particularly the colonies which have seen their herds increase. Indo-China possesses at least one million and a half head of oxen, and as many buffaloes. In Madagascar, the oxen number not less than eight million (compared with four million in 1904), and there are more than five million head in Western Africa in spite of an epidemic which destroyed fifty per cent of the herds. Northern Africa has sufficient for her needs and in addition (chiefly through Morocco's one and a half million head of cattle) is able to export a surplus. In respect to sheep, both Northern Africa (with at least 15,000,000 head) and Indo-China are excellently situated. Swine are especially abundant in Indo-China (more than 2,600,000 head), and in Madagascar (more than a million head).

These resources in live stock, which are capable of considerable development, are the origin of a whole series of problems. There are the problems, for example, of furnishing supplies to France, of organizing a general export trade (from Madagascar to the southeast coast of Africa, for instance, or from Indo-China to Hongkong, Singapore, and the Philippines), and of constructing and developing refrigerating plants in Madagascar, Western Africa, Morocco, and even in Indo-China, so as to be able to supply the French market from regions where the exchange question plays an unimportant part.

SUGAR

French beet sugar production totaled before the war 780,000 metric tons per annum. Despite the reconstruction of the destroyed factories of the Pas de Calais, the present figure does

[7]No mention is made of fisheries. To those of European France must be added: Northern Africa (particularly Tunisia), Western Africa (the Arguin bank), Indo-China (particularly Lake Tonlé-Sap in Cambodia). Finally to the fish caught along the French coasts must be added those which the French fishermen catch off Iceland and Newfoundland, which are afterwards dried and salted in France. This fishing has given birth to an active canning industry.

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not exceed 500,000 tons per annum, to which colonial cane sugar production adds somewhat over a hundred thousand tons. Of total sugar imports of close to 6,000,000 quintals, France receives only 575,000 quintals from her colonies.

WINE, TEA, AND COCOA

In examining these three products we must give special consideration to wines. The wine production of France which totaled eighty million hectolitres in 1875, fell to about 30,000,000 after the plague of phylloxera. It has now risen to an average of between fifty and sixty million hectolitres, including Alsace-Lorraine. The exceptionally fine grape crop of 1922 produced 70,000,000 hectolitres. Outside of Europe, in Algeria and Tunisia,[8] large-scale growers of wine have established themselves, the annual production being between ten and eleven million hectolitres; and Morocco will perhaps before long join these. With this annual production of seventy or eighty million hectolitres the French wine group is by far the most important (even considering only the quantity produced) in the world. Italy produces some fifty million hectolitres. And the whole production of the world is only about a hundred and fifty million hectolitres.

France produces tea in Indo-China. It is estimated that the teas from Indo-China will soon supply all French and North African requirements, which are in the neighborhood of 25,000 tons a year. With respect to coffee, the dominant factor is the practical control of the market by Brazil. The length of time which is required for capital invested in the coffee industry to pay any return (between six and seven years) has hindered the development of the naturally favorable soils for this product which exist in Indo-China, New Caledonia, Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, and Guadeloupe. Cocoa, on the contrary, coming principally from the Antilles and now also from the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Gaboon—without mentioning the mandated territories of Togo and Cameroon—is to be had in sufficient quantities to make the French chocolate industry practically independent of foreign importations.

[8]This industry in Northern Africa is purely French. In Islamic countries the vine is only cultivated for the consumption of grapes as such. It was the phylloxera plague of 1875–1880 which by driving thousands of Languedoc wine growers from the Mediterranean littoral of France to North Africa created this now prosperous industry there.

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TEXTILES

As much cannot be said of the French textile industry. Not only is the French production of wool small (35,000,000 tons in 1913), but, as in all countries of old civilization, the flocks of sheep are decreasing, the decrease in the instance of France having been further aggravated by the war. If in the future the southern portion of Madagascar, the plateau lands of Indo-China, and the Sudan give promise of becoming important as sheep raising centers, for the present the only colonies on which France can draw are those of Northern Africa. And their wool production, between three and four thousand tons, is after all small.

France's most important textile problem involves her supply of cotton, of which she consumes close to two hundred thousand tons per annum. At present, she receives only 10 per cent of this total from her colonies. Nevertheless, two colonial zones are particularly suited to cotton growing—the one Cambodia in Indo-China, where initial efforts in this direction met with instant success, and where since 1921 increasingly important results have been obtained—the other the irrigable basin of the Niger, which is favorable to the cultivation of the Egyptian varieties of cotton. When the development of these two centers is completed, and when to their production is added that of certain other parts of Western Africa and of some plantations in Northern Africa, we can see French territories furnishing sufficient cotton to meet French needs, without mentioning the possibilities of an Indo-Chinese cotton export trade with Japan. This may well occur within ten years. The rise in exchange and the increasing absorption of American cotton by American industries will act as stimulants to production in France's colonies just as the American Civil War acted sixty years ago in India and Egypt.

Today this same factor of exchanges, by interfering with the supply of Far Eastern silks for the silk houses of Lyons has caused France to push the development of French sources of supply. No serious increase can be hoped for in the quantities of raw silk furnished by France proper (the principal source of which are the Cévennes).[9] But Indo-China, which has already planted 8,000 hectares in mulberry trees and which annually

[9]French production of raw silk, which was about 650,000 kilograms in 1908, has fallen to below 200,000. French producers keep first place only in the furnishing of mulberry seeds.

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produces 4,000,000 kilograms of fresh cocoons and 150,000 kilograms of raw silk, proposes to extend the area planted to 36,000 hectares and to raise its production of silk to 1,000,000 kilograms. Arrangements arrived at between the Governor-General of the colony and the Lyons silk houses have further enabled the planting of certain sections of Cochinchina and Cambodia in mulberry trees.

Flax, which in the past France principally imported from Russia, is now cultivated in ample quantities in Tunis and Morocco.

WOOD

The forests of France proper, reduced in the course of centuries, furnished in 1912 only 6,700,000 cubic meters of wood. They suffered enormous damage during the war, through the savage devastation of the enemy as well as by stupid and unsystematic cutting by the Allied armies.[10] But fortunately the colonial reserves are huge. The area of French forest land, which furnishes both common wood and fine woods, may be estimated at 90,000,000 hectares. Our private railway companies and the state railway administration have formed a consortium to obtain their necessary wood supplies from Western Africa.

In considering vegetable oils, we will set aside the olive groves which produce such excellent results in Provence, Lower Languedoc, and the three provinces of Northern Africa. Far more important are the sources of other vegetable oils—ground nuts, palm and copra. The present exports may be estimated at more than 3,000,000 quintals of ground nuts, at 600,000 quintals of almond oil, at 250,000 quintals of palm oil, and at 20,000 tons of copra. These figures are for exports only. But this is only a start. European France was required to import 66 per cent of her vegetable oils from abroad in 1913, but in 1919 only 50 per cent, and in 1922 only 42 per cent. All that is necessary in order practically to eliminate French purchases of such products from abroad is the adoption of scientific methods of production and the development of better transportation facilities.

RUBBER

The rubber resources of the French colonies are considerable. The plantations of Indo-China, together with those of Equatorial

[10]The consumption during the war (exclusive of imports) exceeded 100,000,000 cubic meters.

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and Western Africa and Madagascar, which now produce about 5,000 tons a year, could be made to yield 12,000 tons. But the fall in prices (combined in the case of Indo-China with the rise in value of the piastre), has delayed an increase in production.[11]

MINERALS

If we examine the mineral resources of the French Empire, the first fact we are faced with, of course, is that France herself lacks coal. Even before the war, with production pushed to its utmost limits by engineers and miners, the total output had only reached 40,000,000 tons. German devastation was so successful that, in spite of the efforts made to reconstruct the mines of the Nord and the Pas de Calais, production in 1922 only totaled 33,500,000 tons (not including the Saar output). But Indo-China now has a production which, from 300,000 tons in 1907, has risen to nearly 1,000,000 tons in 1922. It will continue to increase rapidly, since to the surface anthracite deposits at the seaboard must be added further deposits of soft coal which will permit the manufacture of briquettes in Indo-China without the necessity of importing Japanese coal. Indeed, Indo-China has become the chief coal depot for most of the marine commerce of the southwestern Pacific. The Twentieth Mineralogical Congress estimated the Indo-Chinese reserves at 20,000 million tons (a greater reserve than that of France, and two and a half times as great as that of Japan), before the discovery of the soft coal beds. Furthermore, several sections of the colony have not yet been prospected. The abundance of coal in Indo-China is fortunate, as there seems little reason to place great hopes on the other colonies. Madagascar, however, produces graphite, which is used in the construction of electrical furnaces.

We now come to fuel oils. Although the output of the Alsatian wells at Pechelbronn has been raised from 50,000 to 70,000 tons per annum, this is really a very small figure in comparison with the annual consumption. The scattered indications of oil or of schist oil found in France, the total product of the Algerian wells, the expectations founded on Morocco, Madagascar, and Indo-China—all these seem of little importance. It is chiefly outside of her own territories that France must obtain her supplies of

[11]Nevertheless, Indo-Chinese exports of rubber in 1922 totaled 4,500 metric tons, of which 3,000 tons went to France. The plantations cover 33,000 hectares.

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crude oil and gasoline.[12] The iron situation is entirely different. Before the war, the application of the process invented by Thomas Gilchrist to the Lorraine ores made the section of Lorraine which remained French after 1871 (the region of Briey) one of the greatest iron producing centers of Europe. The reconstitution of the Lorraine unit by the re-incorporation in it of the region of Thionville gives it a possible yearly production of 40,000,000 tons of ore.[13] To the above must be added the resources of other French deposits, notably in Normandy, but above all in Northern Africa. Algeria is already an important iron producer, although the greatest beds, those of Ouenza, have just lately been developed. Tunis also produces ore. No exact information concerning Morocco is available. Indo-China, Madagascar, New Caledonia, Western and Equatorial Africa, are all rich in iron ore deposits. As a whole, France is today the most important iron producing country of Europe. She is next to the United States as a world producer. It is because of this great wealth in iron ore that the question of adequate supplies of coal and particularly of metallurgical coke are of such vast importance.[14]

In the matter of other metals, France is less well provided. Nevertheless, aluminum, a discovery of French scientists, continues to be produced in some quantity by France, because of the rich bauxite deposits of Provence and because of the wealth of hydro-electric power available in the French Alps. Outside of Canada nickel is to be found only in New Caledonia. The reserves of this island are estimated at between eight and nine million tons; the annual production is about 100,000 tons. A start has lately been made at treating this substance on the island itself. New Caledonia also possesses considerable deposits of chrome (about 80,000 tons are produced per annum), of cobalt, etc.

[12]We do not consider here France's well-known wealth in hydro-electric power. Furthermore, Northern Africa has an industrial future in this direction. In Equatorial Africa, vegetable oils might furnish motive power to engines direct, or be transformed into hydro-electric energy.

[13]See C. K. Leith: "The World Iron and Steel Situation," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. I, No. 4. Because of the general economic situation and the lack of coke, production in 1922 did not exceed 21,000,000 tons (as against 14,000,000 tons in 1921) for all of the deposits of European France. Lorraine alone is capable of producing 20,000,000 tons.

[14]See Leith article. Recent discoveries of French chemists permit us to consider certain coals of the Pas-de-Calais and the Saar as cokeable. Nevertheless, it will always be necessary to import Westphalian coke and coal.

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The production of copper in France proper is insignificant. Even adding the Algerian production and that of the other colonies, the total is very small, and France remains tributary to the United States for the necessary supplies of this metal. Of all the French domains only the Middle Congo (in the neighborhood of the Belgian basin of Katanga) can be made to produce, after it has been linked with the coast by railroad, in sufficient quantities to meet French needs. In this instance also it is now proposed to treat the ore, at least partially, on the spot.

Zinc is to be found both in Algeria-Tunis and Indo-China; the production of this latter now totals between thirty and forty thousand tons a year. Tin (often mixed with tungsten) is to be found in Tonkin. Lead is mined in the Massif Central and Algeria-Tunis, both regions producing together about 100,000 tons a year. Occasionally this lead is found to have a high admixture of silver.

It is one of the characteristics of the French Empire that it is exceedingly poor in precious metals, particularly in gold. The few French deposits need only be mentioned as curiosities. Guinea produces a minimum of 3,000 kilograms a year; Madagascar occasionally reaches a production of 1,500 kilograms; Indo-China furnishes about 100 kilograms; and Western Africa about 300. No doubt these figures may be increased, but the total will always remain small.

Greater France occupies an interesting position as a producer of phosphates. In 1913 the 300,000 tons produced in European France—particularly in Picardy—were augmented by 2,500,000 tons from Northern Africa and some 200,000 tons produced by the islands of Oceania, thus bringing French production to a total about equaling that of the United States (3,000,000 metric tons). Since the end of the war this latter figure has been exceeded because of the added Moroccan production.

The return of Alsace to France has placed at the disposal of Greater France vast quantities of one of the most important fertilizers, potash. Under the German régime the Alsatian beds were not developed, in order to permit the sale of the poorer product of the *Kalisyndikat*. Thus in 1913 the Alsatian beds did not produce more than 50,000 tons of potash; in 1922 their contribution totaled 210,000 tons.[15]

[15]Salt, which for many centuries constituted the principal mineral riches of France, continues to be produced in quantity in Brittany and Poitou, the Delta of the Rhone, Lorraine and Comté, South Tunisia and Algeria.

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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS EMPIRE

It is not our intention to multiply indefinitely this citing of statistical data.[16] From what we have already said it must be clear that Greater France presents an admirable reservoir of food-stuffs and raw materials.

How is it that the development of all these riches is so little advanced? How is it that French imports from the colonies total (leaving out Northern Africa) but one-tenth of all French imports? How is it that France buys 2,000 tons of cotton from her colonies when they might furnish the 300,000 tons which she requires?

Three things are essential to the development of France's colonies. First, the sinews of development are necessary. In other words, the investment of capital in the colonies, which is now small, will have to be increased very rapidly and in very large amounts—perhaps 4 or 5 milliards of francs would be necessary in one lump sum.[17] Unfortunately, France, absorbed in the urgent work of reconstructing the devastated regions, is not by herself able to float a *Crédit Colonial* in addition to her *Crédit National.* The colonies remain, however, a tempting field for the investors of the rich countries of the world.

In the second place, the development of our colonies is largely a question of transportation. I shall not dwell upon the obvious rôle played by the railroads of European France in linking the regions of the north and east with the Mediterranean and Atlantic seaboards. The railroad is the conqueror of new countries. The fact that a trunk line now links Casablanca and Tunis, thus uniting all sections of Northern Africa, is certainly an accomplishment in which France may take pride. From this main road branches reach far south into the Sahara. Will they before long be linked with roads pushing up from Senegal and the Niger Basin? This dream does not seem utopian since the Sahara was crossed in an automobile-tractor during the past winter, a feat which has completely changed the terms of the problem of a trans-Saharan railroad. In Indo-China, too, we now can foresee the time when there will be rail communications

[16]One might, for example, mention cellulois, pulp, hides and skins, dyes, flower extracts (Provence, Northern Africa, Mascareignes), jute, etc.

[17]See the project of law establishing a general program for the development of the colonies presented to the Chamber by the Minister of Colonies, M. Albert Sarraut (Chamber of Deputies, No. 2449, Annex to the procès-verbal of the Session of April 17, 1921).

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along the entire coast of Annam, from Saïgon to Tonkin, and from there to the Chinese province of Yunnan. Important sections of this future trans-Indochinese road are now in actual operation. Railroads are also being built in Equatorial Africa and in Madagascar. Much work still remains to be done, however, to complete an adequate colonial railway system.

In the third place, it is also of importance that the colonies should be easily able to communicate with France and with each other by sea. The submarine war destroyed 980,000 tons of French shipping. This, together with stoppage of shipping construction during war and the unfair division of the enemy's commercial fleet after the war (particularly in the case of passenger ships), have made inadequate and somewhat precarious the steamship service between France and her colonial ports. Marseilles is too often obliged to buy the vegetable oil products of Dakar at Port Sunlight, just as before the war it was obliged to buy certain Tonkinese woods and the graphites of Madagascar at Hamburg. Fortunately one French colony, Indo-China, following the example of certain British Dominions, has now created its own merchant marine.[18]

Even at the present time the economic value of colonial France is very considerable. The trade of European France with the colonies, small though it is, is nevertheless in the neighborhood of 5½ billion francs (imports 2,287 million francs and exports 3,116 million francs). Algeria alone accounts for about 50 per cent of the above total; but active as are her trade relations with France, they are far from accounting for her total foreign trade, which exceeds in value 3,300 million francs.

It is impossible to place a figure on the total foreign trade of the French Empire because in order to do so it would first be necessary to determine what part of the foreign trade of each group was composed of produce bought or sold abroad, as well as what part came from other sections of Greater France or was sent to them for re-export. It would also be necessary to take into account different customs régimes. Certain colonies, for example, use the French customs system; others (Morocco and Tunis) are governed by International Conventions; others fix their own customs policy; others, again, are included in the Congo Conven-

[18] I should point out the remarkable development of wireless communications between European France and Dakar and Saïgon, and the no less remarkable development which aviation is undergoing in our colonies. This last fact is little known in spite of its extraordinary importance.

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tion. A computation of figures of such different significance would be without value.

Nevertheless, Greater France, as we have said, constitutes a complex and powerful economic machine which requires but one thing before it can be developed to the full—money. Unfortunately it is very difficult for France to obtain this money out of her own pockets until some solution has been found for the reparations problem. She thus is confined within a circle. In order for her to develop her riches to the full—a procedure from which humanity as a whole would draw profit—it is necessary for her once more to achieve an independent financial position; but this independence she can only regain when the utilization of all her various resources gives her back her former economic autonomy.

V. CONCLUSION

I propose to summarize briefly the facts which have been presented in this study.

Surrounding the ancient France of Europe, a small unit of only 550,000 square kilometers but with all the strength of a civilization of several thousand years growth, there are now grouped certain distant lands which in all cover over 10,000,000 square kilometers of the earth's surface.

France, because of the great variety of her soil and climate and because, also, she has been the scene of generation after generation of solid work, produces a wide variety of celebrated goods. It is not generally realized by the world that she is one of the great industrial nations of Europe, and that she is far from confining herself, as is too often said in words which have ceased to have any meaning, to the "luxury industries" in which she has long excelled. The orientation of our effort, even before 1914, was in the direction of *Schwerindustrie*. Peace, in restoring to her her natural frontiers, made France the leading iron producing nation of Europe. For this iron coal is necessary.

To the agricultural resources of France proper—those of the temperate zone and Mediterranean zone—may be added the natural resources of the various "Frances" of Africa and Asia, both temperate and tropical. Thus it comes about that Greater France, like the British Commonwealth and the United States, is one of the great reservoirs of food-stuffs and raw materials of the world. The principal problem of post-war France is the exploitation of the natural resources of this Empire and the

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creation of adequate means of communication between its different parts.

The fate of France is henceforth inseparately linked with that of Greater France. With a population which unfortunately remains stationary in the neighborhood of 40 millions France would seem to be condemned to be but a great memory, a shadow of a glorious past. That instead she is a great reality, faced with a great future, is because of the 60 million subjects and protégés who inhabit the France beyond the seas. Among them there are not, it is true, more than one million of European origin and not more than 10 million of the white race. But it is French civilization which is stamping these diverse elements.

French colonization policy had its faults; it was what most European colonization was, mercantile and brutal. But it was not long before the national French temperament, essentially good-natured, with an ability to understand so-called inferior races and with a tolerance of differing view-points, made the usual policy of conquest and exploitation less harsh than it was elsewhere. The crossing of Africa by Savorgnan de Brazza, without military escort, without the shedding of one drop of blood; the work of Paul Bert in inaugurating French activity in Indo-China by protecting the Annamites and by building schools for them—these were acts quite typical of French colonial policy.

To the harsh doctrines justifying the dominion of France over inferior races there at first succeeded a naif idealism, which saw in all the subjects of France men of equal value ready to be transformed into true Frenchmen. Experience and contact with the various populations of the French Empire have modified this exaggerated view and have taught France the complexity of her colonial problems. She knows now that her task is not to assimilate white, black, and yellow populations, each of them with its own traditions, but to help each, in its own interest as well as in the interest of all, to develop along the lines of its own individual civilization. She aims to develop all that is best in the Arab-Berber and Annamite civilizations; to awaken even in the negro of the Sudan a certain desire for betterment; to associate all these populations, through various measures of local self-government, in a collective productive effort; and to grant them little by little, as they reach majority, a fuller measure of local self-government in collaboration with Frenchmen. This is the

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new conception, both practical and humane, which France has of her proper colonial policy.

France is already reaping the fruits of this policy. During the war the French colonies, in spite of much German intrigue, remained quiescent. If the Frenchmen overseas were able to leave their colonial homes without danger and go to the front; if more than 500,000 troops, and as many workers, were furnished by France's colonies and protectorates; if since 1918 Greater France has been troubled neither with revolts nor similar disturbances; if the peoples which compose it turn unanimously to old France as to a protector—is there not in all this a magnificent justification of the policy adhered to by France during the past forty years?

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

All the domains of Greater France are shown above with the exception of certain islands in the South Pacific, of which Tahiti is the chief.

The map has been compiled by Col. Lawrence Martin on a base map prepared by J. P. Goode, copyright by the University of Chicago Press, 1918.

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AREA AND POPULATION OF GREATER FRANCE

	Area in Sq. Miles	*Population*
IN EUROPE		
France	212,659	39,302,989
Total in Europe	212,659	39,302,989
IN ASIA		
Syria	60,000	3,000,000
India	196	265,388
French Indo-China	256,878	19,747,431
Total in Asia	317,074	23,012,819
IN AFRICA		
Morocco	223,000	5,500,000
Algeria	222,180	5,802,464
Tunisia	50,000	2,095,090
Sahara	1,544,000	800,000
French West Africa	1,800,566	12,283,962
Togo	21,893	672,837
Cameroon	166,489	1,500,000
French Equatorial Africa	982,049	2,845,936
Réunion	970	173,190
Madagascar	228,000	3,613,341
Comores	790	110,000
Somali Coast	5,790	208,000
Total in Africa	5,245,727	35,604,820
IN AMERICA		
St. Pierre and Miquelon	93	3,918
Guadeloupe, etc.	688	229,839
Martinique	385	244,439
French Guiana	32,000	44,202
Total in America	33,166	522,398
IN OCEANIA		
New Caledonia, etc.	7,650	50,608
Tahiti, etc.	1,520	31,655
Total in Oceania	9,170	82,263
GRAND TOTAL	5,817,796	98,525,289

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THE WORLD'S CRISIS IN COTTON

By John A. Todd

IT IS now generally admitted that the world is confronted with a serious shortage of American cotton. It has taken three successive years of failure to convince the cotton trade that the conditions under which the American crop was produced in the past have changed radically and *permanently*. It is now quite clear that whereas before the war the American crop used to average about 15 million bales, and had touched 16 million and 17 million bales in two record years, we cannot now look for an average of more than 10 or 11 million bales; and a crop of 12 or 13 millions would literally be a godsend.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that such a reduced crop is entirely inadequate to meet the world's needs. Only once within the last twenty years at least has the world's total consumption of American cotton been as low as 10½ million bales. That was in the great deflation season of 1920–21, under conditions which are not likely to be repeated in any future year. During the past two years the annual consumption has been about 12¾ million bales in spite of the depressed or disturbed conditions which still prevail in many parts of the world. It may therefore be taken as definitely assured that the world wants at least 12 million bales per annum, even for its minimum requirements; and that same figure, on the other hand, represents the probable maximum of the crop. Such a situation can only result in periodic scarcity until the supply is increased. It therefore becomes of the first importance to consider the prospects of such an increase.

In discussing the world's supplies of cotton it is first of all necessary to recall that "cotton" is not a homogeneous unit, but an aggregate of many different varieties of cotton, coming from practically every country in the world from 45° north to 30° south of the Equator, and varying very widely in character and value and in the uses to which they may be put. It is therefore not enough to discuss the world's supply of "cotton." We must particularize, and for this purpose it is most convenient to divide the world's supplies into three main grades, which may be described as fine, medium and short staple cotton respectively. The following table carries out this classification and

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enables us to place the shortage of the American crop in its proper perspective:

TABLE A

THE WORLD'S COTTON CROPS

(*In thousands of bales of 500 lbs. approx.*)

Variety	*Where Grown*	*Length of Staple, Inches*	*Average Crops Pre-war*	*Post-war*
GRADE I, FINE				
SEA ISLAND	West Indies	1½–2	7	4
	Charleston, S. C., Florida, Georgia	1½–2	90	2
EGYPTIAN (SAKEL)	Lower Egypt	1¾–1⅞	1,100	750
PIMA	Arizona	1⅜–1⅝	.....	70
SUDAN	Tokar, Gezira and Kassala	1¼–1½	20	25
EGYPTIAN (UPPERS)	Upper Egypt	1⅜–1¼	400	500
STAPLE AMERICAN	Mississippi, South Carolina, etc.	1 3/16–1 15/16	200	200
PERUVIAN	Peru	1⅛–1⅜	200	200
BRAZILIAN L'G STP'L	Northern Brazil	Up to 1½	100	200
STAPLE AMERICAN	Uganda, Nyasaland, E. and S. Africa	1⅛-1¼	50	75
	Mesopotamia	1⅛-1¼	.....	1
	Australia	1⅛-1¼	.....	3
			2,167	2,030
GRADE II, MEDIUM				
AMERICAN	U. S. A.	1 –1⅛	15,000	11,000
	Mexico	1 –1⅛	150	200
	Brazil	¾–1⅛	300	600
	Russia	1⅛	250	50
	West Africa	1⅛	20	25
	Levant	¾–1⅛	100	100
	India	1	300	400
	China and Korea	1	100	200
			16,220	12,575
GRADE III, SHORT				
INDIAN	India		4,000	4,000
CHINESE	China, etc.	⅜– ¾	2,000	1,500
RUSSIAN	Russia		750	100
			6,750	5,600
	GRAND TOTALS		25,137	20,205

In regard to the supply of fine cotton the failure of the American crop has had very little effect. America's contribution in that category was comparatively small. The best of it, the American Egyptian cotton from Arizona, has not been affected at all, because there is no boll weevil there; while of the remainder the Delta cottons from the Mississippi were attacked by boll weevil nearly fifteen years ago, so that it is only the South Carolina staple districts that are *newly* affected. The downfall of the American crop, therefore, has made very little difference in regard to the fine cotton supply.

Unfortunately, however, the supply of this grade of cotton has suffered in other directions almost as badly as the American crop. The great bulk of it comes from Egypt, and the conditions

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there have for many years been increasingly unsatisfactory. At one time the Egyptian crop amounted to 1,537,000 bales, but even that showed a marked reduction on the average yield per acre of earlier years; and the fall in the yield has apparently been more or less continuous throughout the war and post-war periods, nor is there any reason to hope that this tendency will be reversed. The causes of this fall are partly agreed—*e.g.*, pink boll worm—and partly very controversial—*e.g.*, the controversy with regard to over-watering and insufficient drainage. But it will take drastic remedies to bring about any material change in the situation, and there is very little prospect of such changes being made under the present régime, or any other that one can envisage as likely for some years to come. For the moment, however, the world's supply of Egyptian cotton (including stocks) is relatively much larger than its supply of American, with the result that the premiums obtainable for staple cotton have dwindled absolutely to vanishing point, in a way which no one would have believed possible. This, again, is already reacting on the supply. In Egypt it has led to a very substantial introduction of the lower grade Upper Egyptian cottons into the Delta, in place of the longer stapled and lower yielding Sakel. Thus, the supply of the finest cottons available (for Sea Island is now practically non-existent) is seriously threatened; and although no one seems to want it at present, the time will certainly come when an increased demand will find the supply short.

Passing to the other extreme—the lowest grades of cotton—we find the supply dominated by the Indian crop, which enjoys the distinction of being almost the only crop in the world that has improved upon its pre-war figures as to yield. Unfortunately, however, the Indian crop is of comparatively little use to the bulk of the world's spinners. Much of it hardly exceeds half an inch in staple; and although there are districts which can and do produce quite satisfactory cotton of American type, its total quantity is comparatively small. Even the most charitable definition of long staple could not possibly raise the figure of India's production of that class to a million bales; and the actual quantity of inch staple is probably not a quarter of that figure.

Of the other crops which fall within this lowest grade the Chinese is by far the largest; but here again the great bulk of the crop is of very inferior quality, being indeed mainly composed of

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old indigenous types of cotton very closely allied to the Indian types. The same may be said of the bulk of the Russian crop, and indeed of all the Asiatic cottons; for certain peculiar types keep cropping up in practically every country from Bokhara and Persia to China.

Whether much of the world's present consumption of American cotton could be switched over to these lower grades is a moot question. A great deal had been done in this direction, especially by the Germans, even before the war. India and Japan, of course, have always been very large users of Indian cotton; and Japan especially made it her business to use Indian cotton in place of American whenever the latter went to high prices. There is little doubt that under stress of necessity many spinners, even in America and England, might use a great deal more Indian cotton than they do. But making every allowance for this, it is more than doubtful whether the world's spinners of American cotton can as a whole hope for any substantial relief from the use of Indian cotton.

It seems, then, that the shortage of American cotton cannot be got round by transferring the demand to other classes. The only hope lies in the possibility of increasing the supply of cotton from some other part of the world of a quality pretty closely akin to the American crop. At the outset it must be made clear that, given time, there is no fundamental difficulty in the way of doing so. It must be realized that the American cotton belt has not, and never had, any peculiar advantage of soil or climate enabling it permanently to out-distance all competitors. On the contrary, the conditions required for growing cotton can easily be found in almost any area right round the world within the tropical or sub-tropical belt. Why then, it may be asked, should America have developed something so like a monopoly of cotton growing, and why should there be so much difficulty in producing *forthwith* equally large quantities of cotton from other parts of the world? The answer to the first question would probably be found in the history of slave labor in the United States. The answer to the second requires rather more elaboration.

So far as climate and soil are concerned, the conditions required for cotton growing are easily fulfilled, but the economic conditions necessary for developing a substantial crop have not hitherto been forthcoming in many parts of the world. In the first place, there must be an ample supply of labor, sufficiently

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intelligent and capable of steady and continuous work. The question of how that labor is obtained has important effects. Forced labor, *i.e.*, what is virtually slavery under higher direction, may seem to offer a simple solution from the economic point of view; but that is a solution which Anglo-Saxons will not tolerate today. If, then, the crop is to be grown by free labor, what is to be the inducement to the laborer? If he is employed at a wage the cost may well prove almost prohibitive. If, on the other hand, he is encouraged to grow the crop himself as an independent landholder, or even tenant, the price of the crop must be sufficient to remunerate him adequately. But the cotton crop stands in a peculiar position towards its markets. It must go through the first manufacturing process of ginning before it starts on its long journey to the ultimate consumer. In the course of that journey it may pass through many hands and change ownership many times, with the risk that the price paid by the consumer may be entirely disproportionate to the price received by the original producer. If, therefore, the producer is to receive the highest price that the manufacturer can afford to pay, there must be some organization which will take the crop from the producer, pay him immediately the highest price they can afford, handle the crop efficiently, and deliver it to the consumer to the best advantage.

Now in the American cotton belt such an organization has grown up naturally and gradually under the stimulus of private enterprise; and although there is room for criticism of its methods in detail, the result is, on the whole, a system which works pretty well. But in a new country it is improbable that such an organization would grow up of itself, and it is quite certain that the crop cannot be satisfactorily established without it.

The experience of the British Cotton Growing Association in various parts of the British Empire has shown this beyond a doubt. Cotton is a crop which cannot be handled on a small scale in isolated lots. There must be enough cotton grown in one district to run a local ginnery. That means a few thousand bales at least, and it takes time and a great deal of spade work to get a few thousand bales grown in a new district, especially where the natives are entirely ignorant of the crop and very much averse to continuous hard work. Again, the value of a cotton crop depends very largely on its quality, and that is a matter involving careful work in seed selection and the main-

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tenance of a pure seed supply, which can only be expected in a country where the trade has been long established on a large scale. A new country obviously requires the assistance of some external organization which shall not only undertake the necessary propaganda work, but, in the majority of cases, actually do the work itself for at least a considerable number of years. This is a matter in which the poor benighted heathen cannot be expected either to know the right way of starting out or to follow that way when he is shown it by some benevolent autocracy. You cannot blame a West African native, who perhaps has never before seen cotton grown as a cultivated crop, for failing to realize the importance of distinguishing between the value of the native seed which grows wild all round him and the foreign seed offered to him by his white rulers. To him one seems as good as the other, and if the good seed is going to cost him more he is pretty sure to reject it. Again, it is impossible to explain to such a grower why a crop for which he got 40 cents one year is only worth 20 cents the next, owing to the fluctuation of prices in a remote market of which he knows nothing whatever.

The work of the British Cotton Growing Association, which for over twenty years has been experimenting with the possibilities of cotton growing in every part of the British Empire, has done an immense amount of good in certain selected countries on just the lines indicated above. The main results still remain to be seen. For the purpose of the present inquiry it is only necessary to mention their magnificent achievement in reviving the cultivation of Sea Island cotton in the British West Indies. Nor need we deal at length with their work in the Sudan, which soon will result in the production from the Gezira of a substantial crop of Egyptian cotton (possibly to the extent of 100,000 bales within the next five or ten years). What we are most interested in here is the work which they have done in developing the production of cotton of the American type in various parts of the Empire. Their successes in this direction may be briefly enumerated.

In Nigeria they found a considerable crop of native cotton of very inferior type, and they have replaced part of it with improved exotic varieties. In Uganda they have produced the largest single crop of any new country (as high as 81,300 bales of 400 lbs. in 1921), and that of a quality about half-way between the old short-staple American cotton and the old Delta types,

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from one of which, in fact, the original seed was descended. In Nyasaland, also, a small crop of somewhat similar cotton has been produced, while still further south in Rhodesia and South Africa small quantities have been grown in many districts. In all parts of Africa, however, the difficulties already outlined with regard to the labor supply and the provision of an adequate organization for handling and merchanting the crop, have been constant. Elsewhere in Africa other European nations have worked along similar lines—the Italians in Eritrea and Somaliland, the French in Senegal and their other West African colonies, as well as in Somaliland, Madagascar and Réunion and even in Algeria and Tunis, and the Germans in their former colonies. But the total result of all these efforts is unfortunately still very small (see Table B). In many of the districts production will certainly increase with time—but how much time it is difficult to say.

TABLE B

SUMMARY OF THE SMALLER COTTON CROPS, 1912-1922

(*In thousands of bales of 500 lbs. approx.*)

Country	*1912*	*1913*	*1914*	*1915*	*1916*	*1917*	*1918*	*1919*	*1920*	*1921*	*1922*
Persia	136	142	139	133	95	82	84	120	125	87	200
Europe and Asia Minor	176	172	157	127	132	119	109	127	131	71	70
Mexico	172	159	108	95	103	119	236	221	230	190	216
Brazil	357	399	387	298	351	419	497	553	427	659	700
Peru	106	134	122	116	129	125	138	187	159	181	175
Other S. American	13	14	14	14	16	20	22	24	42	74	70
W. Indies (British)*	6	7	6	6	4	3	5	6	5	5	4
W. Indies (Others)	13	10	13	14	11	10	12	16	16	25	25
East Indies, etc	61	78	75	72	78	77	73	106	107	97	100
Japan and Korea	52	59	68	63	63	79	91	116	133	130	132
Africa (British)*	64	65	74	66	61	66	47	69	96	156	92
Africa (Others)	16	16	3	2	3	3	5	4	10	25	30
Australia and Mesopotamia	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	1	1	3
TOTALS	1,172	1,255	1,666	1,006	1,046	1,122	1,320	1,550	1,482	1,701	1,817

*400-lb. bales.

Even leaving aside India, which has already been dealt with, there are many parts of old Asia which are very suitable for cotton growing. Certain districts of Levantine Turkey, for example, have already been proved. In Russian Transcaucasia and Turkestan there are large areas, already mentioned, which before the war produced a very substantial crop, quite a considerable part of it pretty good cotton of American type. This suffered almost complete extinction as the result of the economic disruption of Russia. These southern districts were entirely dependent upon other parts of Russia for their food supplies, and with the internal dismemberment of Russia resulting from the revolution the whole system completely broke down. Again,

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in Persia there are many scattered areas where cotton has been grown on a small scale. In fact even in Afghanistan, and probably right across the continent to China and Korea, conditions suitable for cotton can be found in many areas. In Korea quite a substantial crop (over 100,000 bales) is now grown, of which a good deal is of the American type.

In Mesopotamia we hoped we had discovered a second Egypt; but owing to physical difficulties with regard to irrigation, and political difficulties with regard to the government of the country, it now seems doubtful whether we can hope for any large addition to the world's supply from that quarter in the near future. Some excellent staple American cotton has been grown, but the total quantity so far is still small, and the prospects are that it will be a good many years before the crop can possibly reach 100,000 bales.

Journeying eastwards, we have still to include Burma and the French colonies of Indo-China in the list of possible new cotton areas. The last possesses a special interest, for there are tales that it was from this district that the original forebears of the modern American cotton were carried to Louisiana by the French, probably in the seventeenth century.

A great deal of attention has recently been centered on the prospects of cotton growing in various parts of Australia. The Australian experiment is peculiarly interesting because it is based on the determination not to introduce colored labor. It has always been maintained that cotton is not a white man's crop, but the authorities in Australia are convinced that with the present high level of prices it should be possible for white men to cultivate *some* cotton on comparatively small holdings, each man confining his cotton acreage to what his own household can cultivate and pick. Whether the experiment will ultimately prove a success on a large scale it is impossible to say. There seems no reason why it should not if cotton stays at a sufficiently high price. But in any case the amount produced so far is only a few thousand bales and it will be some time before there can be a larger yield.

There remains one large area—the whole of the American continent south of the United States cotton belt—which may be conveniently classified as Latin America. The situation in this area is peculiar in that almost throughout the whole of it cotton is more or less indigenous; in fact, almost certainly South

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America is the original home of one-half of the cottons grown in the world today, among them the black seeded cottons such as Peruvian and Sea Island.

Let us begin our survey of this area at the northern end. It is unquestionable that, given proper economic conditions, Mexico could grow a vastly greater crop than she has ever done. The country is larger than that of the whole American cotton belt (765,000 square miles) and through nearly all of it cotton is actually being grown in small quantities. In northern Mexico conditions approximate closely those just across the border in the United States, and either American long staple cotton or Egyptian cotton can be successfully grown with the assistance of some irrigation. All down the Pacific coast, which it must be remembered is nearly double the length of the western coastline of the United States (omitting Alaska), cotton is at present being grown in scattered places.

All the physical conditions of this immense area seem to be ideal for cotton growing. Where the rainfall is insufficient it can be supplemented by irrigation; the labor supply should be ample, for the numerous population consists largely of semi-Indian races who are said to be better agriculturalists than the American negro, but without the high standard of living and wages to which the latter have become accustomed. Yet with all this the Mexican crop has never exceeded 250,000 bales, mainly because of the lack of one essential condition, namely peace and good government. There is hardly a doubt that under an ordered régime Mexico might easily grow a million bales or more of good cotton. In place of that the cotton world has to thank Mexico for one thing—the boll weevil—which invaded the United States from Mexico in 1892.

Coming to South America we find that there are parts of almost every state right down to the Argentine Republic where cotton might be grown. But the only countries which as a matter of fact have grown any large quantities are Brazil and Peru. Cotton is grown in Peru in a number of long and narrow valleys where irrigation is easy from rivers fed by the snows of the higher ranges inland. The cotton produced varies greatly in different districts and there are at least four main varieties. The total quantity, however, as will be seen from Table B, has never reached 200,000 bales, nor is there any hope of it exceeding that figure substantially in the immediate future, because the area available in

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these narrow valleys is comparatively restricted. It is true that on the western slopes of the Andes mountains there are wide stretches of country around the sources of the Amazon where cotton could probably be grown in large quantities; but transport westwards through Peru is almost impossible, and the eastward river route through Brazil to the sea, though relatively cheap, involves a tremendously long carriage. The prospects of this district, however, have not yet been definitely explored.

Brazil is at present the chief hope of the world for a substantial increase of the cotton supply. There can be no doubt that Brazil possesses enormous potentialities as a cotton country. Several different varieties of cotton are either indigenous there or have been acclimatized, and all along the Atlantic coast from San Paolo in the south almost to the mouth of the Amazon we find huge districts in which cotton is grown, though on a comparatively small scale. The cotton varies widely in quality, from the American type, largely grown in San Paolo, to perennial tree cotton that sometimes approaches the lower grades of Egyptian. One of the most important facts with regard to Brazilian cotton is that enormous yields can apparently be obtained quite easily—yields which quite frequently exceed those achieved in any other country in the world, except perhaps Egypt. Yields of a bale an acre are apparently quite commonplace, and far higher figures are frequently reported on good authority. It is very difficult to get accurate statistics of the total quantity grown because a great deal is used in the local factories in the south, and some probably is also taken up in purely domestic consumption. Further uncertainty is introduced into the statistics by the fact that in Brazil the actual bale weight varies greatly. It is doubtful, however, whether the total output has ever exceeded a million bales of 500 lbs. The one thing certain is that Brazil could produce a great deal more than she has ever done, were economic conditions as satisfactory as the climatic.

It seems difficult to understand why Brazil has not done better in cotton growing, especially in recent years under the stimulus of high prices. Probably in most districts there is an insufficient supply of labor; and there is also lacking a proper supervision and control of the crop from seed selection to picking, handling and baling—in all those respects, in fact, in which trained and intelligent supervision is absolutely essential. In many instances,

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too, large outlays of capital would be profitable, *e.g.*, on irrigation works, but doubtless political and financial conditions prevailing in Brazil make that difficult. The first practical difficulty to be tackled lies in the fact that the crop is very badly handled, no care being shown in picking or ginning to prevent mixture; this, combined with the entire lack of adequate seed selection, makes it impossible to secure the true value for the best of the crop. Recent missions of the International Cotton Federation to Brazil have drawn attention to the enormous possibilities of the country, and have in a measure awakened the local authorities to the necessity of organizing the industry properly if its potentialities are to be adequately exploited.

In the meantime it must be remembered that Brazil is an enormous country with an area larger than that of the United States (excluding Alaska) and that with the best intentions in the world such an area cannot be converted to modern methods in a day. It will take years of patient hard work before serious results can appear. But without doubt Brazil deserves, better than almost any other country in the world except perhaps India, the attention of those in search of a large additional supply of cotton at a comparatively early date. It is asserted that Brazil could grow a crop of 20 million bales, and there seems little reason to doubt the statement. Even under present conditions there is no reason why within a few years she should not produce a crop of at least a million bales available for commercial purposes.

A word about the Argentine, Paraguay and Uruguay will complete our survey. In all three of these countries, particularly in the Argentine, there are possibilities of developing the growth of cotton, of a quality at least as good as in Brazil and with equally high yields. Hitherto, however, the necessary organization of the trade has been entirely lacking, and while recent high prices will certainly attract the attention of local growers to the possibilities of cotton, large results must not be expected in the immediate future. Apart from all other difficulties, the labor supply in these countries presents special problems, but if that obstacle could be overcome by rotating cotton with other crops which require a large supply of labor at other periods of the year, there is no reason why this most southern part of the continent should not rival the north in cotton production.

It may be said in conclusion, then, that there is no funda-

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mental reason why the world should not in the course of time produce a great deal more cotton than it has ever done in the past. The virtual monopoly of the American cotton belt, due mainly to accident and its superior economic organization, will not permanently withstand the competition of other countries where climatic conditions are at least as good and where labor costs approximate much more closely those under which the American cotton crop originally established itself. But for the moment it is idle to speculate what the result might be if these potential areas were developed to their full extent and the world once more provided with an ample enough supply of cotton to produce competitive price conditions. The fact must be faced that such achievements require time and the expenditure of a great deal of energy, capital and patience. And the greatest of these is patience.

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PEACE AGENCIES AND POLITICS

By Walker D. Hines

THE peace which the Armistices seemed to bring in the fall of 1918 has not in fact arrived. At first we turned our faces hopefully to the question of avoiding future wars. Now we are increasingly concerned with the problem of getting rid of the last war.

Just as the physical struggle of 1914–18 reached titanic proportions never before dreamed of in warfare, so the moral and economic struggle of 1919–23 has developed problems wholly beyond human experience and, so far, too great to be solved by human ability. The world's suffering due to these last four years of conflicting efforts to promote selfish interests promises to exceed the suffering of the preceding four years of physical combat.

The subject is both too grave and too vast for fault-finding. But it seems worth while to analyze the agencies and methods which have been adopted for settling the questions which the peace treaties did not adjust and to point out some of the fundamental political factors which have so far prevented a real settlement and which must be reckoned with when it comes to making the concessions necessary to such a settlement.

The question of reparations was left by the Treaty of Versailles an open question and it has become an open sore. When Germany was defeated in 1918 the Armistice was granted upon the understanding that Germany would be required to pay for the damage sustained by the civilian populations in the victorious countries. The ascertainment of the amount of that damage was of course extraordinarily difficult, especially in view of the vast extent and variety of the damage done by air, sea and land through a period of over four years. It is also true that political embarrassments would have been encountered in fixing the precise amount, for passions were running so high that any indemnity within the bounds of reason would have been too low to satisfy popular expectations. It likewise was not practicable to fix the dates and amounts of the various payments, inasmuch as the total could not be fixed and might vary within wide limits.

The treaty, therefore, adopting the general principle of compensation for damage to the civilian populations of the Allies, provided that the amount of such damage should be ascertained

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by an inter-allied commission called the Reparation Commission. This Commission was composed of delegates of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium.[1] The United States would also have had the right to a delegate if it had ratified the treaty. The Commission was required on or before May 1, 1921, and after giving Germany a hearing, to fix the amount of Germany's obligation and the time and manner of her payment of the same.[2]

On the much discussed topic of Germany's capacity to pay, the treaty provided that after May 1, 1921, the Reparation Commission (giving Germany hearings from time to time), should periodically estimate that capacity to pay, closely scrutinizing Germany's system of taxation, and should have discretion to modify the form and extend the date of payments. The treaty also contemplated the possibility that some part of the obligation might have to be cancelled, but provided expressly that this should not be done except with the specific authority of the several governments represented upon the Commission.

Leaving the unsettled question of reparations to the Reparation Commission meant in the last analysis leaving the question to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. It is idle to debate whether a better agency could have been devised, such as a tribunal selected from disinterested countries. Perhaps the stupendous character of the issues and their essentially political nature would have precluded such a solution. But the great fact is—and it is one of the most significant factors in the post-war troubles—that this central problem of reparations was not settled and was postponed for settlement by subsequent agreement among the nations most vitally interested in it, with the result that every month of delay has more deeply intensified the divergencies among the Allies and has proved more demoralizing to Germany.

There was only one hope that such an agency could solve the problem before it reached a desperate issue. That hope was that there would be represented on the Reparation Commission a

[1] In questions relating to damage by sea and in certain questions involving Japanese interests, the Japanese delegate was to replace the Belgian delegate; and in questions relating to Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria, the delegate of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom was to replace the Belgian delegate.

[2] After a vast amount of discussion and disagreement among the governments of the delegates, the Commission fixed the total amount of Germany's obligation at 132 billion gold marks, approximately 33 billion dollars, with certain deductions and additions, and made elaborate provisions for the character of bonds to be issued and for the security therefor.

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country sufficiently detached and sufficiently influential to aid in composing the differences which were bound to arise. That hope existed when the treaty was drafted because it was understood that the United States would be a party. All the other parties to the treaty consented to its provisions on that theory. England and France believed that this great composing factor would powerfully aid in adjusting the differences which would arise between them. Germany believed that this factor would aid in securing justice for her. All believed that this factor would materially aid the political leaders of the various European countries in justifying to their constituents the concessions necessary to arrive at and carry out a scheme of reparations. But these hopes were blasted. That fundamental central conception of the treaty was annihilated. The United States declined to become a party to the treaty.

Although many believers in the League of Nations have felt that the United States' failure to enter that League was the greatest moral disaster of the post-war period, it is now clear that the greatest immediate opportunity which was open to the United States to give powerful and sorely needed coöperation in rehabilitating the world was that of helping the parties to agree upon those essential elements of peace which the peace treaty postponed to subsequent disposition.

Reparation was not the only subject which the treaty left open and referred to special agencies for future adjustment. Numerous other important subjects were referred for settlement to the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers," that is, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan—the United States having eliminated herself from the treaty. These functions have been exercised partly through conferences of the Prime Ministers, and partly through the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris. Among the matters so left open and referred to these governments for settlement were the following: the determination of frontiers between Germany and her neighbors according to principles established in the treaty or in the light of plebiscites, such instances involving portions of the frontiers between Germany and Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Denmark, respectively; the administration of plebiscite areas through commissions selected by these principal powers; the negotiation of the Polish treaty to protect racial, linguistic and religious minorities, and the negotiation of a treaty between Poland and

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the Free City of Danzig; the disarmament of Germany through Interallied Commissions appointed by the principal powers.

The postponement of the settlement of similar vital questions was likewise characteristic of the other treaties—those with Austria (Treaty of St. Germain), Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine), and Hungary (Treaty of Trianon). These treaties, too, imposed tasks of future adjustment upon Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in some respects Japan (the United States having excluded itself by not ratifying the treaties). In important respects the unsolved problems thus referred to the agencies indicated were even more complex than those arising under the Treaty of Versailles, for unimaginable complications were involved in the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and in the transfer of territory and the allocation of property and debts to the successor Allied states, including Italy, Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, and Czechoslovakia.

The efforts to solve the problems thus left open by the various treaties and referred to the great powers for subsequent disposition have produced continuing discord in the matter of reparations and recurring discord as the other questions have been dealt with. A striking illustration is afforded by the partition of Upper Silesia. The Allied powers were required by the Treaty of Versailles to make this partition in the light of a plebiscite of the inhabitants of the area. The treaty was construed to give the right to vote not only to those living in the area but also to those domiciled elsewhere but born there. This led to a campaign conducted throughout Germany, amid the wildest excitement, to get every German inhabitant who had been born in the Upper Silesian zone to return there to vote in the plebiscite. The campaign magnified the importance of Upper Silesia to Germany and greatly intensified the bitterness of the Germans. The wound made by the treaty in requiring the giving up of a part of Upper Silesia was thus reopened and made infinitely more painful. But an even greater evil which grew out of this situation was that when the vote had been taken and the partition came to be made, Great Britain and France locked horns. France wanted more for Poland. Great Britain wanted more for Germany. This was one of the bitterest controversies between Great Britain and France and left an indescribable amount of bad feeling. The matter was finally referred to, and

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settled according to the recommendation of, the League of Nations. But there remained a heightened degree of embittered relationship between France and Germany and between France and Great Britain.

In the making of peace with Turkey we encounter in another form the failure of the chief Allied powers to work together. The Peace Conference had drafted a treaty with Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres. But that treaty was not ratified; war arose between Turkey and Greece (in circumstances to suggest sympathy and support in England for Greece and in France for Turkey), and finally the Treaty of Lausanne was executed in 1923. For three years or more the Turkish problem had rendered more difficult any agreement on the other unsettled problems, and its settlement finally left the principal Allies, especially England and France, in a worse, rather than a better, frame of mind for the disposition of reparations and other matters.

Broadly speaking, the bitterness, confusion and economic uncertainty which have cursed Europe in the last four years have grown out of the controversies over these stupendous unsettled matters. The agencies created for liquidating the peace settlement have unfortunately operated instead to solidify national hatreds and conflicts. This is not said as a reproach but by way of pointing out the conditions which have unavoidably prevented the realization of a tranquil régime. The peace treaties failed to untangle a badly tangled skein of conflicting interests and emotions and the subsequent process of unraveling has so far seemed to leave the unfinished mass more hopelessly snarled than ever.

It should be mentioned that the League of Nations was not charged with the disposition of these questions. It was organized on the theory that the peace treaties and the agencies set up by them would settle the war of 1914–18, and that the function of the League would be to aid in avoiding future wars between countries which were members of the League. A reference to the Treaty of Versailles will show that the League was expected to act upon comparatively few matters connected with the peace settlement, and these of relatively minor importance; among the most important were the choice and supervision of the governing commission for the Saar Basin, the framing of a constitution for the Free City of Danzig, passing upon the extension beyond a five-year period of certain commercial provisions of

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the treaty, and the disposal of disputes arising under Part VII of the treaty relating to ports, waterways and railways. These things did not go to the foundations of world peace as did those which the treaty expressly left for disposal by the great powers.

A further condition which has operated almost conclusively to prevent the League from introducing itself into the controversies which have arisen is that these great powers are also the dominant factors in the Council of the League. When, for example, the British Empire, France, and Italy, acting through their delegates on the Reparation Commission, disagree on vital questions, it is not surprising that some or all of them will oppose invoking the machinery of the League for the purpose of overcoming the positions they wish to maintain. In the Turkish situation, and during the resulting war between Greece and Turkey, earnest coöperation between Great Britain and France was lacking, mainly because of the hostility and distrust growing out of the great variety of their conflicting interests, including the matter of reparations. Without the earnest support of those two powers —which naturally was not forthcoming—the League of course could have taken no effective action. Even in the Graeco-Italian controversy over the killing of the Italian members of the International Boundary Mission near the Albanian boundary, and over the subsequent seizure of Corfu by Italy, the prior commitments of the great powers stood in the way of untrammeled action by the League. The Mission had been appointed by, and was acting under, the Conference of Ambassadors. Moreover, the strategic position of Italy upon the Reparation Commission made it out of the question to expect France, with its whole reparations policy at stake, to seek in the Council of the League to upset a position to which Italy was already committed.

The truth is that the League cannot begin to have a fair chance until the peace settlements growing out of the war shall have been liquidated to a reasonable extent—and that is still far from realization.

When we look through the form to the substance of all these agencies available to give effect to the peace, it is of course apparent that the controlling elements are Great Britain and France, and the fundamental difficulties are in essence a conflict between them and the influence which this conflict has upon Germany. Until Great Britain and France find a basis of agreement, there can be no real and final settlement of the last war.

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The controlling motive of France is protection from the aggression of Germany, which, just across the border and with a population nearly twice as great, has in the course of fifty years twice invaded and occupied the territory of France. This motive is even stronger than the desire and need for reparations, even if the latter is talked about a great deal more. Although the whole world, including even the United States, was compelled to go to war because it could not afford to have Germany overcome France, and though doubtless it would be compelled to do so again, there has been no corresponding appreciation, in the countries which then helped France, of the advantage of underwriting the peace of the world by giving France definite assurance that such aid would again be given in the case of unprovoked aggression by Germany. The result is that France has been preoccupied in strengthening herself by maintaining a large army and by weakening Germany. This has not suited Great Britain, which has no such sense of insecurity; the sea, which Great Britain controls, separates her from Germany, and the latter no longer has a navy. Nor does Great Britain believe there can be a healthy Europe with a Germany diseased and wasting away. Again, Great Britain, being the great trading country of the world, wishes Germany sufficiently prosperous to be a satisfactory customer. Beyond all that, and of very vital importance, Great Britain does not wish to see France become the great, predominant power of the continent, any more than it wished to see Germany occupy that position before the war. These fundamental differences go much further toward explaining the present conflict between the two countries than their differences in the matter of reparations.

Nor should we assume that a nation's foreign policy is simply the logical outgrowth of general national conceptions. It is rather the result of many diverse forces, practical as well as patriotic. For example, the French steel industry's interest in raw material and world trade, and in alliances with related industries in the Ruhr, may be influential in shaping the Ruhr policy of France; and naturally the influence of the British steel industry would operate in an opposite direction upon British policy.

When we come to the clash of interest between Great Britain and France with reference to reparations, a highly interesting circumstance is that while the Treaty of Versailles was being

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drafted Great Britain, under the leadership of Lloyd George and with the active participation of Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa, took the initiative in demanding that the definition of reparation damage should be enlarged to include the cost of pensions to naval and military victims of the war and their dependents, although it was more than questionable whether such cost could legitimately be regarded as a part of the damage to the civilian populations—which, before the Armistice, had been accepted as the basis for the compensation to be made by Germany. Great Britain's persistence prevailed, and it is estimated that the amount of reparations was thereby more than doubled. Great Britain, however, with its greater political elasticity, has since evinced a marked willingness to make a readjustment, and influential British circles have insisted that Germany cannot possibly pay what has been demanded. Although this doubling of reparations by the addition of pensions was a British manoeuvre, France has not been slow to take advantage of that condition by insisting that she must have an amount of reparations not only sufficient to pay for the damage to the devastated regions but also enough to enable her to repay the war loans which she obtained from the Allies, if repayment is not waived.

On this subject of reparations the situation is curiously mixed, because France, while urgently needing full recompense at least for the injury done in the devastated regions, yet dreads to see Germany sufficiently powerful and prosperous to pay such an amount. France moreover is naturally hostile to the thought of fixing at the present time a reduced and relatively low figure as the final amount of reparations, and then of continuing through many decades to bear the tax burden necessary to meet the bonds issued to raise money for the reconstruction of her devastated regions; she foresees Germany, speedily reviving and paying off a relatively small indemnity, continuing thereafter her powerful and prosperous progress, freed from the burden she ought to share and all the more powerful and prosperous by being so freed. On the other hand, Great Britain, for the reasons indicated, would rather see Germany prosperous at once through an early, final, and comparatively easy reparations settlement.

Starting from these opposite points, Great Britain and France get further and further apart, the former magnifying and the latter minimizing the difficulties in the way of Germany making

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payment and the general danger arising from a prolongation of Germany's uncertainty and unstability. The British position has encouraged Germany to make an exaggerated showing of inability to pay reparations and to adopt in the Ruhr the policy of passive resistance, and has exasperated France to the last degree. The demoralizing effect upon Germany of this disagreement between the two Allies who could control the situation is indescribable, and of itself has been largely responsible for her present economic paralysis.

While the central figures in this tragedy of discord are Great Britain and France—and Germany—every other European participant in the war is involved in one way or another in some of the numerous unsettled problems. The only way to the necessary settlements is for the governments involved to make concessions which so far they have been unwilling to make. The political obstacles in the way of such concessions are indeed vast. The complexities of the disputes are utterly baffling to the disinterested observer, and these very complexities enable each government to make a complete demonstration to its constituents that it is 100 per cent right and its adversaries are 100 per cent wrong. During the long and painful years of disagreement such arguments have crystallized into formulas of political faith which the public has come to accept as fundamentals and which public men will find it dangerous to disregard unless they can show they have obtained concessions which will appear to justify a changed position.

Since political action is essential to putting any settlement into effect, it is well to consider the character and limitations of the political machinery of the countries of continental Europe. It is idle to complain that "politics" are so much considered. All the problems under discussion are unavoidably political in the sense that they can be settled only through individual governmental action by the respective countries interested. In each country the settlement must take form and expression through governmental machinery, which in turn is necessarily selected and operated by political processes. And on top of other difficulties we must face the fact that the sort of political machinery which the continental governments of Europe employ, and must employ, is not well adapted to cope with existing tasks.

The governments of Europe are largely governments by parliament and without any independent executive with real power.

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Moreover, in the continental parliament there is no majority party which has a responsibility to the country for carrying forward an affirmative policy; as a rule there are a large number of separate political groups and the life and policy of any particular government (that is, the ministry for the time being,) depend on some temporary combination of enough of these groups to secure a majority. These combinations are subject to constant change and are largely determined by the personal competition of their leaders or groups of leaders; also, personal animosities appear to play a far greater part than they do in our political life. In such circumstances, it is obvious what obstacles are in the way of a government remaining in power if it comes forward with a program that its opponents can claim involves any concession from the fullest measure of national rights and aspirations.

In the comparatively easy times which existed before the war these defects were less apparent. But in the face of the unimaginable complexities which have developed since the war it is becoming seriously questionable whether the existing methods are equal to the gigantic governmental tasks of the present day, and whether we are not confronted with the bankruptcy of the parliamentary method of governing as now organized in various countries on the continent.

The weakness of the continental parliamentary system was clearly brought out in the dramatic and stirring advent of Mussolini in Italy. Undoubtedly he is a man of extraordinary capacity and force. But the thing that gave him the opportunity to impress himself upon the people of his country was the utter impotence of parliamentary government, fallen as it had into a condition where no combination of groups would or could carry forward a constructive and courageous policy.

An ever-present condition in Europe to stir up and embitter political activity is the traditional jealousy and suspicion which is the legacy of centuries of conflict and of armed watching for conflict. The manoeuvres to preserve a balance of power, the secret diplomacy, the searching for special advantage, the efforts to checkmate known or suspected adversaries—all these have made a soil highly unfavorable to the cultivation of peace but well adapted to the rank growth of discord and strife. Our far greater preoccupation in America with domestic affairs makes it difficult for us to realize this difference in Europe, a difference

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which has been greatly intensified as a result of the war and the failure to settle promptly the questions left unsettled by the peace treaties. There are local issues, too, of which we seldom think, that multiply and accentuate political divisions and seriously obstruct liberal and constructive action in national affairs. Illustrations of these are religious differences (extremely potent politically), highly militaristic conceptions prevalent among army leaders, and controversies (long obsolete in this country) such as the question of monarchy versus democracy and that of centralization versus local autonomy.

Moreover, to a very large extent, the voters in Europe have less political experience and less political background than is true of the voters in our country. The right of suffrage is new in many parts of Europe to many classes of voters, and it is perhaps fair to say that in no part of the continent of Europe can the political training of the masses compare in duration and extent with the corresponding training here. Representative government began in this country when our colonial governments began, say 300 years ago, and even then it was a transplanted and not a new growth.

We must also remember that many of the European governments have been recently formed along new lines, and some of them in newly created countries, so that the difficulties in the way of successful functioning are greatly intensified. For example, Germany, which was the strongest monarchy in Europe outside of Russia, suddenly became a republic. It is now engaged in the task of learning how to be a republic—a task sufficiently perplexing in normal times and almost baffling under existing conditions. Germany has a tremendously able and selfish capitalistic class, which it is widely believed continues strongly sympathetic with monarchical principles. There is also a conviction, inside and outside Germany, that this class is bent on evading all measures which would make Germany pay an adequate amount of reparations or impose upon the wealth of Germany the taxation necessary to pay that charge, and which is also bent on shifting to the laboring classes whatever burden may finally be imposed.

Poland and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom furnish further examples of these new political handicaps. They are earnestly trying to learn how to use new and unfamiliar governmental tools, each trying at the same time to harmonize intense sectional,

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racial and religious animosities within its own borders, each discovering various degrees of inexperience in its public men and in its electorate, and each wrestling with a tremendous military burden.

These comments upon the political features of government as it is practiced on the continent of Europe are pertinent to the question of how to get a settlement of the matters which have not yet been adjusted through the processes indicated by the peace treaties. We must remember that not one of the unsettled problems can be solved unless one or more of the interested parties makes concessions, and that no government can make a concession without the support of a combination of political groups possessing a majority of the legislature, because if the majority is unfavorable another and non-consenting government will forthwith be substituted.

This practical political situation should appeal to our own public men who, though the beneficiaries of a vastly more stable system of politics and of a far more tranquil state of mind on the part of the voters, nevertheless appreciate the necessity for translating action even upon foreign affairs into terms of domestic politics. France has the most thoroughly established political system of any of the continental Allies and is probably less subject to the extraordinary political complications above pointed out than are the others. But even France suffers from these complications to a degree which we find hard to realize. Besides, France is confronted with the most difficult of all the European problems, one profoundly affecting the pockets and the feelings of her citizens. The amount of taxes they will have to pay over many decades is in question; their feeling of being duped by the peace treaty into a situation where they get neither security nor reparations is involved; their traditional hatred of Germany has been steadily reinflamed by developments since the Armistice, and there is always present their fear—one of the most real things in French life—of renewed German aggression. Further than that, France has a general election next spring; evidently that fact does not encourage marked moderation in the proposals of her government or in the attitude of any important combination of her political groups.

We are disposed to be impatient of the discord in Europe. We feel that one country or another should, in the general interest, recede from its extreme position; that it is utter national selfish-

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ness, political obstinacy, plain disregard of the welfare of other peoples, that causes such unrelenting adherence to the stands already taken. But we are not in a position to indulge in righteous wrath or in contempt. What each of the European Allies has done has been done under the stimulus of an apparently vital need for home security or for the promotion of home interests, under political exigencies and difficulties which we cannot adequately realize, and under a tremendous revival of nationalistic spirit. Can we find better reasons for our conduct during and since the Peace Conference? Our record is that through our Executive we were instrumental in shaping the peace treaties, that the other countries entered into them on the theory that our country would be a party, and that then our government, on account of a deadlock between the Executive and the Senate, threw these treaties over and refused to help in liquidating the problems of the peace. We may say that we had a perfect right to do this in order to keep faith with our own traditions and in order to serve the best interests of our own country; that all other countries ought to understand the peculiarities of our Constitution and discount accordingly anything our Executive does; and that we must not recede a hair's breadth from our position. But there is not a single Allied country in Europe which cannot make at least as good a plea for maintaining without concession or change its position upon the matters now in dispute.

If with our impregnable strength and unparalleled good fortune we "stand pat"—if we decline to do anything to help tranquillize an unfortunate world—if we decline through formal Act of Congress to consider whether the Allies can pay us their debts in full—if we decline to join in a non-military League to facilitate mutual understanding and the development of an organized world-wide public opinion—if we decline even to give our moral support to a World Court—why, then, should we complain if public men in Europe, under vastly greater difficulties, likewise "stand pat" and refuse to recede from any position they have heretofore taken, regardless of the effect upon the general situation?

The fact is that all the Allies are tarred with the same brush. Each appears to have been utterly devoid of spiritual and unselfish principles since the Armistice. Each has pursued its own selfish purposes regardless of the effect upon others, and in doing

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so has jeopardized its own welfare. And these characterizations apply also to our own country.

The time is past for blind adherence to formulas heretofore announced. Every government can prove to a certainty, from its own standpoint, that the formulas it has adopted and the positions it has taken are absolutely right. The nations involved could discuss until the end of time, without solution, the question as to who is right and who is wrong in abstract principle. We should not waste breath now on debating whether the Ruhr occupation is legal or whether any public man or set of public men was right in the enunciation of some prior declaration.

The only prospect of real world peace and prosperity is for concessions to be made, and perhaps the time is coming when the situation will be so bad, and the prospect of disaster so clear, that our own Congress and the parliaments abroad will alike be willing to support adjustments involving the necessary elements of compromise.

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THE INDIAN QUESTION IN KENYA

By Stanley Rice

KENYA COLONY, or, as it used to be called, British East Africa, is a tropical possession of the British Empire situated right on the Equator. Topographically it may be divided into three main sections. The northernmost of these, consisting largely of desert and unproductive soil, may be ignored for the purposes of this discussion; the value of the Colony both actual and prospective lies in the south between the island of Mombassa on the Indian Ocean and the shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza. The second main section consists of the actual sea coast (including Mombassa) and its immediate hinterland. As we go westward from the coast we pass through this low lying belt into the third section, which gradually rises until it becomes a high tableland at an average elevation of some 5,000 feet. It falls again to the shores of the great lake, though by no means to sea level. Nairobi, the capital, is between 5,000 and 6,000 feet above the sea.

Out of Kenya's total area of some 246,000 square miles this elevated tableland covers roughly about 50,000, though it has never been accurately surveyed. Its existence is of the highest importance to the present question, for it is only the "White Highlands," as it has come to be called, that makes European colonization at all possible. From this point of view the position is not unlike that in India where what may be called the agricultural settlers, the tea and coffee and rubber planters who alone own lands of any extent, are confined to the more elevated slopes.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, chiefly owing to the enterprise of explorers, British trade began to be attracted to East Africa, but no attempt was made at first either to administer the country or to establish a colony. But when Germany put in an appearance in the eighties it became necessary to define the respective spheres of influence. Kenya Colony was allotted to the British. The island of Mombassa together with a strip of the coast extending inland for ten miles remained under the Sultan of Zanzibar, but in 1890 a British Protectorate was declared there and the administration is now carried on in conformity with British ideas. As happened in India, a trading company whose original object was only profits was driven by the force of

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

KENYA COLONY

In article 13 of the Pact of London, Great Britain and France promised to cede territory to Italy in compensation for colonial gains they might make by the treaty of peace. In fulfilment of this, Great Britain has expressed a willingness to cede to Italy the portion of Kenya marked A on the above map. The Italians, however, have asked for more. They have reduced an earlier more extensive claim and now demand in addition only the territory marked B.

circumstances to undertake the administration of the country. The commercial enterprise however did not prosper. The company found itself in difficulties and in 1895 reluctantly surrendered its charter to the British Foreign Office. The colony remained under Foreign Office control until 1908 when it was handed over to the Colonial Office as being more naturally within

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that department's province. By the Colonial Office it has been administered ever since, and Whitehall retains the ultimate control. The Governor is the agent of the Colonial Office and in all major matters must take his orders thence. He is assisted by executive and legislative councils, but to all intents and purposes they are advisory bodies, the former being the machinery for carrying out the Colonial Office policy and the decisions of the latter being subject to the veto of the ultimate authority.

The coming of Indians and other Asiatics to Mombassa and the coast dates back several centuries. They came purely as traders, very rarely penetrated into the interior and made no attempt either to interfere with the indigenous systems of government or to undertake the moral or the economic education of the African inhabitants. Indirectly, however, they served a useful purpose, not only by bringing to the people the simple commodities of which they stood in need but also by introducing to them the methods of a higher civilization, though naturally enough they themselves were not slow to take advantage of their superior intelligence to become rich at the expense of the natives.

In 1896 the British Government began to build the Uganda railway with a view to opening up the interior, and for this purpose they imported large numbers of Indians, at first mainly unskilled laborers, then, as the railway progressed, clerks, since the enormous cost put European labor out of court and the African was thought to be too primitive to undertake the work. The foreigner, both white and brown, began to penetrate into the remoter parts, the white man to farm on the large scale, the brown to carry on his traditional employment of money lending and petty trade, or, if he were an artisan, to supply general needs when the railway was finished. The lower ranks of the railway itself were, and still are, staffed by Indians. The result of this expansion is that at the last census the European population numbered 9,561; the Asiatic about 30,000, of whom 22,822 were Indians; while the native Africans were estimated at from two and a half to three millions.

The Indians have shown a tendency to date what they call their troubles from the assumption of responsibility by the Colonial Office. This, however, was a mere coincidence. It happened to synchronize with the extraordinary outburst of nationalist activity in India which took place in 1907. It was also about this time that the Indian question in South Africa

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came prominently into notice. A new spirit had arisen in India. The Indian had begun to question the hitherto unquestioned superiority of the white man and his claim to domination. The slogan of the extreme party was self-government and as a corollary the political equality of the races, not only in India but in overseas dominions where Indians were to be found.

The war gave a great impetus to this movement and Indians could point with pride to their great contribution to the Allied armies and to their great sacrifices for the Allied cause. There was, however, another reason for this intensification of nationalist feeling. British leaders were never weary of proclaiming the doctrines of self-determination and the rights of the weaker nations. Indians, always quick to seize upon western catchwords but slow to appreciate their practical application, utilized these doctrines to the full. These considerations are amply sufficient to account for the new-born grievances of the Indians in Kenya without charging the Colonial Office with sins of partiality.

Thus the essence of the present question is the Indian demand for political equality. The points in dispute are in the main four:

1. The reservation of the Highlands for Europeans.
2. Commercial and residential segregation in towns.
3. The franchise.
4. The restriction of immigration.

In 1908 Lord Elgin, then Colonial Secretary, decided that the Highlands must be reserved for European settlement and entirely closed to Asiatics, who could find an outlet for their activities in the lower regions which were unsuitable to Europeans. This decision was affirmed by Lord Milner in a despatch dated May, 1920, and again by Winston Churchill in a speech at an East African dinner in London in 1922. Unfortunately the wording of Lord Elgin's despatch left room for argument. In the course of it he said: "It is not consonant with the views of His Majesty's Government to impose legal restrictions on any particular section of the community, but as a matter of administrative convenience, grants should not be made to Indians in the upland areas." The Indians, backed by the Government of India, argue that the decision was confined to the original grant and not to subsequent transfers. The point is perhaps arguable as a question of verbal interpretation but there is little doubt that the intention was to bar Asiatics absolutely. Lord Elgin

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can scarcely have meant to nullify his own orders by admitting Asiatics to gradual, and perhaps ultimately to preponderant, possession in the Highlands. At any rate, the European has given the widest interpretation to the order and on the strength of it he has established himself in the Highlands in full confidence that his children will grow up in European traditions, uncontaminated by any Asiatic influence.

The underlying motive in the matter of commercial and residential segregation was the same as in the reservation of the Highlands for Europeans. The Indians in East Africa are not drawn from a very high class. They are largely Mohammedan traders from Bombay, but there are also a good many who come from lower strata as well as a certain number who conform to European ideas of comfort and sanitation. It was long ago pointed out that commercial segregation—the confinement of Indian houses of business to their own quarter—was both impracticable and illogical, since European houses also employ Indian clerks and deal with the native races. The stigma of segregation thus fell only on the Indian heads of firms and in their case it was uncalled for. Happily these arguments have prevailed and commercial segregation is no longer pressed. As for residential segregation the Indian argued that he does not ordinarily want to live cheek by jowl with the European but that where he has adopted European customs he ought not to be compulsorily relegated to the Indian quarter. He contended that for all practical purposes drastic municipal laws and a stringent control of sanitation could achieve all that was desired. This was of course no answer to the European settlers' fear of Asiatic influence upon the growing generation, but the fear was after all based upon a theory which is never likely to have much effect in practice. It assumed that the Indian of the lower middle class is really anxious to intrude, whereas it is more than probable that he would be extremely uncomfortable if he tried to enter the European preserves.

The basic motive for the Indian agitation on these two points is that they entail a stigma of inferiority. It is impossible to overrate the extreme sensitiveness of the Indian in all matters of dignity. He will contest a point of honor to a degree which the more practical European mind considers irrational. Much of the misunderstanding is indeed due to the western inability to appreciate this attitude of mind. It is of no use to tell an Indian

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that such an ordinance will be a dead letter or that it has only been enacted to guard against improbable contingencies. He is conscious that its very existence brands him as an inferior. He may say that his exclusion from the Highlands is a hindrance to his legitimate prosperity. He has himself proclaimed that he is not anxious to invade the European quarter. Actually, in both cases what he really resents is the racial disqualification.

Although Indians profess to regard the question of the Highlands as crucial, it seemed for some time as though these two points of dispute might be adjusted by compromise. The Indian, it was hoped, might be persuaded to accept without loss of dignity the accomplished fact of reservation. The European might waive the point of residential segregation, trusting to the safeguards already mentioned. This, it will be seen, was the solution adopted. But the problem lies much deeper and finds its practical expression in the remaining two points of dispute.

Before proceeding to the details of the franchise and immigration questions it will be convenient to set out clearly the conflict of principle which has governed the whole controversy. In 1921 the Imperial Conference passed a Resolution which is so important that it must be quoted in full:

> The Conference, while reaffirming the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1918 that each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction of immigration from any of the other communities, recognizes that there is an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire. The Conference accordingly is of the opinion that in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth it is desirable that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognized.[1]

The Indians not unnaturally regarded this Resolution as a triumph for their fight for equality, for if the "rights of Indians to citizenship" do not connote equality what is the meaning of the phrase? That the mother country cannot interfere in the concerns of the self-governing Dominions they are willing to admit, but they point out that the question of Kenya is for the mother country herself and that she is bound to honor her own signature. To the contention of the white settlers that each community is entitled to "enjoy complete control of immigra-

[1]South Africa refused to accept this.

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tion from any of the other communities" they reply that the handful of white settlers in Kenya is not and cannot claim to be the arbiters of the destinies of the whole colony. To the Indian therefore the question is of vital importance. For if the principle of British citizenship, promised by the Resolution, is not to be conceded to him there, what is to prevent all the other Crown Colonies from following the example? And if they should do so, of what practical value are those high sounding phrases such as "an equal member of the British Empire" and "the rights to citizenship?"

Against this contention of the Indians has to be set an opposing principle regarding the kind of government that is best for the natives. It is quite probable that the implications of the Resolution were not fully realized at the time of its adoption and that the case of a colony inhabited by three distinct races, where the black population outnumbered the brown and the white together by about fifteen to two, was not appreciated. At any rate it became the main plank in the platform of the Europeans in Kenya that the country must be governed primarily in the interests of the African native, that it cannot be governed jointly by two differing civilizations, and that therefore the Europeans to whom the Africans entrusted their future and who by experience and tradition are obviously better fitted for the task must continue to act alone. The Indian replies that he is a necessary factor in the uplift of the Africans. He is brought into closer touch with them, he has admittedly done useful work in this direction and will continue to do it, and his simpler habits and the conditions of his own native climate permit him to go where no European can venture.

The argument regarding the welfare of the African native has been stressed by both sides, but to tell the truth it savors of the *ad captandum* species. It is very doubtful whether either side is quite sincere in its championship of the African cause, with the exception of the missionaries who naturally favor their own creed and their own civilization. It is impossible to resist the impression that the white settler is using the African largely in order to fortify his claim to racial superiority or that the Indian is really concerned only with political equality and with profits. The real question at issue came to be this: Is a British colony to be governed by white men who represent the mother country or is the responsibility to be shared with the Indian who is recognized

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as an equal partner in the Empire? The difference is sharply accentuated by the fact that India's own position is anomalous. She is the only large Dominion within the British Empire which possesses a high civilization and yet is not white. One feels instinctively that if the Indian community in Kenya were Australian or Canadian, no such difficulty as the present would ever have arisen.

Bearing these general considerations in mind, we may now turn to the thorny question of the franchise. The Legislative Council of Kenya originally consisted of eighteen officials, eleven elected Europeans and two nominated Indians. The nomination of the last named was changed to election after Lord Milner's despatch of 1920; but in 1921 there was a reversion to nomination, the number simultaneously being increased to four. This proceeding was, however, considered inadequate, and in 1923 the program called from its authors the Wood-Winterton Scheme was put forward. Though its text was never published,[2] it included the following proposals:

1. A common electoral roll so arranged as to enfranchise about 10 per cent of the Indian population.
2. An arrangement of constituencies which would give elected Europeans a majority of 7 to 4.
3. Some kind of municipal franchise not defined.
4. No embargo on immigration.
5. The Highlands to be left to the Europeans and the principle of segregation to be abandoned.

The Europeans instantly took fire. They held indignation meetings and passed a violent resolution which though couched in carefully chosen language did not conceal their resolve to resort if need be to armed force to resist the proposals—a move which showed how far they were actuated by zeal for the African native, since it can hardly be supposed that altruism would call forth the extreme of armed rebellion in its support. The impelling motive was fear for the future. A proposal which maintained the official majority and which guaranteed a further majority of European representatives might be satisfactory enough, but it was coupled with unrestricted immigration and with a common electoral register. Rightly or wrongly the white man foresaw a large influx of Indians, a fair proportion of whom would come upon the electoral register. Rightly or wrongly

[2]Not in extenso. A summary is given in the British White Paper of July 23, 1923.

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they feared that the Asiatics would through the preponderance of numbers alone tend to dominate state policy, if not through their representatives at least through the electorate to whom white candidates as well as brown must appeal. And there was another fear lurking behind. They had seen concessions made to agitation in Ireland and in India. What guarantee was there that further concessions would not be made to Indian demands in East Africa and that some day the white majority would not be put on terms of equality with the brown or even turned into a minority?

The Indians were at first inclined to accept the proposals which, indeed, went a considerable way towards meeting their demands except in the matter of the Highlands, but the violence of the settlers stiffened their attitude and induced them to take their stand upon the original claim of equality in all respects. Feeling ran very high. The white settlers produced charges of cowardice in the war and worse; the Indians indulged in wild language of meeting force with force; and the only result of these irrelevancies was to engender further heat. It was at this crisis that the Government resolved to invite both parties to a conference in the calmer atmosphere of Downing Street.

Now although the welfare of the African may have been put into the discussion by both parties from motives not entirely altruistic, it evidently must be consideration of paramount importance to the Colonial Office. To them the interests of brown and white are and have to be subordinate to the interests of the native inhabitants. The idea was comparatively new but, new or not, it had been fully recognized that the primitive peoples were not to be simply regarded either as potential labor or as potential prey for the foreigner. But behind the details of the dispute, behind the arguments of the disputants, behind even the welfare of the African, there loomed up the ever insistent question as to whether the British can consent to share the control of a Crown Colony with any other race, and especially with an Asiatic race which, far from governing other peoples, has not yet given proof of ability to govern itself.

These questions have now been answered by the Colonial Office in the manner that was to be expected. The Government, they say, "regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population and they are unable to delegate or share this trust. . . . It is the mission of Great Britain to work con-

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tinuously for the training and education of the Africans towards a higher intellectual, moral and economic level." It is therefore in their opinion essential that this duty of trusteeship shall be carried out by the Secretary of State and the agents of the Imperial Government "and by them alone." These words are very significant. They establish an important principle in the government of Crown Colonies, wherever Indians or other non-indigenous peoples are to be found. They indicate clearly the intention of the British Government to retain control in all such Colonies. And they go further than this. For they distinctly imply that now and for a long time to come there shall be no advance towards the ideal of democratic self-government by a handful of Europeans, which the white settlers of Kenya had so ardently desired. The government of a Crown Colony must henceforth be carried on in the paramount interests of the native inhabitants, and it is assumed that no one is so well fitted to judge of these interests as the Imperial Government and its local agents.

The decision of the Colonial Office represents an honest attempt to reconcile the two opposing principles aforesaid. The details of the settlement may be summarized thus:

1. A communal franchise; five elected Indians and eleven Europeans. The official majority in the Councils to be maintained.

2. Immigration to remain under present regulations but the question to be reëxamined from the standpoint of the economic interests of the African native.

3. Reservation of the Highlands for Europeans.

4. Abandonment of segregation of any kind.

Thus an attempt was made to meet the claims of Indians by enlarging the number of representatives and by reintroducing the principle of election, at the same time retaining the ultimate control of all general questions in the hands of Europeans. Franchise by community instead of a common register was meant further to safeguard a European policy in native interests, but the result of the settlement was to concede to Indians much less than they had demanded.

Looking back, we can now see that two cardinal mistakes were made in the past. It probably could not have been foreseen that the importation of Indians to build and eventually to work the Uganda railway would have the effect of bringing

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about a crisis. But the grant of a franchise of any kind to a fraction of the population in a young Colony argued an unimaginative statesmanship. It indicated an inability to see that democracy is conditioned by circumstances and that to introduce democratic institutions into such a Colony as Kenya is to make a mockery of the principle. It aroused in the minds of the settlers quite exaggerated hopes for the future. On the other hand it never occurred to any one that the time was coming when India would insist on taking her stand along side of the other Dominions, though as the franchise was only introduced in 1920 the repercussions from India might have been anticipated.

The settlement has had the usual fate of compromises. It has not satisfied either party. The Europeans have accepted it as a working hypothesis but with a note of sullen resignation. They are disappointed because it puts off to an indefinite date, if not altogether, their cherished ideal of self-government and they regard with some suspicion the abandonment of segregation. They recognize, however, that the decision of the Cabinet is final and accept it in the Anglo-Saxon spirit of respect for authority. The Indians in the Colony have as yet given no sign; much will depend on the establishment of good relations between the races on the spot.

But in India a storm arose on the heels of the settlement. Its terms were denounced in unmeasured terms by all shades of native opinion. The Legislative Assembly talked of retaliation; the National Congress threatened a boycott of British goods. Protest meetings were held in Bombay and elsewhere. The decision was considered "utterly subversive of the principles of equality within the British Commonwealth." It established "the dangerous and intolerable principle of white domination." Last, and most important of all, India was called upon to withdraw from the British Empire Exhibition now being organized and the Indian delegates to the Imperial Conference were urged to raise the question there and to withdraw if they should fail to obtain redress. Except on the point of segregation India thinks herself flouted, for any change in the regulations which govern immigration must, she considers, react unfavorably upon Indians alone since it is they and not white men who fill the walks of life to which the African can aspire, and they contrast any restriction upon their freedom of action with the unfettered immi-

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gration into the neighboring mandated territory of Tanganyika.[3] There is no longer any talk of the African. Indignation is reserved for what is called the betrayal of legitimate Indian aspirations.

As this article is being finished the Imperial Conference (South Africa again dissenting) has resolved to accept the proposal of the Indian delegation to set up commissions in each Dominion to inquire how far the Resolution of 1921 has been carried out and how its application can be extended. The question of Kenya is not to be reopened immediately, but as the Colonial Office is a party to the new decision Kenya will not be excluded from the scope of the Conference on Crown Colonies. Thus the immediate danger of any dramatic action by India seems for the moment to have passed, but the substantive question of Indian status overseas remains unsolved and the Kenya question may again become acute.

[3]The League's mandates secure equal rights of immigration to the nationals of all member states, and India is of course a member.

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DISMEMBERED HUNGARY AND PEACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

By Oscar Jászi

IN SPITE of her small territory and present economic bankruptcy, the new Hungarian state plays a dominant part in any consideration of the problems of Central Europe. The Hungarian question is so intimately connected with the general condition of the neighboring states that no serious diagnosis can be made of the disastrous moral and economic ills of that part of the world without understanding the main issues of recent Hungarian history. Economically, geographically, historically, Hungary always has been an important part of Central Europe. Should she continue in her present state, alternately despairing and in the throes of a feverish dream of revenge, there is small possibility for serious work of reconstruction and the establishment of a sane equilibrium in the Danubian countries.

I

There is a wide-spread belief in Europe—supported by the Marxist interpretation of history—that the chief cause of the recent conflagration lay in the capitalistic and imperialistic rivalry between Germany and the other great commercial countries. Without denying the partial truth of this hypothesis, I nevertheless see that a still more important factor was at work in all those regions which for many decades were called the danger zone of Europe.

This danger zone was made up of the Dual Monarchy, the Balkan States, and the Russian Empire, all of which countries had one characteristic in common, namely, that they were not finished units. They were not really national states in which geography, race and government contributed to form a harmonious organism; instead they formed a world apart, a mediaeval world. In these countries the rôle of national consciousness was usurped by armies and dynasties, all eager to protect the economical privileges of their class and to develop their national language and culture to the detriment of the subject races. A perfect example of this mediaeval type of civilization was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose constitution gave the power in Austria into the hands of the Hapsburg army and

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bureaucracy, and in Hungary into that of the Magyar feudal classes, allied with the *haute finance* and a small circle of intelligensia. This order of things led to a system of Germanization in Austria and of Magyarization in Hungary, directed against the Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Ruthenians, Poles, and Italians, peoples who constituted the large majority of the population.

In Hungary the system I have described provided two real and important privileges for the ruling classes: The one was the exclusion of the middle classes of the non-Magyar races from all government offices and from the local county administrations, as well as from the higher spheres of cultural life. The other was the restricted suffrage, exercised with open balloting, which gave full opportunity to the dominating classes to nullify not only the political action of the national minorities but also of the pure Magyar landless peasantry and working classes. Before and during the war not one representative of the Hungarian working classes or the Hungarian landless peasantry had a seat in the Hungarian Parliament. And the non-Magyar races, although they formed almost half of the entire population, were only represented by some fifty members out of a total of 453. Of these fifty some forty were the representatives of Croatia-Slavonia, composing the delegation chosen by the Sabor, or provincial assembly, at Zagreb.

This arbitrary system was the natural outcome of the mediaeval economic structure of Hungary, which left immense estates in the hands of the feudal lords (most of whom had obtained them from the Hapsburgs in return for military or other services at the time the lesser nobility and the peasantry were struggling for national independence), while on the other hand it excluded the vast majority of the Hungarian people from the ownership of landed property, or gave them allotments incapable of supporting independent peasant families.

This economic and political situation had a further natural consequence. With the growing power and consciousness of the national minorities the spirit of Magyar chauvinism rose higher and higher. The great liberal traditions of Francis Deák and Joseph Eötvös were forgotten, and there came in a vogue of Magyarization by force—by the artificial suppression of foreign tongues and cultures, by the persecution of the leaders of the national minorities, by the vexatious supervision of their schools

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and churches. The non-Magyar and non-German nations of the Dual State saw more and more clearly that their aspirations for national autonomy and cultural development were hopeless in the face of the mighty powers of Hungarian feudalism. Irredentist sentiment grew ever stronger, and the Slovaks, Rumanians and Jugoslavs of Hungary flirted in secret with organizations of their own or kindred nationalities, both within and without the Monarchy.

All these causes coöperated in creating a very uncertain political equilibrium in the Danube Basin. The air was full of plots and of trials for high treason. The nervousness of influential circles in Vienna increased and the more clear-sighted were of the opinion that a continuation of the situation was impossible. Certain influential groups and personages made attempts to overthrow the dualistic system and rebuild the Monarchy on the lines of a confederation. Unfortunately, all such efforts were shattered against the solid wall of Hungarian feudalism. Under these conditions the endangered Hapsburg Monarchy was compelled, in order to save itself, to adhere more and more closely to German imperialism as against the Slavs.

Certainly the tragic death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at the hands of a fanatic student exemplified one of the most profound causes of the war. It seemed to symbolize the impossible situation in the Danube Basin and the Balkans, to symbolize the desperate craving of the subjugated nations for independence and national autonomy. Hungarian democracy, under the leadership of Count Michael Károlyi, had done its best to prevent war, and during the war it advocated a separate peace.

The outbreak of the war found Count Károlyi in America, engaged in a tour of the Hungarian colonies with the aim of securing their political and financial support for the progressive movement in Hungary. At the first rumors that the Viennese militarists were preparing for a war against Serbia, he delivered several public speeches before Hungarian emigrant societies, in which he denounced the Dualistic system and called for a rapprochment with the Slavs. Previously he had sought to establish a liason with leading Frenchmen in order to develop a Franco-Hungarian understanding in opposition to German and Austrian imperialism, and he made no secret of the fact that he intended next to proceed to Russia to convince the Slav world of

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the peaceful intentions of the Hungarian people. In this he was prevented by the sudden outbreak of the war.

In the absence of Count Károlyi, the socialists and the radical liberals of Hungary did their best to ward off the war. Let me quote a sentence or two from an article of mine published in the liberal daily *Vilag* on July 19, 1914, during that fearful week just before outbreak of hostilities: "It is not true that sympathizers will be found in the ranks of working Hungary and thinking Hungary for a war against Serbia. Outside the feudal class and *haute finance* the whole public opinion of the country is for peace, and feels that it would be a crime to raise hecatombs for the Southern Slav ghost, which cannot be frightened away with the bloody instruments of war."

After the return of Count Károlyi to Hungary, he and his friends took every opportunity to denounce German imperialism and to advocate schemes for a separate peace. Count Károlyi was so energetic, and his activities were so popular, that a special Prussian spy, Major Consten, was sent to Budapest to gather evidence of high treason against him; in fact, he installed a special police bureau for this purpose, which was later a subject of protest in Parliament.

When her German ally was defeated the situation of the Dual Monarchy became desperate. Portions of the army were split into nationalistic groups, others were Bolshevized; anarchy and dissolution took the place of order and discipline. In Hungary the superhuman task of saving the country fell to the Government of Count Károlyi. Count Károlyi and his Cabinet, of which I was a member, saw clearly the impossibility of the task; but we considered it our patriotic duty to attempt the impossible. We did our best to appease the Bolshevized mind of the masses by introducing far-reaching democratic reforms. By proposing a vast scheme of democratic confederation we tried to convince our fellow citizens of foreign tongues that it would be more profitable for them to remain within the historical frontiers of Hungary than to secede.

And this we could do without hypocrisy and on a firm moral basis because Count Károlyi, the socialists and the radical liberals had for twenty years been advocating the very same program of universal suffrage, national autonomy and agrarian reform, and during that time had endured persecution and calumny in common. Our effort must not be considered, there-

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fore, as merely a last-minute make-shift to avoid Bolshevism, but as the final step in a consistent democratic program, to further which we had sacrificed a life-time of public activity.

Feverishly we introduced reforms, the elaboration and administration of which should have taken decades. We introduced universal suffrage and the secret ballot with proportional representation. We secured all the public liberties of the people, especially free press and free speech. We tried to meet the needs of the working masses by a very advanced social policy. We separated the church from the state and inaugurated genuine liberal education. We offered honest home rule to all our nationalities, following the example of the United States and Switzerland. We began energetically the expropriation of the latifundia in order to create an independent and liberal-minded farmer class. As an example, Count Károlyi of his own accord gave up all his estates for the good of the public.

In the meantime we took pains to emphasize our peaceful intentions towards the newly formed neighboring states and let them know that we advocated an economic policy of complete free trade and a cultural policy based on reciprocal guarantees of national autonomy for all minorities. To demonstrate the earnestness of these reforms and intentions, we dethroned the Hapsburgs and proclaimed a democratic republic.

Unfortunately our efforts were of no avail. The working classes abandoned the flag of the republic and our alien races forsook the boundaries of ancient Hungary. Despair and starvation threw the nation into the arms of the Bolsheviks. Circumstances analagous to those prevailing in Russia after the fall of Tsarism—economic blockade, famine, national humiliation, mutilation of the country, the Messianic creed of Marxism, the entire disorganization of social and political life—led to very similar consequences.

The system which I have described, ending in a total economic, moral and political collapse, in turn plunged unfortunate Hungary into the disaster of the Rumanian occupation, and following upon that—under the auspices of the Allies—into the White Bolshevism of Admiral Horthy. Under the pretext of extirpating Communism—which after the defeat of the Red Army became a mere dead dog—Horthy exterminated at the same time the political and social liberties of the country. I must confine myself to pointing out merely the principal features of

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this new régime. They included the suppression of universal suffrage and of the secret ballot, the persecution of the press, the establishment of internment camps for political malcontents, the creation of an order of Knighthood, the passage of emergency laws against republicans and those who criticised the new system abroad and of a law of *numerus clausus* for the elimination of Jewish students from the higher schools, the militarization of the coal mines, and the nullification of endeavors to obtain land for the landless peasantry by a legal expropriation of the feudal estates.

II

When we come to analyse the fundamental changes which the war has brought about in the national and economic structures of practically all of the countries of Central Europe, it is necessary for us to elevate our minds above the tragedies and miseries of the present situation and view only the broader issues of the war and of the peace settlement, unbiased by the heavy losses which they have brought to many nations and many classes.

From this perspective I see some most beneficial and also some pernicious results. Let me begin with the advantageous changes:

As a result of the war, the question of nationalities was solved in many regions; new and more ethnically homogeneous states whose population had formerly been under alien rule now came into independent existence. Many ancient irredentas ceased to be. Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, achieved all if not more than they had aspired to for centuries. In broad terms, the movement towards universal national autonomy took an important step forward.

Another propitious change was that the three oppressive military dynasties which had continually plagued Europe with their warlike preparations and imperialistic dreams were destroyed; Romanoffs, Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs no longer impede the march of popular progress.

Even more important is the movement which I will call "the advent of the peasants," which like a gigantic wave has broken down, wholly or in part, the old ramparts of feudalism in all the new states and overturned the economic and social domination of the great landlords. All over Central and Eastern Europe—from the borders of Hungary northwards to the Baltic, southwards to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and eastwards to

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Siberia—the old feudal holdings have been expropriated and divided among the small and landless peasantry.

And in consequence of this fundamental social and economic change another very promising and propitious fact now dominates the horizon of Central Europe. I refer to the cultural elevation of the former semi-bondsmen. The elementary and high schools in the newly formed states are crowded with peasant boys and girls who under their former rulers were held in a deplorable state of illiteracy.

When I thus emphasize all these profound beneficial changes it becomes also my duty to point out certain dangerous and unfortunate features that followed in the wake of Armageddon. One of the most distressing results of the World War is the state of economic and moral collapse which naturally is most accentuated among the vanquished nations, but the consequences of which bear down also on the victors.

Large economic units, many centuries old, linked together by ties of cultural intercourse and free trade, were broken to pieces. A great number of military and customs barriers were established, dividing populations which long had lived in economic unity. These artificial changes stopped the natural blood-circulation of many ancient economic organisms as if their veins had been gripped in an iron vise. As a result, there has been a serious falling off in production in many regions, and in some misery and famine prevails.

These economic changes involve serious moral consequences as well. *Homo homini lupus*—the original collective mind of human society, according to the pessimistic philosophy of Hobbes—came back again into being in many parts of Russia, Central Europe, and the Balkans.

This economic and social disease is further aggravated by a spirit of national and race hatred which is perhaps even more bitter than before the war. One chief cause is that the peace treaties were short sighted and unjust in many respects and inflicted unnecessary humiliation and economic hardship upon the losers. It must be admitted that in Central and Eastern Europe it is often impossible to draw an absolutely equitable ethnographic line between different peoples, so inextricably are they intermingled. In consequence, it was often inevitable that national minorities should be sacrificed to the principle of building up a national home for the homogenous majority of the popu-

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lation. But the peace treaties inflicted unnecessary cruelties which could have been avoided by a wiser spirit of justice and benevolence.

Many of the new irredentas created by the peace treaties are even more dangerous than were the old ones, because they consist of elements which were formerly in a dominant position and which, therefore, usually represent a higher degree of culture and national consciousness than is possessed by the new dominant rulers.

All these factors work to create a poisoned atmosphere of national hatred, irredentist dreams and mutual suspicion, which inevitably leads towards a revival of the old militaristic and imperialistic system (the elimination of which was the main purpose of enlightened public opinion throughout the world) and the establishment of new absolutisms and dictatorships, now on the side of the Reds and now on the side of the Whites.

III

In the light of the foregoing facts, I think the importance of the Hungarian problem is clear. The chief victim of the historical forces I have enumerated was my unhappy country. We lost about two-thirds of our territory, with the most valuable industrial and commercial resources, and fifty-nine per cent of our population. This tragedy was further accentuated by the fact that very important Magyar minorities came under foreign domination. This was partly a natural consequence of the situation of Magyar minorities as small islands, pushed forward into the seas of subject nations, and partly due to exaggerated pretensions by the new states, who often based their claims on the argument of needing strategical safeguards.

In consequence, new and important Magyar irredentas arose inside the frontiers of the new states. Hungarian statistics estimate the Magyar minorities under alien rule at over three millions. These figures are perhaps exaggerated. We must keep in mind, too, the fact that a very considerable emigration from the annexed territories followed the dismemberment of the mother country, and that a large number of the detached population consisted of half-assimilated elements, especially Jews, who will doubtless change their national sentiments in accordance with their new situation. But apart from all this, the new states contain considerable Hungarian minorities which present a

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serious problem to those who wish to avoid the calamities encountered by the Magyar Government in pre-war days.

This problem is indeed a difficult one. The Hungarian minorities today under alien rule are proud and self-conscious. For centuries they were the rulers, in some instances the oppressors, of their present rulers. Their loss of political and economic privileges, their changed standard of life, are naturally bitter to the upper classes of these Hungarian minorities. Add to this the fact that even in the new countries where the government is openly and loyally opposed to any process of forced assimilation the exaggerated nationalism and chauvinism of certain officials and societies makes the situation of the Hungarian minorities difficult. Many of the methods of the old Magyar system have been adopted. This tendency is accentuated for two reasons. In the first place there is the motive of revenge. The new rulers wish to show to their erstwhile oppressors exactly how harsh their system was. In the second place there is the fear provoked by the threats and the warlike preparations of the Horthy Government. As a result, the public is inclined to ask how they can guarantee national and cultural autonomy to the Magyar minorities within their borders so long as the Magyar mother-country is preparing for war.

There are two ways open for mutilated Hungary to set about restoring her strength and healing her wounds.

The one would be a democratic and pacific way: the reformation of her agricultural organization; the elimination of the unearned increment of the feudal classes; democratization of her public life; honest suppression of war-like activity; and the adoption of an energetic initiative in developing sincere cultural and economic relations with the neighboring states. This would serve to cure the wounds of Hungary's dismemberment, would create a prosperous farmer class which could develop modern intensive agriculture (for Hungary is still a rich country, although her mighty resources are almost undeveloped,) and would open the way for the Hungarian intelligentsia to find useful work in the newly formed states, where their scientific, technical and financial services are badly needed. The old territorial unity of Hungary became an impossibility after Europe's latest evolution. But on the basis of the policy I have outlined it would be possible to restore the national and cultural integrity of the Hunariang race by securing a free economic and cultural inter-

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course between the mother country and her detached territories. In such a pacific and creative atmosphere it would also be possible to alleviate and correct certain injustices of the peace treaty. We could hope for a rectification of our frontiers at many points and for the recovery of certain territories inhabited by compact Magyar populations. Signs are not wanting that in a peaceful and loyal atmosphere such changes could be brought about. President Masaryk of Czechoslovakia, for instance—the most enlightened and humane statesman of Europe—told me on several occasions, and has since repeated the statement to a well-known newspaperman of Budapest, that if a democratic government should be established in Hungary, the loyal and peaceful intentions of which could not be questioned, the Czechoslovak nation would be inclined spontaneously to take a step in the direction of a more just and equitable rearrangement of the frontiers.

Unfortunately the way out just indicated is barred for the Horthy régime, as the policy which I have described is the line of action which the feudal aristocracy fears and hates the most. The essential aims of this oligarchy are the restitution of the Hapsburgs, the restoration of the former frontiers, the renewed domination of Magyars over alien races and, above all, the maintenance of the large feudal estates. This last aim is perhaps the most important to them, as the peace treaty deprived Hungary of just those territories where the small peasantry was most predominant. I can say without exaggeration that three-fourths of the agricultural population of present-day Hungary is landless, or owns such small allotments that peasant life is precarious. The resulting antagonism between the great feudal class and the landless people is the cause of incessant tension and no better future for Hungary is possible without a sincere and honest solution of this problem.

These circumstances compel the military dictatorship in Hungary to choose another way out, one very different from the policy I have indicated. According to their idealogy Hungary was innocent of complicity in bringing on the World War, which was really caused by German-French capitalistic rivalry. The Hungarian army was actually victorious, and its collapse was brought about by conspiracy. Hungary today, in her mutilated form, is a country incapable of existence. All serious economic and social reforms must await the restoration of her historic

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frontiers. Therefore, it must be Hungary's sole endeavor to create an efficient army and to get powerful allies for the new war which will come within a short time.

If we examine the situation, then, we cannot fail to see that the Hungarian question is the key to the whole problem, an Archimedean point, as it were, for peace or war in Central Europe. And I venture to say—nor will future history contradict me—that without a complete democratization of Hungary, without the inauguration of a new internal and external policy in that country, a new war in Central Europe is inevitable.

IV

But the plan I have outlined signifies far more, to my mind, than a necessary compromise or a wholesome application of therapeutics to heal the present unwholesome and dangerous condition of my countrymen. It also signifies to me the taking of the first step in a more vast and comprehensive task—the task of establishing a new international order. The measure I have indicated would smooth the way, I believe, towards a New Europe. The Old Europe is corroded by imperialism, by foreign war and civil war. The vicious feudal dogma of an absolute national sovereignty makes almost impossible all social life worthy of the name. All the states of Central Europe live in a state of clandestine anarchy. Nations have no consideration for each other either in economics or in politics. This system destroys all moral unity in Europe. European distress, misery, anarchy, and civil war are, in their deepest roots, a moral problem.

What our most profound and noble thinkers—a Saint-Simon, a Proudhon, a Tolstoi, a Dostoievski, a Romain Roland, an H. G. Wells—predicted long ago, has become a reality: Europe is in a state of dissolution, because the spirit of a new Machiavellism destroys private and public morality.

And the only way out of this hell is the adoption of the American method or the system of the British Commonwealth—the Anglo-Saxon way of confederation. All other methods proposed during the past few years have been quackeries. The only possible cure for Europe's ills is a democratic confederation of democratic peoples, the extirpation of the system of rigid and selfish national sovereignty, peaceful and rational coöperation between all countries for the common good of all. The fundamentals of this system are to be found in two basic institutions:

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one, free trade between all the parties to the confederation; the other, a system of honest national and cultural autonomy for all national minorities living within the boundaries of the confederation. Under such conditions political frontiers would slowly become mere demarcations of administrative divisions.

Unfortunately this plan, though advocated by the best European thinkers, among them by President Masaryk himself, is at present entirely utopian, given the atmosphere of hatred now prevalent. The more moderate scheme of a confederation of the peoples of the Balkans and the Danube (the great creative idea of Louis Kossuth, which he conceived during the painful years of his exile after he had come to realize the immense importance of nationality) appears at first glance to be hardly less utopian. Still, my friends and I have taken it up, and we have developed it further, until we look upon it as the first serious step toward larger confederations in Europe.

The territories of the Danube and the Balkans are linked together by powerful economic, geographical, and cultural ties. Peaceful coöperation between them seems to be the order of destiny. Any one of the nations in this region is too small to live an entirely independent economic and political life, and the deadly struggles and rivalries among them make them all easy victims of foreign imperialistic schemes. Yesterday some of them were vassals of German imperialism—today of French—perhaps tomorrow of some Panslavic combination. The only road towards real self-determination, national independence, and economic prosperity lies in the direction of a free-trade Danubian Confederation.

Although these hopes are for the moment rendered vain by national and race hatred, by the economic and political jealousies of the capitalistic and militaristic classes, we can make honest efforts in the right direction, and chief among them one for the final elimination of Hapsburg feudalism and the establishment of a democratic and peaceable Hungarian Republic.

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THE BRITISH FLAG ON THE CASPIAN: A SIDE-SHOW OF THE GREAT WAR

By Brig. Gen. Sir Percy Sykes

THE titanic struggle in the west left the British public scant leisure for following the fortunes of the "side-shows." Yet the "side-show" in Asia produced results that were important and far-reaching. From another point of view they were essentially dramatic, and proved British officers and men the peers of the Englishmen who made the reign of Queen Elizabeth illustrious.

The capture of Bagdad in March, 1917, was rightly held to be a great achievement, and the results were felt far and wide; but in the very same month the collapse of the mighty Russian army was started by the issuance of the notorious Army Order No. 1, which struck at the root of military discipline by laying down that the Russian soldier need no longer salute his officer. As the months passed, it gradually became certain that Russia had ceased to count in the World War, and in England even the man in the street began to discuss the ominous movement of German divisions from the Russian front to the west.

What was not realized, except by a few, was that the collapse of Russia destroyed the main protection of the Indian Empire, which was the chief objective of the Germans in Asia. It was, indeed, true that the southern route across Persia, which had appeared to the Germans so promising in 1916, had been closed by the capture of Bagdad. But now a much better northern route was available, *via* Batum to Baku on the Caspian, and thence, across that inland sea, to Krasnovodsk, Askabad, and Tashkent. At this period the number of German and Austrian prisoners in Central Asia exceeded one hundred thousand, and had the German staff been able to regain touch with this large body of veterans and form even two divisions, utilizing for the purpose Russian munitions, equipment and transport, an advance into Afghanistan would have compelled the Amir to range himself on the side of the allies of the Caliph. Moreover, upon receiving the signal from Kabul, the tribes of the northwest frontier of India would have risen immediately, and an overwhelming force would have invaded the rich plains of the Indus Valley.

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The position was almost desperate and demanded measures involving the greatest risks, but British initiative rose to the occasion. It was decided to meet the enemy as far as possible from the frontiers of India and, in pursuance of this sound policy, to despatch a mission across northwest Persia and the Caspian to the Caucasus, with the object of inducing the inhabitants of the latter region to fight for their homes and thereby prevent the Turks and their German masters from taking Baku. The occupation by the enemy of this town, the chief port on the Caspian, would not only have constituted an important advance along the Batum-Baku-Tashkent line, but would have made secure their control of the priceless oil fields, on which almost the whole system of transport on the Caspian and in neighboring areas depended. Indeed, oil was the pivotal question. In consequence, to deny Baku to the enemy, even for a while, was of great importance.

Major-General Dunsterville was appointed to carry out this extremely difficult task. After many adventures in crossing Persia, he reached Baku in the summer of 1918 at the head of about one thousand British troops, and immediately set to work to organize the town against two Turkish divisions that were already knocking at its gates. Unfortunately, the Armenians were but half-hearted allies, considering that the British force was too small for its task. Moreover, the large Tartar population was bitterly hostile to the Armenians and friendly to the Turks, so that the permanent defense of Baku was an impossible task from the military point of view.

During this critical period the British Admiralty had also been taking thought, with the result that in July Commodore David Norris left Bagdad with his broad pennant flying on a Ford car. His advance party included two officers, twenty-two men, one 4-inch and two 12-pounder guns. The distance to be traversed from Bagdad across western Persia to Enzeli, the port on the Caspian, was seven hundred miles. The roads were bad, if compared with any metaled roads in Europe, and the strain on the cars was severe, but the party pushed steadily on, crossing range after range, until it reached Hamadan, where the tomb of Esther and Mordecai struck a familiar note for the seamen. Everywhere they aroused intense curiosity which was heightened by the fact that their mission was being kept secret. The Persians were naturally excited at the unwonted sight of

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the broad pennant, while the long barrels of the guns inspired respect. In spite of the bad going, one hundred miles a day were accomplished and, within a week of leaving Bagdad, Commodore Norris reached General Dunsterville's headquarters at Kazvin. He there ascertained that the Bolshevists had recently been expelled from Baku, and that the newly formed Centro-Caspian Dictatorship had appealed for aid, which the General was giving them. To anxious inquiries about oil-fuel, on which all naval action hinged, a satisfactory reply was given.

Commodore Norris had arrived on the scene just in time. Two days later he ended his long motor journey at Enzeli, where he soon took stock of the port which had been constructed by a Russian company, from whose representative he hired the wharves, sheds and oil tanks. Two British officers were placed in charge of the harbor and shipping, and they slowly evolved order out of chaos, for since the collapse of Russia everything, including the dredging, had been neglected. There were considerable difficulties to be overcome. To begin with, the Bolshevists were both powerful and hostile at the port and made mischief in every possible way, even pretending that the numbering of the berths was a dangerous form of propaganda! From Baku, too, there was much opposition, chiefly because the money for the hire of the docks had been paid at Enzeli, instead of at Baku —and money in the East is the root of all evil. The Commodore proceeded to Baku on board a chartered steamer named the *Kruger*, the saloon of which was adorned with a large portrait of "Oom Paul."

Upon arrival at Baku he carefully examined the harbor, which is a semi-circle running east and west, with the town in three distinct divisions lining the shore. To the west is a large oil field, the naval yard and the power station; then comes the important and extensive oil refineries and dockyards, which constitute the "Black Town"; touching this is the "White Town," which includes the business and residential quarters.

The position of affairs at Baku at this period almost defied description. The government was carried on by committees, which intrigued against one another, and by Russian and Armenian generals who gave contradictory orders, few of which were obeyed. The Armenians ought to have realized that they would be massacred in the event of Baku falling, if only for the sufficient reason that they had quite recently killed some thou-

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

THE SCENE OF BRITISH OPERATIONS

sands of its Tartar inhabitants. Yet they considered that the British should bear the brunt of the fighting, while they themselves reserved the right to criticize their allies freely and unfairly. They also seemed to regard them in the light of universal providers.

To show how difficult it was to make the Armenians into serviceable fighting men, it may be mentioned that their machine guns were each manned by a group, and that when the men decided they required a change they returned to Baku without permission, taking their machine gun with them and, of course, leaving a gap in the scheme of defense. Again, when requested to dig themselves in, the suggestion raised a storm of indignation, couched in the words "Only cowards dig trenches. We are not

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cowards, but Armenians thirsting for the fight." They usually ended these protests by lining up and firing a volley at the sky, regardless of the futility of the proceeding and the scarcity of ammunition. The Gilbertian touch was strengthened by the fact that the power station supplied light to the Turkish Headquarters as well as to the town!

The strongest force was the Centro-Caspian Flotilla, consisting of twelve armed vessels, including two light cruisers, which had policed the Caspian before the Russian Revolution. It played entirely for its own hand and, being controlled by a committee, possessed little fighting value. To strengthen the hands of the Commodore, Gen. Dunsterville announced to him one morning that he had decided to make him a Rear-Admiral. Norris protested against this forced promotion on the ground that only the Admiralty could gazette him to a higher rank, but, failing to convince the General, he ended the conversation by saying, "Very well, Sir, if you make me a Rear-Admiral, I shall make you a Bishop." The Commodore on his arrival at Baku inspected the dockyards, which he found to be well equipped. He sent for the guns from Enzeli and efforts were made to take over and arm one or two vessels. This scheme, however, was strongly opposed by the Flotilla committee, which objected to the organization of another—and possibly rival—force on the Caspian.

As an interlude to the wearisome negotiations, Commodore Norris accepted an invitation to go on board the *Ardagan*, the Flotilla committee's ship, which had been ordered to shell Turkish trains that were passing along the shores of the Caspian within easy range. When he boarded the filthy vessel he found no one awake, but in course of time the stokers appeared, got up steam, and the ship started after its commander had waited in vain for a considerable proportion of the crew that had decided to remain at Baku. The men were friendly and presented the Commodore and his officers with a large tin of caviare. He, on his part, produced some sardines and other delicacies, which the Russian officers immediately devoured, to avoid being obliged to share them with the crew, with whom they messed. Meanwhile the *Ardagan* was steaming along the coast and fired at one or two trains at long range without much success. Norris suggested that the ship should approach the shore in order to gain an effective range. This was being done when the committee

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held a hurried meeting and unanimously declared that, in view of the fact that a field battery was known to be stationed in the neighborhood, the ship should immediately return to Baku. The order was, perforce, executed by the captain.

The negotiations with the committee dragged on, the Russians demanding that the British should mount their guns on the ships of the Flotilla and serve under its officers, while Commodore Norris, whose trump card was his knowledge that the Flotilla possessed very little in the way of ammunition, held out for British control. This trying situation was ended by the long-delayed Turkish assault. This was successful, for although the British put up a splendid fight, suffering twenty per cent casualties, the Armenians cut off to their homes and left large areas totally undefended. Gen. Dunsterville finally gave the order to evacuate Baku and informed the committee of his decision. Realizing, at last, the grim reality of the situation, they implored and threatened, one of the sternest "die-hards" telephoning to the Flotilla to open fire on the *Kruger*, while another concluded an impassioned speech with a request for passage for his family and himself. Thanks to admirable staff work, the British troops were all finally embarked and, with lights out, the *Kruger* steamed cautiously out of the harbor. But, suddenly, as the guardship was being passed, a member of the crew, which was composed of Russians, turned on the electric lights. The guardship immediately opened fire, and it was only thanks to good luck that the "Dunsterforce" reached Enzeli in safety.

Thus ended the first act of the drama. Gen. Dunsterville had done a great service in preventing the enemy for a period of six weeks from reaching the Caspian and obtaining possession of the oil fields. He had also occupied the attention of a large body of Turkish troops and many German officers, whose services were badly needed elsewhere. From the naval point of view, experience had been gained, which was destined to bear fruit in the immediate future.

Supplementing the mission of Gen. Dunsterville, a second mission was despatched in the summer of 1918 across Eastern Persia to Transcaspia, under Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleson. Its object was to support those elements of the population which were hostile to the Bolshevists, and to prevent the western section of the Central Asian Railway and the port of Krasnovodsk from falling into enemy hands. Had the Turks, after the capture

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of Baku, been able to seize Krasnovodsk, the mission (which had been joined by the Turkomans and a number of Russians who termed themselves Menshevists) would have destroyed the railway line and thus have delayed for a long period the junction of the Germans with their fellow countrymen who were prisoners of war at Tashkent.

For a while, after the evacuation of Baku, the Centro-Caspian Flotilla held the trump cards and its action might have been decisive. As a matter of fact, the committee was unwilling to serve the Turks or the Tartars who were now the masters of Baku. It was equally unwilling to join the Bolshevists at Astrakhan, as its independence would have been lost. Towards the British there was deep if suppressed hostility and, had there been no garrison at Enzeli, an attack against them might have been attempted. At the same time, the committee did not wish to run risks, and finally decided to wait and see and—as the French wittily express it—*voler au secours de la victoire.*

The curtain was raised on the second act with the arrival of Commodore Norris at Krasnovodsk. He was received with enthusiasm by President Khun, an ex-ticket collector, who was a leader of the Menshevists. Unlike the unfriendly committees at Baku, this man helped in every way possible, and ships were speedily taken up and armed. The first to be equipped was the *Kruger*, the waist being filled with bales of cotton, on which four field guns were lashed down. These guns, which were manned by the Royal Field Artillery, could not be moved, so to fight them the ship had to be turned. But at this period it was all a game of bluff and, as a Persian happily put it, the *Kruger* looked very fierce. By the end of October five steamers had been armed and three more were nearly ready. When the great distance from the base at Bombay, the bad roads in Persia, the lack of a dockyard and the scanty personnel are considered, the results achieved were remarkable.

The equipment of this squadron coincided with the collapse of Turkey, and in the middle of November, two months after the evacuation, Baku was reoccupied by the British. On this occasion they had to deal with the Tartar population, for after the capture of Baku these fierce Moslems had massacred the Armenians to the number of sixteen thousand men and women, and now ruled the city. The Great War had been won; but as it had been decided to support General Denikin's attempt to over-

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throw the Bolshevist Government there was still ample scope for the activities of the little naval force that had been created. The situation was greatly improved by the fact that the railway line at Batum was now in British hands. On the other hand, it was known that the Bolshevists possessed a strong squadron at Astrakhan, which had been strengthened by destroyers of a modern type, sent across Russia from the Baltic. Early in December, four armed vessels started northwards on a cruise which marked the beginning of British control of the Caspian. Three armed Bolshevist vessels meanwhile attacked two British ships which were at anchor, but retreated when the latter opened fire. The British then bombarded and destroyed the Bolshevist advanced base on Chechen Island. These successful operations took place before the upper portion of the Caspian became frozen over, to the north of a line running a little on the Astrakhan side of Chechen Island on the west to Alexandrovsk on the east coast.

The British, safe from interruptions, now set to work to transfer their main base from Krasnovodsk to Baku, and during the winter the ships were re-armed with more modern guns; these were still, however, lighter and of less range than those mounted by the Bolshevists. Twelve coastal motor boats were received and a base, including an aerodrome for forty aeroplanes, was formed at the harbor of Petrovsk, two hundred and forty miles to the north of Baku. Finally, an advanced base was established at Chechen Island, which is ninety miles to the north of Petrovsk. Thus preparations were made in every way for the resumption of hostilities in the spring, and, in the meantime, the mere prevention of the export of oil from Baku affected the enemy unfavorably in more ways than one.

Early in the new year the question of the Centro-Caspian Flotilla became acute. It rendered a nominal obedience to Denikin, but wireless messages had been intercepted which proved that it was in constant communication with the Bolshevists. It was obviously a serious potential danger to the British and it was decided to take prompt action. The task was both difficult and delicate, as the Flotilla was in a position to give serious trouble. Fortunately the British motor boats, cruising about at twenty-five knots an hour, with their torpedoes ready to be discharged, rattled the committees badly; and after two torpedoes had been fired the Flotilla surrendered and tamely

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steamed to the moorings assigned to it. After this important task had been successfully accomplished without loss of life, the White Ensign of the British Navy was, at last, hoisted with befitting ceremony.

With the breaking of the ice the third act of the play commenced. Commodore Norris was anxious to try conclusions with the Bolshevist squadron before it had recovered from its enforced period of idleness. A study of the map will show that Alexandrovsk is, as already stated, opposite Chechen Island and is one hundred and twenty miles from it. As had been anticipated, it was now occupied by the Bolshevists, who by this move very foolishly fell in with the plans of the British. The operations commenced with bombing raids on Astrakhan and the bases of the Bolshevist squadron in the Volga delta, the airmen in their raids flying at least as far as in any other war area. Early in May, enemy ships were sighted and proved to be three armed vessels towing two large barges under escort of a destroyer. The enemy slipped the barges and escaped into Alexandrovsk, leaving the crews, which included an old woman whose white undergarment had been hoisted in token of surrender. The barges contained coal which was intended for the destroyers, and this was duly burned with the barges. An examination of the prisoners brought to light the fact that the full Bolshevist force was in Alexandrovsk harbor and that it consisted of eight destroyers, eight armed ships, ten motor boats and two or three submarines, which latter vessels, however, never appeared on the scene. To this force the British were only able to oppose five armed merchantmen, so that the odds, so far as material strength went, were all against us. Fortunately, in morale the odds were all the other way.

An opportunity to attack was now awaited. After two or three foggy days, May 20th broke fair, and a seaplane returned from a bombing expedition with the good news that the enemy force was still in the harbor of Alexandrovsk. The following day was equally fine and it was decided to attack. The harbor, an inlet some six miles in length, resembles a V, with the splay facing north. When the British approached they sighted a number of craft, including several destroyers, but these disappeared northwards, while the other armed vessels opened fire and then retreated down the harbor. With considerable intrepidity, Commodore Norris decided to follow, despite the risk of a submarine

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attack and in spite of the danger of shoals from which the buoys had been removed. As the little squadron advanced, it was possible for only two of the ships to open fire at the range, whereas the Bolshevist guns were in action throughout. Despite this, a large barge mounting two 6-inch guns was first hit and set on fire, and a second ship was also burnt. Meanwhile, the enemy retreated right down the harbor, taking cover behind various merchant vessels and also being protected by a battery of guns mounted on the shore. The British were finally able to get into range with their 4-inch guns, and dense clouds of smoke testified to the deadly accuracy of their gunners. Meanwhile, two of the British ships were badly hit, one of them, which by reason of its 6-inch guns was the "Dreadnought" of the squadron, becoming almost unmanageable. Commodore Norris therefore decided, after the action had been in progress for rather over an hour, to break it off. When the squadron was clear of the harbor loud explosions were heard, proving that the efforts of the British had been crowned with success. An attempt was now made to bring up the carrier ship with its four motor boats, but the wireless could not be worked and the opportunity was lost. However, the action, in which the British were strikingly inferior in the power and range of their guns, resulted in the sinking of nine enemy ships, including one large destroyer. On the following day the only available seaplane made no less than five bombing raids which confirmed the results of the British victory.

A few days later the British visited the scene of their triumph and found it to be deserted. Some fishermen informed them that two Bolshevist destroyers had, by mistake, engaged one another and that one had been sunk, but the Commodore did not add this to his total. Finally, bombing raids were organized on the "lame ducks," but they managed to escape up the Volga where, at any rate, their battered condition proved the severity of the Bolshevist defeat, news of which soon spread far and wide. Some weeks later, it was reported that the Bolshevist commander, who was only a sub-lieutenant, had been shot, and that his successor had placed his motor boats under the command of his wife!

Some months previously Commodore Norris had opened up relations with the Ural Cossacks, who dwell near the mouth of the river of that name. They had stoutly opposed the Bolshevists and were given a supply of munitions by the British. After the victory at Alexandrovsk, the Commodore visited their

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port, Gurieff, and received a warm welcome. He was made an honorary Ural Cossack, a distinction which has only been bestowed on twelve individuals, the other British recipient being Sir George Buchanan, the former British Ambassador to Russia. The ceremony of initiation was lengthy and distinctly "wet." These Cossacks were primitive folk, wearing their hair and beards very long. When they joined Denikin's force and were obliged to cut their hair and trim their beards their feelings were outraged to such an extent that they dispatched a special deputation of their women to remonstrate with the General.

During the summer the months passed somewhat monotonously. The climate was hot and trying, mails were few and far between, and the seaman did not take kindly to caviare, which is the delicacy of Baku, stigmatizing it as "that —— fish-jam." One incident, however, caused considerable amusement. The Bolshevists despatched a seaplane to bomb the British and, in order to stimulate the pilot to perform prodigies of valor, they placed an emissary in back of him, with orders to shoot him should he betray any lack of courage. But the best laid plans are apt to miscarry, and these two men formed a Soviet in due form and unanimously decided to surrender. Accordingly, they descended at some distance from the British squadron and were soon in safety on board a British vessel.

Little reference has been made to the difficulties of the naval authorities in dealing with the Tartar Government of the State of Azerbaijan, as the town of Baku and the surrounding districts were now termed. For example, the President remarked to Commodore Norris at their first meeting, which was some time after the victory at Alexandrovsk, that he wondered why he never saw him or his ships at Baku. The Commodore countered by inquiring whether he had noticed any hostile ships bombarding Baku, and upon receiving the President's acknowledgment that he had not, explained that his absence was due to the fact that his ships were watching the Bolshevists and that it was owing to this that Baku was safe. This was entirely a new point of view for the President, who did not believe in what he could not see, but he had the grace to declare himself satisfied.

During the summer there was much uncertainty as to the future. Denikin twice attempted to capture Astrakhan, but each time failed. This was hardly surprising, in view of the fact that his staff attempted to arrange for combined land and sea

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operations, in which the British were to participate, without consulting the charts. Not that the charts were especially accurate, for those used by the British were fifteen miles out on the eastern side of the Caspian. When this was pointed out to a Russian naval officer he replied "*Nichevo*—it is nothing—for the topography on the western side is nine miles out"!

In the early autumn the curtain was rung down on this gallant little "side-show" of the Great War. Orders were issued for the ships, munitions and stores to be handed over to representatives of Denikin, who showed their zeal by opening dozens upon dozens of tins of bully beef, presumably to assure themselves that they did not contain brickbats. The British, who had wished to see the matter through, had serious fears for the future, since Denikin, an honest patriot, was surrounded by many of the old official class who were intensely disliked by the people.

When the actual handing over began, the Baku Government, which was seriously alarmed, claimed to receive an equal number of ships and offered the command to the Commodore, the value of whose services they finally appreciated. When two heavy guns that had been mounted on shore came to be dismantled and the breech blocks were removed, the Tartar Governor actually made a bid of one million roubles for them. During the evacuation, Baku was flooded with Bolshevist literature, couched in good English and explaining that the British were fighting on the side of reaction against the forces of labor and progress. Each section of the appeal wound up with "Why don't you go home?" which question hugely amused all ranks. Less appreciated was the Admiralty order giving instructions for salutes to be fired and the main brace spliced in honor of the signature of the Peace Treaty. As the principal part of the manoeuvre referred to above consists of serving out a double tot of rum, of which there was not on hand a drop, Commodore Norris was obliged to reply regretfully that the order was impossible of execution.

On August 24th the evacuation was completed, and the Commodore and his staff were entertained at a great banquet. Many speeches were made, testifying to the gratitude felt for the work of the British and to the deep regret over their departure. The next day the train moved off to Batum and home with the band playing Tipperary.

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At the beginning of this little account a reference was made to our valiant ancestors of the Elizabethan era. A notable figure among them was Anthony Jenkinson, the first Englishman to sail down the Volga and to launch out across the Caspian Sea to Persia. In the vivid account of his adventures he wrote, with pride of race, that, "During the time of our nauigation, wee sette vppe the redde crosse of Saint George in our flagges." May we not hope that his heroic spirit has learnt how his descendants, three centuries later, hoisted the White Ensign in the same remote inland sea?

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AGAIN THE YELLOW PERIL

By Raymond Leslie Buell

RACIAL antagonism resembles justice in one respect if in no other: it may sleep but it never dies. The conflict of color is resurgent in the Dominions of the British Empire where Asiatic immigration is still a problem, and in the Crown Colony of Kenya where Hindus, Britishers and blacks are agitated over "racial equality." It is resurgent in the United States, whether in the case of the negro, the Indian, or the Japanese. In a domestic sense, the Oriental problem in the United States is relatively unimportant. Contrasted with ten million negroes and 250,000 Indians, there are less than 150,000 Japanese in the United States. But from the international standpoint the problem may become one of considerable magnitude. The Japanese cannot be called an "inferior" people as is done with the Indians and the negroes; and they, alone of the color groups in this country, are represented by a sensitive and powerful government abroad.

Agitation of some sort against the Japanese in this country has recurred from time to time ever since 1900. President Roosevelt believed he had brought it to an end when he negotiated the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. President Wilson did penance for it when he consented to the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917 and allowed Japan to secure Shantung at the Paris Peace Conference. Undoubtedly President Harding hoped that the Washington Conference would dissipate all the misunderstandings between the two great powers of the Pacific.

Nevertheless the anti-Japanese agitation continues on the Pacific Coast, under the leadership of the Exclusion League and the American Legion. It is becoming aggressive in and about Seattle, a neighborhood which hitherto has been comparatively sympathetic with the Oriental. It has appeared in other parts of the State of Washington where, because of the anti-alien policy of the Department of the Interior, Japanese farmers have been unable to renew their leases of public lands. It has cropped out in the Utah, Idaho and Montana legislatures where anti-Japanese legislation has been debated. It is an endless theme in Hawaii, where the Labor Commission appointed by President Harding protested recently against the "menace of alien domina-

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tion." It has appeared in Congress, where exclusion bills are pending.

Diplomats, rear-admirals, and big business men are about the only persons in this country, or for that matter in Japan, who worry about the Open Door, naval bases, spheres of influence and railway rates in China. From the popular standpoint, the most important factors in the Oriental problem concern immigration and the treatment of Japanese in the United States—questions which the Washington Conference did not attempt to solve. The people of the Pacific Coast are indifferent to the disposition of the salt mines of Shantung. But they become very disturbed over Japanese "picture" and *kankodan* brides, and the Japanese birth rate in California. The people of Japan do not care a great deal whether the Bonin Islands are fortified. But they become greatly incensed when they hear of "racial insults" to Japanese in the United States.

A Japanese cannot become naturalized in this country as can a European. Congress has never passed a law expressly barring Japanese from naturalization, as it has done in the case of the Chinese; it has merely limited that privilege to "free white persons" and to negroes. But in November, 1922, the Supreme Court definitely ruled that free white persons meant only Caucasians, that the Japanese were not Caucasians, and that there was no evidence that Congress intended to make Japanese eligible to citizenship.[1] The Japanese are now confronted with the unpalatable fact, laid down in unmistakable terms by the highest court in the land, that we consider them unfit to become Americans.

We have justified the policy of naturalizing only "free white persons" on the ground that the "colored" races cannot comprehend democratic institutions or assimilate themselves in other ways to American life. Perhaps this theory, so dear to the Nordic idolators, is sound. But we disavowed it when we granted the franchise to the negro. And today we repeatedly disavow it when we admit to citizenship swarthy settlers from the Near East, Mexicans, and Parsees. Under the 14th Amendment, every child born in this country is an American citizen, regardless of the color of his skin or of that of his parents. A Japanese alien, even if he has lived here for forty years, cannot become a citizen if he wants to. But a Japanese child born here

[1] *Ozawa v. the United States*, 260 U. S. 178 (Nov. 13, 1922).

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becomes one whether he wishes to or not. Obviously, it is absurd to deny citizenship to Japanese aliens on the ground of race when we force it upon their children.

Awake to this inconsistency, leaders in the anti-Japanese movement propose a constitutional amendment which would exclude from American citizenship children of parents themselves ineligible. But such an amendment would violate the historic belief of this country that children born under our institutions can comprehend their purpose sufficiently well to exercise the duties of citizenship. By creating an increasing number of alien residents such an amendment would aggravate rather than remedy the Japanese problem. It would create a dangerous precedent which the South might use in an attempt to extend the principle to the negro.

While Japanese born in this country automatically become citizens of the United States, they also are citizens of Japan. The Japanese Civil Code declares: "A child is a Japanese if his or her father is a Japanese at the time of his or her birth." To the uninformed, there is something sinister about Japan's claim of allegiance from Japanese wherever they may be born. Yet this rule of *jus sanguinis* is followed by most of the countries of Europe and by several countries in South America. The Japanese Government has attempted to solve the problem of dual citizenship by the Expatriation Law of 1916, which allows Japanese born abroad, under certain conditions, to lose Japanese citizenship. But if application for expatriation is not made until after the age of seventeen the Japanese cannot lose his nationality without first returning home and performing the required military service. An increasing number of Japanese children born in this country are becoming expatriated, through their guardians, before the age of seventeen. But there seems to be no justification for the restriction imposed on those over this age. As long as the restriction exists, Japan's motives are likely to be questioned.

Discriminations of more practical importance than ineligibility to citizenship have been imposed on the Japanese by many western states. The Pacific Coast is particularly alarmed at the inroads which the Japanese have made into agriculture. Within the last ten years, the acreage under Japanese cultivation in California has increased between 300 and 400 per cent. Although the Japanese control only about three per cent of the farm land

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of the state they practically monopolize the vegetable business. Few white farmers today engage in truck farming. And whatever the cause for the rural exodus may be, the presence of Japanese competitors of a low standard of living, willing to work twelve or fourteen hours a day, is no incentive for the American to go back to the land.

In order to stop the invasion of agriculture, California, Washington and Arizona have passed anti-alien land laws. In 1913 California enacted a law, against the wishes of President Wilson, which denied to aliens ineligible to citizenship any rights in regard to real property which were not granted by the Treaty of 1911 between the United States and Japan—except the right to lease land for three years. As the Treaty of 1911 was a treaty only of commerce and navigation, and not of agriculture, this meant that Japanese could not purchase land for farming purposes. Nevertheless, the law offered little protection to the American farmer, because Japanese could still lease land in unlimited amounts, subject to renewal every three years. This led to the passage of an initiative measure in 1920, which abolished the right to lease land and prohibited several means which the Japanese had used to evade the 1913 law.

In 1921 the legislature carried the anti-Japanese program further by passing a law placing the fifty-six Japanese language schools in California under state control. It also amended the school law so as to allow communities to establish separate schools for Japanese. Under this authority, half a dozen school districts have established separate schools or classrooms for Japanese children. In 1923 the legislature passed a bill which abolished the language schools altogether. But it was vetoed by Governor Richardson for constitutional reasons. A law was also passed prohibiting Japanese from making "croppage contracts." In such contracts the landlord allows the Japanese to cultivate the land in return for a half (or some such portion) of the crop. By means of croppage contracts the Japanese continued to stay on the farms, despite the laws of 1913 and 1920 prohibiting ownership and leases. In addition to prohibiting croppage contracts, the legislature passed two resolutions calling on Congress to prohibit Japanese immigration and advocating a constitutional amendment withholding citizenship from Japanese born in the United States. It is probable that the Exclusion League will place several initiative measures on the ballot at the next

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election, one prohibiting Japanese from engaging in the fishing business, which they now control, and a second prohibiting Japanese language schools in a manner that will conform, if possible, to the Supreme Court decision of June 4, 1923

Except for the time in 1906 when the distinguished Japanese scientist, Dr. F. Omori, was besieged with tomato cans by a gang of hoodlums in San Francisco, very little violence has been used against the Japanese on the Pacific Coast. However, a close approach to it occurred in the summer of 1921 when fifty-eight Japanese laborers were deported from the melon fields of Turlock because they had under-bid American "fruit tramps." No violence was employed because the Japanese offered no resistance. During the past year isolated attempts have also been made to burn Japanese houses and blackmail Japanese farmers.

Responsible anti-Japanese leaders have opposed the use of violence. Nevertheless, the anti-Japanese movement in the West has not stopped merely with repressive legislation. Fantastic charges in regard to emperor worship, Japanese "spies" and super-governments in California are widely circulated, and anti-Japanese novels such as Peter Kyne's "Pride of Palomar" are printed serially in the newspapers. Attempts of American denominations to build churches and community centers for Japanese congregations in Los Angeles, Hollywood, and Long Beach have been defeated under pressure of anti-Japanese leaders. When the agitation in regard to the proposed Japanese church in Hollywood was at its height, a yellow dodger was circulated to this effect:

Japs:

You came to care for our lawns—
We stood for it.
You came to work truck gardens—
We stood for it.
You sent your children to our public schools—
We stood for it.
You moved a few families in our midst—
We stood for it.
You propose to build a church in our neighborhood—
We didn't and won't stand for it.
You impose more on us each day until you have gone your limit.
We don't want you with us so, get busy, Japs, and move out of Hollywood!

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At Rose Hill signs such as these have been displayed: "*Japs: Don't Let the Sun Set on You Here. Keep Moving! This is Rose Hill.*" If attacks of this character continue, violence would seem to be the logical result.

On June 5, 1923, the Japanese American Relations Committee of Tokyo, of which Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa is chairman, issued a statement saying that the treatment of Japanese in America is "so grave that it may endanger our international relations and welfare." In order to pave the way for a solution of the problem, the Committee made this proposal: Let the two governments of Japan and America appoint a Joint High Commission consisting of a certain number of representatives of the two nations to study the question of Japanese immigrants in America. It shall be the duty of the Commission to examine the whole question with the utmost care and frankly to exchange their views; to investigate the real causes of misunderstanding and discord; to consider methods for the fundamental and permanent solution of the entire question; and to report their findings and specific recommendations to the respective governments, and also to the public of both countries.

Anti-Japanese leaders on the Pacific Coast are naturally opposed to this suggestion. They regard the problem as purely American, the major facts of which are known. They are afraid that the American members of such a commission would not be Westerners, and would lack information and a proper point of view.

At the same time, a number of these leaders have agreed to coöperate in an Oriental survey, now being undertaken under the auspices of the Committee on Social and Religious Surveys of New York City, which is an outgrowth of the Interchurch World Movement. Professor Robert E. Park of the University of Chicago is in charge of this survey, and he is being advised and assisted by five regional groups on the Pacific Coast, including Vancouver. These groups contain representatives of local Chambers of Commerce, organized labor, the Exclusion League, the American Legion, and religious organizations whenever they agree to participate. The survey is thus becoming a very important coöperative affair. It will study every aspect of Japanese, Chinese, and Hindu life in America. Particular care is being taken to prevent it from becoming propagandist in nature. It will not recommend a policy, but will merely present

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an impartial and authoritative summary of the facts. If this survey is completed as planned its chief importance will lie in the fact that it will have succeeded in bringing together factions which hitherto have had no ground in common.

Another bright spot in the situation is the work for the Japanese carried on by the churches. There are one hundred and sixty-seven Christian missions and churches for the Japanese on the Pacific Coast, with a membership of 5,390. In Los Angeles two denominations have combined to erect a Japanese Union church which is an outstanding achievement in Oriental assimilation. Out of the $100,000 put into this church, $65,000 was raised by Japanese. Despite a vigorous anti-Japanese campaign in Seattle, the Board of Education has turned over an old school building for the use of a Japanese congregational church; and the Japanese have been asked to contribute $10,000 to the Community Chest. The California Federation of Churches is outlining a program of Christian internationalism in which it hopes to educate the people of the state as to American relations with the Orient.

The churches do not believe in opening up the gates to Oriental immigration; but they realize that the future relations of the United States and the Orient will be determined very largely by the attitude of the Pacific Coast.

That the Japanese have responded to the advances made to them is shown by the recent appointment of six Americans as advisory members of the Japanese Association of America, and also by 2,000 replies to a questionnaire sent out to the second generation of Japanese in America by Dr. Paul Waterhouse, a religious worker among the Japanese. Nearly 1,600 of these replies were from children under fifteen years, whose answers were of little value as far as their opinions were concerned. But these replies showed that practically all of these children were attending American public schools and nearly two-thirds were attending some Protestant Sunday school. Thirty-five per cent gave their religion as Christian, and nineteen per cent as Buddhist; the remainder gave no answer. About 350 replies were received from Japanese between the ages of fifteen and twenty-two, or about forty per cent of the Japanese of that age born in California. About all of this number had attended American grammar schools; fifty-one per cent were attending high school or planning to attend; fifty per cent planned to go to college.

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One-half of this number said they were Christians, while one-fifth were Buddhists. Seventy-seven per cent of those who answered the questionnaire did not wish to follow their father's occupation.

Despite the efforts of the churches to assimilate the Japanese to some aspects of American life, the mass of the people and the government agencies in the different states along the Pacific Coast will have nothing to do with any such movement. Many people will admit that it is possible to raise the standard of living of the Japanese and thus to decrease their birth rate. Others admit that assimilation is possible in other ways, provided that further immigration is rigidly prohibited. But the vast majority of the people on the Pacific Coast will have nothing to do with Americanization work for the Oriental because of the belief that it will be misconstrued in other parts of the country either to mean that they favor Oriental immigration or the present means of restricting it.

The avowed purpose of the leaders in this new anti-Japanese campaign is to make it so uncomfortable for the Japanese now living here that they will "voluntarily" return to Japan. Needless to say, the campaign in this respect has failed. Japanese laborers in America are willing to put up with almost any treatment as long as they earn a living here which is inconceivable in the Orient.

Constitutional objections may also stand in the way. In November, 1923, the Supreme Court of the United States finally decided that the anti-alien land laws violated neither the treaty of 1911 with Japan nor the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It also decided that a state has the power to prohibit croppage contracts by which Japanese had evaded the purpose of the land laws. The Supreme Court justified this legislation on the ground that "the population living on and cultivating the farm lands might come to be made up largely of ineligible aliens," which would threaten the security of the state. Whatever the legal objections to these decisions may be, their political effect will be to increase the anti-Japanese agitation on the Pacific Coast, because the leaders of this agitation will now believe that there are no constitutional limitations upon oppressive anti alien legislation.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court a few years ago laid down the doctrine that once the Federal Government admits an alien

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into this country, he acquires the right to earn a living which the state can not impair.[2] The courts have also declared unconstitutional the provision in the 1920 land law in California prohibiting a Japanese alien from acting as the guardian for his child born in America, as well as alien poll taxes and laws prohibiting foreign language schools.[3] In the so-called Whites Point case, the Superior Court of Los Angeles county handed down a very interesting decision (July 9, 1923) in which it ruled that the treaty of 1911 permitted Japanese in this country to lease land "for the purpose of a health resort and a sanatorium" —a decision which constituted a decided defeat for the Exclusion League.

Despite the land law decisions, the Supreme Court will surely put a check on legislation impairing more fundamental privileges, and aimed to drive the Japanese out of the country.

But even if the anti-Japanese laws are rigorously enforced they will not solve America's Japanese problem. They will merely transfer the Japanese from the farms to the cities. Because of the campaign to "Keep California White," this rural exodus has already begun. According to the Bureau of Licenses, the number of Japanese entering business in Los Angeles has increased about twenty-five per cent within the last two years. It is reported that the Japanese have put a million dollars into the oil fields on Signal Hill. Japanese competition in industry is likely to prove more harmful to American labor than if the Japanese remained on the farms where white labor is scarce.

As a matter of fact, the anti-Japanese legislation has retarded the assimilation of the Japanese. The land laws have literally forced the Japanese to become tramps. Naturally they have no incentive to erect permanent homes and to develop land from which they may be ejected in a few years by the owner. The bitter campaigns which accompany the passage of anti-Japanese legislation, in which poor berry hucksters are held responsible for all the sins of the Imperial Government, make the adjustment of the Oriental to American life more difficult than ever.

On several occasions, these campaigns have severely strained the diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.

[2] *Truax v. Raich*, 239 U. S. 33.

[3] *In re Yane*, Calif. Dec., No. 3348, p. 520; *Ex parte Terui*, 200 Pac. 954; *Meyer v. Nebraska, cited.*

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In 1906 the Japanese Government protested vigorously against proposed school segregation in San Francisco. In 1913 it protested bitterly against the California land law. It should be noted that the present attitude of the Japanese Government is more restrained than it has been in the past. Today the treatment of the Japanese on the Pacific Coast is much more discriminatory and oppressive than it was in 1906 or in 1913. But no public protest has been made by Japan since 1913, apart from the informal address of Ambassador Hanihara last May. Nevertheless, the diplomatic aspect of the controversy is by no means ended. If Japan is silent, it is the calm before the storm. It is impossible to believe that the two great powers of the Pacific can live together in permanent peace if this agitation continues indefinitely.

Back of the whole anti-Japanese movement in America is the belief that Japanese immigration to this country is increasing. Every anti-Japanese election in California has been a protest against further immigration; and many Californians believe that the state can make its protest felt throughout the country as a whole only by enacting laws of a "pin-pricking" nature. In 1906 there were 93 Japanese out of 25,000 school children in San Francisco. Nevertheless, the city school board passed an ordinance which prohibited Japanese from attending the general public schools—an ordinance creating an international scene. The politicians of San Francisco were not concerned by the presence of these 93 Japanese in the schools; but they were concerned by the great number of Japanese laborers who were flooding the city. That immigration was the real issue was proved by the fact that the school ordinance was withdrawn as soon as President Roosevelt promised to stop immigration from Hawaii and to negotiate the Gentlemen's Agreement.

This agreement did not take the form of a treaty, much less of a law. Apparently it is based only on an exchange of notes whose text has not been printed to this day. In the report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration for 1908 a summary of this "understanding" was made: the Japanese Government promises to issue passports only to Japanese non-laborers going to the United States and to those laborers who wish to "resume a formerly-acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife, or child residing there, or to assume active control of an already possessed interest in farming enterprises in this country."

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Ever since this agreement was negotiated Japanese have been accused of evading it and entering this country in wholesale batches. The agreement says that those Japanese who wish to join "a parent, *wife*, or child residing there" may enter. But it says nothing about joining a husband. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government issues passports to wives for the purpose of joining a husband in the United States. And until recently it issued passports to thousands of "picture brides," who were married by proxy in Japan and who never saw their "husbands" —Japanese laborers—until they arrived in America. So great was the protest on the Pacific Coast against this means of evading the agreement and against the unmorality of this type of marriage that the Japanese Government voluntarily promised not to issue passports to picture brides after February, 1920.

But Japanese laborers in America are still being supplied with wives called *kankodan* brides. The Japanese Government has extended the time in which Japanese may visit Japan for the purpose of securing such a bride, without performing military service, from thirty to ninety days. According to advertisements appearing in the *Japanese American News* and the *Japanese New World* in February, 1922, "peace excursion parties" have been organized to secure cheap passage for Japanese going home for this purpose.

There is nothing particularly infamous about a man wanting to get a wife. And if the Japanese are estopped from seeking Japanese brides, they will look about for Americans, which is the last thing the Exclusion League desires. Nevertheless, the California Board of Health statistics show that the birth rate of Japanese women in California is three times that of the white. In 1908 the excess of Japanese births over deaths was 24; in 1921 it was 4,379. Forty-three per cent of the Japanese mothers in California have more than three children. Under the Gentlemen's Agreement, there is absolutely no limitation upon the number of Japanese women laborers who may enter this country, as long as they are accompanied by a husband who has a residence here.

It has also been charged that a Japanese who has smuggled himself into this country across the Canadian or Mexican border may secure a certificate from a local Japanese association, certifying that he has a legal residence in the United States. He presents this certificate to the Japanese consulate, which in turn

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authorizes him to bring relatives into this country or gives him permission to visit Japan and then return, with or without a bride. By this means, he converts an illegal into a legal residence here, and proceeds to bring in a family when he has no business to be here himself.

It is impossible to tell to what extent the Gentlemen's Agreement has been evaded or how rigidly it has been enforced. A great number of statistics have been produced by both sides, none of which are convincing. Nevertheless, 10,675 Japanese entered the United States under the Gentlemen's Agreement in 1921 and 8,981 entered in 1922. If the three per cent immigration quota now applied to other immigrants were applied to the Japanese, only two or three thousand could enter the United States annually.

The Gentlemen's Agreement is defective not so much because of these figures but because the sole responsibility for enforcing it lies upon Japan. American immigration officials must accept every passport issued to Japanese coming to this country. In case they believe that a Japanese is not entitled to enter the United States they can do nothing but ask the State Department to make a diplomatic protest to Japan. In reviewing these cases, the hearing and the decision are *ex parte:* Japan, and Japan alone, determines in each individual case what Japanese shall come to our shores. This is a privilege which we grant to no other nation in the world. The Japanese Government perhaps has been absolutely sincere in restricting passports to the United States. But under this type of restriction there is always the *possibility* of fraud or of misinterpretation. The Gentlemen's Agreement is psychologically defective. As long as it regulates the entrance of Japanese into the United States the people of the Pacific Coast will not be persuaded that Japanese immigration has been stopped, and they are likely to vent their dissatisfaction by passing more pin-pricking laws.

No mere tinkering with the Gentlemen's Agreement, even to the extent of limiting the number of Japanese women entering the country, will overcome its fundamental weakness, *i.e.*, Japan's sole responsibility for enforcement. The extension of the "percentage" plan (on the basis of the 1890 census) to the Japanese would be virtually an exclusion measure and one that would be non-discriminatory. But this method of limiting immigration is already attacked by capital, and if Congress is induced to let

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down the bars in order to admit a greater percentage of European laborers the question of Japanese immigration would at once again arise.

A Japanese exclusion law, similar to that now excluding Chinese, would be as bad as the Gentlemen's Agreement. By violating the racial sensitiveness of the Japanese people, it would have very serious diplomatic consequences which every President since Roosevelt has attempted to avoid. Largely for this reason, anti-Japanese leaders no longer speak of an old-fashioned Japanese exclusion law. But they now demand the exclusion by law of all immigrants "not eligible to citizenship."

This proposal was introduced in the last Congress by the House Committee on Immigration; and in November, 1923. Senator Shortridge informed Secretary of State Hughes that the California members of Congress would reintroduce such legislation in the coming Congress. While such a proposal is more politely worded than an exclusion law applying deliberately to the Japanese, it has all the defects of such a law. Every general immigration bill introduced in Congress since 1911 has originally provided for the exclusion of immigrants ineligible to citizenship; but such a clause has always been omitted out of respect for the racial sensibilities of the Japanese people. The last example of this was in the Immigration Law of February 5, 1917, which omitted these delicate words from its final draft and substituted instead a "barred zone" clause, excluding immigrants living within certain degrees of latitude and longitude, but not including Japan. If the proposal now pending in Congress should be enacted, the conciliatory work of the Washington Conference might be entirely destroyed.

There is nothing to be said in favor of the immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States. If unrestricted, it would wipe out American standards of living, eventually reduce us to the economic level of the Oriental, and implant an alien and half-breed race on our soil which might make the negro problem look white. But the best means of enforcing the exclusion of Japanese immigration is not through the Gentlemen's Agreement, nor through an exclusion law, but through an exclusion treaty.

There are always two parties to a treaty; its terms are arrived at by mutual discussion, agreement, and understanding. Such a treaty should not only provide for exclusion but it should also

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provide that Japanese born in the United States and permanently living here should be automatically released from Japanese allegiance. Such a treaty would place the responsibility for enforcing exclusion as much upon the United States as upon Japan. In such a treaty some provision should be made to prevent the hardships which have arisen in the administration of the Chinese exclusion laws and other restrictive legislation. Japanese emigrants should not be allowed to cross the Pacific to America only to be turned back by American immigration officials. The determination whether or not a Japanese comes within the "exempt" classes should be made by American consular or immigration officials in Japan, working in coöperation with Japanese authorities.

A treaty embodying these principles would prohibit effectively future Japanese immigration and would thus go far in allaying anti-Japanism on the Pacific Coast. Many anti-Japanese leaders would agree to such a treaty, as far as its exclusion provisions are concerned; but they do not believe it would be acceptable to Japan. If the terms of this treaty were made reciprocal, this defect would to a certain extent be removed. It should apply to Americans wishing to go to Japan and to Japanese wishing to come to America, with the customary exceptions of tourists, students, etc. The Japanese Government has already agreed to the necessity of exclusion by entering into the Gentlemen's Agreement. But it is improbable that it will ever consent to a treaty of this character unless the discriminatory legislation now imposed on Japanese in the United States is repealed. America has an obligation toward its present Japanese population which it cannot ignore. This population is here at our invitation and under our laws. It is therefore entitled to the same treatment we accord other immigrant groups. It is probable that the Pacific Coast would voluntarily give up most of its discriminatory legislation and its anti-Japanese agitation if it were convinced that exclusion was really being enforced. The agitation against the Chinese in California died out following the passage of the Chinese Exclusion laws. Probably the Japanese Government would agree to an exclusion treaty if it were assured that these discriminations and this agitation would come to an end. Such assurance could be given in the treaty, simply by guaranteeing to Japanese residents in the United States most-favored-nation treatment in all civil rights. Such a treaty

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should also make Japanese residents eligible to citizenship. They are just as qualified to become citizens as dozens of other groups whom we admit. Their children born here are already citizens. No possible danger could come from giving the vote to a few additional thousand Japanese—if they pass the naturalization tests—provided future immigration is stopped.

A treaty embodying these provisions would satisfy our demand for exclusion and Japan's demand for racial equality. It would establish the principle that the segregation of races of different color is necessary, as far as laboring masses are concerned, not because of racial inferiority but because of racial difference. And it would prove to the Japanese that we really mean what we say, because it would grant Japanese lawfully in this country the same treatment we grant Europeans.

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SOME STATISTICS ON THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII

By Romanzo Adams

INSTABILITY has been characteristic of the population of Hawaii for at least half a century. Among the factors chiefly responsible may be named the great decrease in the native Hawaiian population and its partial amalgamation with Caucasian and Asiatic elements, the importation of laborers from many countries, the rapid increase by births of certain foreign peoples, and the departure of many laborers to the mainland of the United States and of others to their native lands. Considerable interest attaches to the question of Hawaii's future population. Doubtless migration to and from the Territory will eventually be a less important factor and the population will gradually become more stable. What will this population be?

Just now the prediction is frequently made that, unless some special device be introduced to prevent it, the Japanese will soon form the majority of Hawaii's population. The following statistical study has been made in order to help in forming a just opinion as to the probable outcome of present tendencies and forces. The period under consideration, so far as the definite forecast is concerned, extends to 1941. It should be understood that the term "Japanese" as used herein includes, unless otherwise specified, all persons of Japanese descent, both native and foreign born; the terms "Chinese," "Portuguese," "Filipino," etc., are similarly used. The term "American and North European" includes American, British, German, and a few others, and corresponds to the definition "Other Caucasian" used in the census.

I. GROWTH OF THE POPULATION OF HAWAII BY RACIAL ELEMENTS

Table A shows the growth of the various population elements in Hawaii from 1896 down to the present year. The figures for 1923 are the estimates of the Territorial Bureau of Vital Statistics; they may be accepted as very accurate because arrivals and departures as well as births and deaths are matters of record and publicity.

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A study of Table A on the next page reveals several most interesting phenomena.

The Chinese, the first of the labor groups to be brought to Hawaii, reached their highest relative numbers in 1896, when they constituted 17.7 per cent of the population as compared with 8.0 per cent in 1923. The Japanese, coming to Hawaii more recently, reached their highest relative number in 1920, when they constituted 42.7 per cent of the population; since that date their percentage has decreased as follows: 1921, 41.6 per cent; 1922, 41.1 per cent; 1923, 40.4 per cent. The number of adult male Japanese, both Hawaiian and foreign born, decreased from 41,795 in 1910 to 36,548 in 1920, and further decreases will characterize the present decade. Attention is called to the recent rapid increase in the number of Filipinos. The very recent increase in the category described as "Other Caucasians" is explained mainly by the coming of men in army and navy service.

It will be particularly noticed that though there was an approximate equality of the sexes among the laborers brought from Portugal, Spain and Porto Rico, there has been a marked inequality in the case of the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos, especially in the earlier years of each movement. Note that since 1900 the Japanese have been approaching sex equality and, in a smaller degree, the Chinese also, while the same tendency is manifest in the case of the Filipinos since 1910. The men arrived first; then came the women; and then the children began to multiply.

II. JAPANESE STEERAGE TRAVEL

A. BETWEEN JAPAN AND HAWAII

In connection with the foregoing it is interesting to consider certain facts regarding the travel of Japanese between Hawaii and Japan and between Hawaii and the United States.

Before 1908 the number of Japanese women arriving in Hawaii was less than a fifth the number of men, but arrivals of women have exceeded departures almost constantly since that date. Thus we find that between 1908 and 1923, there have arrived in Hawaii from Japan 23,353 men, 27,685 women, 4,439 children; in the same period there have departed from Hawaii to Japan 29,988 men, 14,769 women, 19,129 children. Therefore 6,635 more Japanese men and 14,690 more Japanese children

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TABLE A

POPULATION OF HAWAII BY NATIONALITY, 1896–1923

1896 census taken by Hawaiian Republic; 1900, first American census.

	1896			1900			1910			1920			June 30, 1923
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Both Sexes*
NATIVE HAWAIIAN RACE	16,399	14,620	31,019	15,642	14,157	29,799	13,439	12,602	26,041	11,990	11,733	23,723	21,468
CAUCASIAN-HAWAIIAN	4,249	4,236	8,485	3,460*	3,439*	6,899*	4,438	4,334	8,772	5,528	5,544	11,072	12,514
ASIATIC-HAWAIIAN				1,558*	1,400*	2,958*	1,812	1,922	3,734	3,524	3,431	6,955	7,374
PORTUGUESE	4,596	3,636	8,232	9,785*	8,487*	18,272*	11,571	10,730	22,301	13,737	13,265	27,002	26,397
PORTO RICAN	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2,878	2,012	4,890	3,133	2,469	5,602	6,375
SPANISH	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,078	912	1,990	1,326	1,104	2,430	2,105
OTHER CAUCASIAN	3,433	1,574	5,007	5,699*	2,848*	8,547*	9,255	5,612	14,867	12,309	7,399	19,708	35,774
CHINESE	17,963	1,419	19,382	22,296	3,471	25,767	17,148	4,526	21,674	16,197	7,310	23,507	23,714
JAPANESE	18,158	4,171	22,329	47,508	13,603	61,111	54,784	24,891	79,675	62,644	46,630	109,274	120,590
KOREAN	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	3,931	602	4,533	3,498	1,452	4,950	5,608
FILIPINO	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2,160	201	2,361	16,851	4,180	21,031	36,199
H-BORN CHILDREN OF FOREIGNERS	7,058	6,675	13,733	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ALL OTHERS	661	172	833	421	227	648	605	466	1,071	409	249	658	402
TOTAL	72,517	36,503	109,020	106,369	47,632	154,001	123,099	68,810	191,909	151,146	104,766	255,912	298,520

*Estimate necessary because of certain differences in the classifications in the census of 1900.

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have left Hawaii than have arrived, whereas 12,916 more women have arrived than have left. Including all three categories, 8,409 more Japanese have left than have arrived.

From 1908 to 1920 the female arrivals consisted in the main of wives whose husbands had preceded them and of young women who had been sent for to become brides—"picture brides." More recently the arrivals have consisted largely of Japanese women returning from visits to Japan and of Hawaiian-born young women who had been sent to Japan as children to be educated. Indications for the present decade are that departures of women will exceed arrivals.

The Japanese men who arrived after 1908 were mainly men returning from visits in Japan, but there were some immigrants, mainly sons over sixteen years old of Japanese already in Hawaii. There were also some Hawaiian-born males who had been sent to Japan as children and who returned classified as men. About a third of the men who departed were returning to Japan for permanent residence and those who were married took their wives and children. Most children going to Japan in this way do not return to Hawaii.

B. BETWEEN HAWAII AND THE UNITED STATES

Two things relative to the departures of Japanese from Hawaii for the United States challenge the attention:

1. The very heavy movement before 1907 (the date of the "Gentleman's Agreement" between Japan and the United States) and its negligible and comparatively evenly balanced character after that date. Thus we find that whereas in the period 1885–1907 inclusive 28,027 Japanese (men, women, and children) left Hawaii for the United States, there was practically no travel in the opposite direction. On the other hand, from 1908 to 1923 inclusive there have been only 1,624 departures for the United States, against 677 arrivals thence. In other words, 947 more Japanese have gone to the United States from Hawaii than have gone to Hawaii from the United States.

2. A beginning of a slight revival of the movement in 1918—this latter movement being one of Hawaiian-born Japanese and of Japanese naturalized as a result of service in the war. The numbers involved are not large yet, but they are large relative to the total number eligible to go—that is, to the number able to prove their citizenship to the satisfaction of the American immi-

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gration authorities. Probably from 20 to 25 per cent of those eligible have gone to the mainland and the movement will grow as the children reach maturity in increasingly large numbers. It should be remembered that comparatively few Hawaiian-born Japanese have as yet reached adult years.

III. BIRTHS AND DEATHS

The birth rate of course has an important bearing on future population. It depends mainly on two things: first, the relative number of married women of child-bearing age; second, the fecundity of the women, which is partly a racial, but chiefly an economic and social class characteristic.

No forecast regarding the future population of Hawaii as affected by birth rates will be valuable unless it is based on a careful study of the age and sex distribution of the various national groups.

TABLE B

AGE DISTRIBUTION, BY NATIONALITY AND SEX, 1920 CENSUS

	Males				*Females*			
	Under 10 Yrs.	*10–19 Yrs.*	*20–49 Yrs.*	*50 Yrs. or Over*	*Under 10 Yrs.*	*10–19 Yrs.*	*20–44 Yrs.*	*45 Yrs. or Over*
HAWAIIAN AND PART HAWAIIAN	6,306	4,409	7,709	2,610	6,132	4,531	7,079	2,955
PORTUGUESE	4,591	3,260	4,628	1,253	4,423	3,280	4,167	1,388
PORTO RICAN	914	666	1,254	295	868	676	678	246
SPANISH	473	318	409	126	382	301	328	93
OTHER CAUCASIAN*	1,391	1,953	7,254	1,797	1,194	937	3,672	1,589
CHINESE	2,731	2,054	6,354	5,048	2,668	1,822	2,231	578
JAPANESE	16,394	8,915	30,208	7,111	15,919	7,564	19,588	3,653
KOREAN	607	201	2,178	502	558	217	550	137
FILIPINO	1,570	980	13,932	357	1,541	499	2,027	112
ALL OTHER	96	53	174	86	87	79	58	25
TOTAL	34,973	22,809	74,100	19,185	33,772	19,896	39,288	10,776

*Includes a number of men in military and naval service.

Table B shows the abnormal age distribution of the women of the various national groups in Hawaii. It is especially notable in the case of the Japanese. These are relatively numerous at 20–44 years of age; on the other hand, there are few old women, and few girls 10–20 years of age. The age distribution of the Japanese women is at present unusually favorable to a high birth rate—more favorable than it will ever be again. Before 1930 the age distribution will shift in such a way as to result in a measurable decrease in the birth rate.

The decade 1910–1920 was for the Japanese in Hawaii a period of getting wives. Before 1907 the great majority of the men who

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came from Japan were unmarried and often even those who were married left their wives in Japan. Commonly the men came with the intention of remaining only a few years in Hawaii.

The application of the provisions of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" to Hawaii had the effect of stabilizing the Japanese population of the Territory and many of the men, when they decided to prolong their stay, sent for their wives or for "picture brides." "Picture bride" arrivals since the date of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" have been as follows: 1907, 466; 1908, 755; 1909, 436; 1910, 658; 1911, 865; 1912, 1,285; 1913, 1,572; 1914, 1,407; 1915, 1,050; 1916, 909; 1917, 985; 1918, 1,017; 1919, 848; 1920, 676; 1921, 529; 1922, 555; 1923, 263.

The coming of the women was an important movement; but it now is practically completed. The demand for wives and brides has been supplied. At the present time the Japanese men of Hawaii are married in higher ratio than are the men of any other racial group.

TABLE C

BIRTH RATES, 1920

	No. Births Year Ending June 30, 1920	*No. Births to Each 1000 Population*	*No. Married Women Under 45*	*No. Births to Each 1000 Married Women Under 45*
HAWAIIAN AND PART HAWAIIAN COMBINED	1,866	47.9	6,302	296.0
PORTUGUESE	1,127	45.4	3,851	292.6
PORTO RICAN	265	50.0	780	339.4
SPANISH	116	47.7	336	345.2
OTHER CAUCASIAN	374	14.9	2,487	150.3
CHINESE	661	29.2	2,005	329.6
JAPANESE	4,963	43.7	19,204	258.4
KOREAN	192	36.9	578	332.1
FILIPINO	584	24.9	2,156	270.8
ALL OTHER	17	28.3	68	250.0
ALL RACES	10,165	39.0	37,767	269.1
ALL EXCEPT THE JAPANESE	5,202	35.0	18,563	280.2

Table C reveals the fact that the fecundity of the Japanese women is lower than that of any other group but the American and North European. This is contrary to popular opinion but is well attested by the statistical data. The corresponding data for the various foreign-born nationalities in the United States are not available, but there is reason for believing that both the fecundity and the crude birth rate of the recent immigrants coming to America from southern and eastern Europe are higher than they are for the Japanese in Hawaii.

The death rate is, of course, another factor to be considered in determining the rate of natural increase of population. The

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death rate of the Japanese in Hawaii, considered in relation to age, falls a little below the average, which is, however, rather high because of the exceptionally high rates of the native Hawaiians and the Filipinos.

The nationalities of Hawaii are listed as follows in order of rate of normal increase, the lowest being put first: 1, American (including north European); 2, Filipino; 3, Hawaiian (including part Hawaiian); 4, Japanese; 5, Portuguese; 6, Porto Rican; 7, Spanish; 8, Korean; 9, Chinese.

IV. FUTURE VOTING STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII

It has been predicted that the Japanese will have a majority or nearly a majority of the voters by 1940. This is improbable. They constitute at present only 40.4 per cent of the population and the percentage is diminishing. Moreover, by 1940 most of the Japanese men and women over forty years old, being aliens, will not be eligible for naturalization, while nearly all of the other people in the islands over forty will be either native-born or foreign-born eligible to naturalization—this on the basis of present laws and policies.

It is not possible to make a very close estimate of the voting strength of the various national groups in 1940 because of the numerous uncertain factors entering into the calculations, chief among them being the question of further immigration and emigration. There is also the uncertainty of whether those who are citizens will actually exercise their right to vote. But because many wild guesses, some of them purporting to be estimates based on statistical calculations, have been given wide publicity, I am venturing to make an estimate of the number of potential voters in 1941. (See Table D.) In order to indicate my method to a slight extent, I am making the estimate by stages.

TABLE D

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF POTENTIAL VOTERS IN 1941

National Groups	*Preliminary Estimate*	*Final Estimate*
HAWAIIAN AND PART HAWAIIAN	20,000	20,000
PORTUGUESE, SPANISH AND PORTO RICAN	22,000	20,000
AMERICAN AND NORTH EUROPEAN	11,200	15,000
CHINESE	11,500	10,000
JAPANESE	44,000	30,000
KOREAN	1,200	800
FILIPINOS AND OTHERS	8,500	40,000
TOTAL	118,400	135,800
PER CENT JAPANESE	37.1	22.1

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The preliminary estimate of column one is based on the assumption that the situation as presented by the census of 1920 will not be modified by immigration or emigration at a later date. On this assumption the potential voters of 1941 will consist of all of the people who were living in the Territory in 1920 and who still survive, except certain classes excluded by law. These classes are as follows:

1. Men stationed in Hawaii for military and naval service; 2, foreign-born not eligible to naturalization; 3, native-born women married to aliens not eligible to naturalization; 4, illiterates; 5, mental incompetents.

As there is available a considerable quantity of statistical information regarding these five classes, as well as regarding death rates, this preliminary estimate, as far as it goes, should not be far from the truth.

In the second column I have introduced such modifications as I have thought necessary in view of probable immigration and emigration, matters of much greater uncertainty.

The greatest uncertainty in my estimate given in column two relates to the Filipinos, who, it will be remembered, are eligible to citizenship. The estimate assumes a continuation of existing laws and labor policies, but the planters are anxious to change their policy if they can secure a modification in the law to permit the importation of Chinese laborers. In the event of their securing laborers from China or elsewhere nearly all the Filipinos might possibly return to their native land. If the new laborers were aliens ineligible to citizenship, none of them would be voters. But the coming of new laborers in sufficient numbers to supplant the Filipinos would also have the effect of accelerating the movement of Hawaiian-born Japanese toward the mainland of the United States.

Even if all the Filipinos leave Hawaii, however, I can see no valid ground for the view that the Japanese will constitute over 28 per cent of the total potential voters in 1941.

A potential voter in order to become an actual voter must register and cast a vote. If foreign-born, he must be naturalized. This is a matter, not of counting heads, but of practical conduct, of interest, of disposition.

For example, most of the foreign-born Spanish and Porto Ricans are at present ineligible, being illiterate, and their children are nearly all minors. The Filipinos are politically minded,

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but they have not yet transferred their political interest to Hawaii and as a result very few of them have sought naturalization. The Americans, Hawaiians and Portuguese have had larger political experience and they formulate the issues and policies and hold the offices. The Chinese and Japanese have had little or no political experience and they are not politically minded. Their voting is more a matter of ritual than of practical politics, but they will develop politically with experience. From present indications they will be conservative in politics.

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RECENT IRISH HISTORY

By Ernest Boyd

THE REVOLUTION IN IRELAND, 1906–1923. By W. Alison Phillips. New York: Longmans, 1923.

THE DRAMA OF SINN FEIN. By Shaw Desmond. New York: Scribner's, 1923.

THE IRISH REVOLUTION AND HOW IT CAME ABOUT. By William O'Brien. London: Allen & Unwin, 1923.

MICHAEL COLLINS' OWN STORY. Told by Hayden Talbot. London: Hutchinson, 1923.

THE IRISH STATESMAN. Edited by George W. Russell (AE.) Dublin: Vol. 1, No. 1, 15th September, 1923.

WHEN Sir Horace Plunkett remarked that Irish history was for Englishmen to remember and for Irishmen to forget, he overlooked one of the greatest obstacles to that happy consummation, to wit, the absence of any history of Ireland which one could agree to remember or to forget. Volumes on every conceivable aspect of Irish history exist in plenty, but there is not one work which enjoys the credit and confidence which have made a classic of John Richard Green's "History of the English People," of Bryce's "American Commonwealth." No historian, I imagine, ever expects to escape censure; inaccuracies and prejudices will occur in the best regulated histories, and there are always partisans and parties which protest against the presentation or analysis of given circumstances where their interests are involved. But there is an irreducible minimum of objectivity which the historians of other countries achieve to the satisfaction of the majority of their readers at home and abroad.

Not so in Ireland. From the "Annals of the Four Masters" to "Michael Collins' Own Story" every contribution to the history of Ireland is challenged on fundamental questions and on matters of fact that ought to be established beyond dispute. Even British Blue Books and White Papers, compiled in London by bureaucrats of an aloofness wholly admirable, do not evade the destiny of all documents relating to Ireland. Ulster accepted the official report on the Irish Insurrection of 1916 because its bias was naturally in favor of the loyalists. The report of the Financial Relations Commission, an equally authentic official

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British publication, is rejected there with scorn to this day and ignored by most teachers of history who are unsympathetic to Irish national aspirations, for the simple reason that it establishes the fact of English overtaxation in Ireland to a degree where, in the eyes of Irish patriots, it constitutes one of the most popular of England's services to Ireland. But statistics and calculations which are good enough for His Majesty's Treasury are not good enough for those who hold that the King can do no fiscal wrong.

Although I myself when young eagerly frequented expert economists and heard great argument as to whether Ireland's mineral resources and industrial possibilities were unlimited or non-existent, I sorrowfully confess that I am still unaware whether the machinations of John Bull are really responsible for our undeveloped harbors and wretched railway system. I should not like to imperil my immortal soul by swearing that there is fine Irish coal unmined because of British monopoly interests. Experts have proved that there is coal, and I have burned it in my own stove, but other experts declare that the deposits are small, and that, commercially speaking, there is nothing to justify coal-mining operations on the large scale of modern industry. It is out of such simple matters as this that the fires of controversy, if not the home fires, are kept burning in Ireland. Even the climate is not excluded from controversial imbroglios, for it is argued that de-forestation—by the invader, of course—has altered the climatic conditions of what was once a land literally flowing with milk and honey. From which it follows, I need hardly say, that if an Irish government would plant trees, gayly plumaged birds would enchant the ear and the susurration of innumerable bees would restore the ancient Gaelic practice of drinking mead—that is in southern Ireland, but not in northeast Ulster where Cuchulain came from, before the present era of prohibition. This parenthetic fact is in itself characteristic of the troubles that overtake delvers after Irish facts, for the most northerly county in Ireland geographically belongs by British law to Southern Ireland, and the portion of Ulster which is now outside the boundaries of the Free State is precisely that part in which the legendary heroes of Ireland were cradled and fought their battles, where Deirdre's adventures earned for her the title of the Irish Helen of Troy.

The four volumes which have recently been added to the vast literature of the "Irish Question" depart in no particular from

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their countless predecessors. That is to say, it is inconceivable that any person in search of reliable information would arise from the perusal of these tomes in the possession of it. Their alleged purpose is to trace the history of events which led to the extinction of the Irish Parliamentary Party under John Redmond, the rise of Sinn Fein, and the creation of the Irish Free State under the Treaty of 1921. Messrs. Shaw Desmond, William O'Brien, and Michael Collins write from a definitely Irish Nationalist standpoint, while Professor Alison Phillips, who is Lecky Professor of Modern History in the University of Dublin, endeavors to be unbiased, with results so extraordinary that I propose to examine his book at more length than the others. This is all the more justifiable inasmuch as Mr. Phillips is the only professional historian in the group, and one of high standing amongst his colleagues. His history, moreover, is a perfect example of the perverse conditions which I have indicated as rendering the study of Irish problems peculiarly baffling.

Mr. Hayden Talbot is an American journalist who gained the confidence of Michael Collins, and in this book he has collected and expanded material contributed to the English press. It gives an account of the Easter Insurrection, the Black and Tans, and the whole campaign against England, as seen by Collins. A great deal of space is devoted to the reasons which led Collins and Griffith to accept the treaty, from which it is evident that these two men had some sense of realities and tried to act as practical statesmen rather than heroes in a political melodrama. Very naturally there is sharp criticism of Erskine Childers and de Valera, the former being described as "the evil genius of Ireland" and the latter an "illogical, incompetent, inexperienced school-teacher."

"The Drama of Sinn Fein" is also an essentially journalistic work, though it is more elaborate than most of its kind. It tells the familiar story of the Easter Rising without adding materially to the facts, whether accepted or rejected, of that enterprise, and, as it traces the course of events to the signing of the treaty, full allowance is made for every circumstance in favor of Sinn Fein. Documentary proofs, facsimiles, and so forth, are produced, but it would be rash to pretend that they will convince any one not previously well disposed to the cause which Mr. Shaw Desmond champions. As an Irishman I confess that the very wealth of the author's documentation and "inside" knowl-

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edge induces in me a native scepticism, especially when he purports to report the conversations, thoughts and prayers of those concerned in the peace negotiations. Mr. Shaw Desmond is merely one journalist amongst many, and his authority is not greater than that of the many competent news gatherers who followed events in Ireland from 1920 to 1921. He calls the Free State the "monstrous birth of a mutilated Ireland," and his lurid style contributes to a picture of the negotiations which is just a little too close to the legends of Republican propaganda: baffled and trapped men, lured into the spider's web of Lloyd George; betrayals of old comrades in arms; corruption and despair.

As for Mr. William O'Brien's bulky volume, it continues the tale of the rise and fall of the Parliamentary Party from the point in 1910 where his "Olive Branch in Ireland" stopped. Mr. O'Brien continues also his vendettas against John Dillon and Joseph Devlin, the villains of the piece in his opinion, and he contrives, as usual, to prove that everybody was wrong who did not think as he did. For which reason his final judgment of Sinn Fein, the Free State and the Republicans, resumes itself into still another *apologia pro vita sua*. All parties in Ireland, apparently, have been destined to blunder to the greater glory of William O'Brien.

After reading these books one turns with interest to the work of Professor Alison Phillips who sets out, as he says, "to write history, not propaganda." At the outset, however, he declares that when he first took up his duties at Dublin University, in the autumn of 1914, he was ignorant of "the merits of the Irish Question," but was inclined to favor the Union. In the space of a year his belief in the Union had reached a point where it seemed to him that it "alone stood between Ireland and a sea of troubles." The fact that the Union now no longer exists, that the six counties of northeast Ulster are outside the Free State, and that grave disorders both preceded and followed the signing of a treaty of peace with England—are all so many painful proofs to Professor Phillips that he was right, much as he may regret to remind us of it. It is in this frame of mind, historical elation chastened by the stern horrors of everyday life during a period of terror, that the author of "The Revolution in Ireland" sets about his task, which is "to find out the truth, if possible, and tell it;" history, not propaganda. Nothing could be fairer, were

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it not for the disturbing thought of that conviction of his that the Union was the only remedy. Is it not perilously like the situation of a doctor who, confronted with a patient obviously suffering from the effects of cocaine, declares: "I shall make an absolutely impartial diagnosis of this case, but understand that I am a believer in cocaine, first, last, and all the time."

The introductory chapters are the logical expression of Professor Phillips' view, for they contain all the stereotyped arguments once employed by the Irish Unionist Alliance. The Irish never could govern themselves; their boasted civilization was nothing more than a collection of warring chiefs and fighting clans; if they had been converted to Protestantism in their own native language they would be as contented with English rule as the Scottish people. The Union was carried by corruption and bribery, but that was a regrettable weakness of the period; it did not cause any of the disasters commonly attributed to it, because those disasters had other contributory causes; the financial results of the Union need not be discussed, because they have been too much talked about, and, in any case, another expert Commission is going to inquire into the matter. In brief, the Union must be diagnosed on the same principle as the imaginary patient mentioned above, and so it is done, to the satisfaction of all who believe that such economic injustice and disaster as the Financial Relations Commission attributed to the amalgamation of the British and Irish Exchequers can be ignored in a consideration of the effects of the Union of Britain and Ireland in 1801.

Professor Phillips' premises, of course, exclude the equally vital factor in the case, namely, that the Union was obnoxious to the majority of the Irish people and that the entire agitation against England, the whole problem which the two countries had to face, rested precisely upon that factor. It was a factor which held, even though it could be proved beyond a doubt that material prosperity increased by leaps and bounds in Ireland from the moment the Act of Union was passed. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that this history regards every step towards an alleviation of the pressure of the yoke of Union as a step downward, and refers to the negotiations which led to the treaty and the creation of the Irish Free State as a "surrender" on the part of Britain. Although the author goes at length into the differences engendered in the ranks of Sinn Fein, although he admits that a powerful minority opposed the agreement, it never

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crosses his mind that the signatories on the Irish side also "surrendered," in so far as that word has any meaning in this case. In fact he actually quotes Commander-in-Chief Mulcahy's admission that it was mere heroics to pretend that the Irish army had beaten the British troops, or that they could ever hope to do so, and then proceeds to the conclusion that an agreement was negotiated because Sinn Fein had terrorized the British authorities into submission. Where Mr. Shaw Desmond insinuates that the Irish delegation was bamboozled, Professor Phillips alleges that England abjectly submitted to the worst exactions of the brutal and unscrupulous Irish. Neither of these gentlemen can entertain an idea so commonplace as that both sides welcomed an escape from the barbarism of sheer force, and by the exercise of some intelligence and reason arrived at the sort of compromise by which history is really made.

It follows that Professor Phillips necessarily abandons all pretence of impartiality which might conflict with his thesis. Facts quoted from loyalist newspapers such as *The Irish Times* are given as absolute truth, but all quotations from the other side are presented with a twist which weakens their effectiveness. *Notes from Ireland*, the official bulletin of the Irish Unionist Alliance, is not described as propaganda, but "an invaluable supply of historical material," whereas *Sinn Fein* and the *Irish Bulletin* are "propagandist publications" to be "used with great caution." By a similar process of reasoning, once the agreement was reached, the British Government is accused of betraying loyal Irishmen, of handing over the country to the Irish Republican Army and to anarchy. At the same time this I. R. A. is used as an argument in favor of the theory that the Sinn Fein representatives were powerless to maintain order. The Free State thus looms up as a species of Jekyll and Hyde. When it suits Professor Phillips, the Irish representatives with whom Britain concluded the treaty are a sinister band of scoundrels known as the I. R. A., otherwise they are a handful of timid and inexperienced men utterly incapable of coping with the I. R. A. An Irish Unionist suspected of favoring the Black and Tans and the victim of an outrage is a "loyalist" deserted by base English politicians. But an Irish Nationalist who loyally abides by the agreement with England and is victimized is not a loyalist. Minority Irishmen who resist the Free State are anarchical desperados, but the Free Staters are themselves merely ex-

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desperados, so no tears need be wasted on them. Ulstermen, however, who armed against the King in 1914 and who still denounce the Free State and refuse to cooperate on the Boundary Commission, are just decent, loyal citizens, trying to make the best of a gross betrayal.

In other words, to those whose mentality remains unchanged, even the obsolete political vocabulary of John Redmond's time seems adequate and serves as a substitute for thought. Professor Alison Phillips can write a history, after all that has happened, in which every argument and every political label seems like some remote survival from the days of Gladstone and the Land League. Although ex-Lord Chancellor Campbell, once Lord Carson's right hand man, sits in the Senate of the Irish Free State, although the Civil Service is largely the same, and the administration is carried on literally by those formerly denounced as tools of the oppressor, this book speaks of terrorized Unionists, of Protestants exposed defenceless to the wicked fanaticism of a Catholic Free State, and conjures up a picture which more accurately describes the position of active agents of the British régime at the worst period of the Black and Tan terror than the present amiable coöperation of Southern Nationalists and Unionists, who have injected into their relations none of the peculiar religious intolerance of northeast Ulster.

The ancient gibes recur, in the approved manner of the Carsonite campaign before the war, as when Professor Phillips writes: "The British people, who are at bottom neither cowardly nor ungenerous, will some day awake to the fact that it was the cowardly and ungenerous policy of their government, culminating in the great surrender, which has been largely responsible for the woes of Ireland, and that they cannot rid themselves of a share in this responsibility by shutting their eyes and ears. The American people, whose sense of their own exceptional righteousness is apt to lead them into blundering interference in the concerns of other nations, have also their share of responsibility. It is hardly for them to affect indifference to the misfortunes which their ill-informed clamor helped to create."

This impatience of America's "blundering interference" will sound a little curious to American ears which not so long ago were assailed by appeals that did not go unanswered, and which still are more familiar with demands that America interfere "in the concerns of other nations" than with orders to keep out. It is

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typical of this method of writing history that this charge is made by an historian who elsewhere records President Wilson's refusal to support Ireland's claim at the Peace Conference. Perhaps it will enable readers in this country to grasp at once the strange workings of Professor Phillips' mind when the facts clash with his preconceptions.

Fortunately, outside the fanatical ranks of the Republican Diehards there is little of this spirit abroad in Ireland today. The Irish Free State is more accurately represented by the ideals and teaching of *The Irish Statesman*, which Sir Horace Plunkett has revived and entrusted to the admirable editorship of George W. Russell, in whose vision of Ireland there is more than is dreamt of in the philosophy of either Mr. de Valera or Professor Alison Phillips. Here one leaves behind the ancient shibboleths of both groups of impossibilists, those who argue that the Irish are incapable of unity and self-government, and those whose affecting superstition it is that Ireland is a heaven-sent island republic of saints and scholars, whose destiny is thwarted by a treaty which confers upon it all the powers that can make for real independence and prosperity. *The Irish Statesman* says: "We have blundered badly, and are by no means at the end of our blunders. There is, however, a clearer recognition of the truth that it is national character which shapes social and political institutions, not institutions which shape character." The whole tone of the paper, the diversity of its contributors, and the tolerant sanity of its conception of Irish nationhood are a reflection of a changed and changing Ireland.

The one serious problem which is now imminent is that of determining the boundaries of Northern Ireland in accordance with the political and religious opinions of the inhabitants. Apart from smaller areas in the Six Counties which might go to the Free State if a plebiscite were held, the two large counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh as clearly belong to the Free State as the remaining four counties to Northern Ireland. If the principle which partitioned Ulster has any justification, it should have been extended to the point of excluding Fermanagh and Tyrone from the jurisdiction of Belfast for exactly the same reasons as Belfast claimed to be exempted from the jurisdiction of Dublin. Partition is the issue on which Republicans and Free Staters alike are agreed, in so far as they regard it as inherently objectionable, and *The Irish Statesmen* expresses the reasonable atti-

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tude towards this question when it hopes that persuasion and a policy of conciliation will eventually bring the little corner of Northern Ireland back into a united Ireland.

Meanwhile, after much hesitation on part of the Belfast Government, Northern Ireland has at last consented to confer with representatives of Britain and of the Free State with a view to a modification of the boundary line drawn by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which created the Six County area of Northern Ireland. The logic of the situation would involve the reduction of that area to four counties, obviously an unattractive prospect for the Northern Government. So long as obsolete political ideas are in vogue the conciliatory policy on which friends of Ireland, North and South, rely will be hampered. Belfast will have to learn, like the historians, that England has recognized the Irish Free State as an integral part of the commonwealth of British self-governing dominions, that the convenient habit of identifying President Cosgrave with his bitterest I. R. A. opponents will have to be abandoned by those whose boast is that they "think imperially." A fundamental dissociation of ideas, to use Remy de Gourmont's phrase, is required of Irish publicists and statesmen, of politicians and people, before they can properly envisage the revolutionized Ireland of today.

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THE ULSTER BOUNDARY

The above map shows the present boundary of Northern Ireland (broken line) and the boundary as it probably would be (solid line) were it drawn in accordance with Article 12 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on the basis of a plebiscite by parishes.

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THE ULSTER BOUNDARY

The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 partitioned Ireland, giving Ulster the six northeast counties. In the following year the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, creating the Irish Free State. Article 12 of this treaty provided that if the Ulster Government availed itself of the right to remain outside the Irish Free State, a Commission of three should be set up, consisting of one representative of the British Government (who should act as Chairman), one of the Free State Government, and one of the Ulster Government, to determine the boundaries of the six-county Ulster area known officially as "Northern Ireland." The Ulster Government did not participate in framing this treaty and has refused to recognize it as binding, although such a course entails a denial of the authority of the Imperial Government, which in other matters Ulster recognizes.

At the moment the question is in suspense. The Free State has appointed its Commissioner. The British Government recognized its obligation to appoint a Chairman after the last Free State elections. The Northern Government continues to refuse to be represented on such a commission, although it has recently agreed to enter a preliminary conference to be held in London to discuss ways and means of solving the problem.

The map opposite shows that the situation in the northeastern part of Ireland is as complicated as anywhere in Eastern Europe. Large districts of the Six Counties are predominantly Roman Catholic and anti-partitionist; other large areas are strongly Protestant and partitionist; and in others it would be impossible to say which element predominates. A serious complication is the existence of partitionist and anti-partitionist enclaves, making it impossible, in many instances, to draw a line that would place under the jurisdiction of the Free State all the anti-partitionist districts. Even if such a line were drawn as fairly as possible the resulting customs frontiers would be destructive of the economic life of the regions in question.

It should be noted that Londonderry, the second largest city in Ulster, is Catholic in the majority, while the two important counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh have a Catholic majority, as indicated by the figures at the last General Election to the Imperial Parliament, when 53.89 per cent of the voters supported pro-Free State candidates and 46.11 voted for the partitionists.

It has been suggested that, if the Northern Government were unwilling to leave the matter to a plebiscite, the best way out of the dilemma would be by means of a friendly provisional agreement between the Premiers of the Northern and Free State Governments, whereby part of southern Armagh and Fermanagh should be conceded to the Free State, and in return the northern corner of Monaghan and the base of the Inishowen peninsula in Donegal, with the fertile Laggan region in the same county, should go to the Northern Government.

The Irish people as a whole seem to regard the obvious difficulties and complications of the Ulster boundary question as the best argument against partition. The Northern Government, however, raised the issue definitely when it took advantage of the privilege of remaining outside the Free State. The Free State, accordingly, has thrown the burden of a decision back on the Imperial Government, adopting the policy of waiting for the latter to proceed with the enforcement of the Treaty which it negotiated and ratified.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Harry Elmer Barnes

General International Relations

THE PROBLEM OF ARMAMENTS. By A. G. Enock. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 196 pp.

A statistical condemnation of modern armaments as an economic burden and a leading cause of war.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR. By P. Kerr and L. Curtis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923, 169 pp.

Williamstown Lectures, dealing with such practical achievements in the prevention of international conflict as the establishment of the Union of South Africa and responsible government in India.

A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT. By J. W. Hughan. New York: Crowell, 1923, 401 pp.

A careful analysis of what has been accomplished by international agreements in the past, of the difficulties of the present problem, and of the contributions of the League of Nations toward its solution.

DIE WELTPOLITIK DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS. By H. Preller. Berlin: Mittler, 1923, 217 pp.

A valuable survey of world politics by a broad-minded German scholar.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER THE WORLD WAR. By Otfried Nippold. Translated from the German by A. S. Hershey. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 241 pp.

A discussion not so much of the content of international law as of the means of enforcing it. Written in 1917, it looked forward to the formation of a League of Nations as the only means of realizing the victory of law over war.

THE REFORMATION OF WAR. By J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Dutton, 1923, 287 pp.

A somewhat pompous but concise and pertinent discussion of the necessity of facing war as a permanent fact in human society, and of proceeding to reduce the brutality and carnage attendant upon the introduction of new methods of warfare based on contemporary applied science.

Foreign Relations of the United States

PRIZE CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789–1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, three volumes.

A collection of Prize Cases compiled by the Carnegie Endowment from the 250 volumes of Supreme Court Decisions, intended for technical students of international law and diplomacy.

AMERICA'S RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN SITUATION. Edited by Carl Kelsey. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1923, 223 pp.

A collection of papers by various experts.

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OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN COMMERCE. By A. L. Bishop. Boston: Ginn, 1923, 321 pp.

A good manual.

AMERICA AND THE ATLANTIC. By G. A. Ballard. New York: Dutton, 1923, 351 pp.

A historical study following the interpretation of Mahan. Deals only briefly with contemporary problems.

LA CONFÉRENCE DE WASHINGTON. By L. Archimbaud. Paris: Payot, 1923.

The first important French analysis of the Disarmament Conference.

MY RHINELAND JOURNAL. By Henry T. Allen. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923, 593 pp.

Gen. Allen's detailed account of his duties, routine and otherwise, with the American Army of Occupation. Contains no revelations.

FROM AN AMERICAN LEGATION. By Ira N. Morris. New York: Knopf, 1923, 287 pp.

The author was American minister to Sweden during the war.

Europe

THE GENESIS OF THE WAR. By H. H. Asquith. New York: Doran, 1922, 405 pp.

A defense of British policy before the war by one of the men most responsible for it. The volume does not contain much that is new.

WHERE ARE WE GOING? By D. Lloyd George. New York: Doran, 1923, 371 pp.

A collection of the ex-Premier's speeches on European politics in 1922-1923. Contemporary French policy is roundly abused. There are also chapters on the inter-allied debts, prohibition and social subjects.

OFFICIAL GERMAN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WORLD WAR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923, two volumes, 1,360 pp.

Translations of the German documents dealing with the responsibility for the origins and continuation of the World War, prepared by the Carnegie Endowment.

THE MALADY OF EUROPE. By M. E. Ravage. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 250 pp.

A critique of the present European situation from the liberal point of view.

EUROPE SINCE 1918. By H. A. Gibbons. New York: Century, 1923, 622 pp.

A somewhat subjective survey of post-war developments, achievements and problems.

THE FABRIC OF EUROPE. By H. Stannard. London: Collins, 1923, 260 pp.

An optimistic essay on the nature and causes of the present European confusion.

CONSEQUENCIAS ECONOMICAS DE LA GUERRA. By F. Bernis. Madrid: Maestre, 1923, 388 pp.

An exposition and analysis by a Spanish publicist.

THE THIRD YEAR BOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By C. H. Levermore. Brooklyn: Brooklyn Daily Eagle Press, 1923, 450 pp.

A continuation of the author's excellent summarization of the achievements of the League of Nations since its establishment.

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TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. By F. N. Keen. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923.

A collection of sane, well-reasoned papers in support of the League of Nations.

LES ORIGINES ET L'OEUVRE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. Edited by P. Munch. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1923, two volumes.

A composite work by people identified with the League.

ACTIVIDADES DE LA LIGA DE LAS NAÇIONES. By Cosme de la Torriente. Havana: de Rambla, Bouza y Ca., 1923, 491 pp.

A detailed account of the organization and work of the League of Nations, by the head of the Cuban delegation.

FRANCE. Edited by J. Buchan. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1923, 366 pp.

An admirable volume, of composite authorship, dealing mainly with the period since 1870.

RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. By H. Lichtenberger. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1923, 133 pp.

A general survey of the diplomatic, political, economic, and psychological bases of Franco-German relations between 1914 and 1922, by one of the Frenchmen who knows Germany best. The first in a series of volumes dealing with contemporary German conditions.

MILITARY OPERATIONS—FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 1914. Compiled by J. E. Edmonds. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 543 pp.

The first volume of the official British history of the war.

LE MOUVEMENT DES PRIX EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1914. By P. Einzig. Paris: Rousseau, 1923, 142 pp.

A technical review.

GERMANY'S CAPACITY TO PAY: A STUDY OF THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM. By H. S. Moulton and C. E. McGuire. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1923, 384 pp.

An able analysis which has received high praise.

GERMANY AND HER DEBTS. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM. By L. L. B. Angas. London: Simmonds, 1923, 158 pp.

The author urges the elimination of pensions from reparations and the reduction of the latter to £4,230,000,000, to be paid through forty-three years.

LE PROBLÈME DES RÉPARATIONS: LA TECHNIQUE DES RÈGLEMENTS. By A. Garrigon-Lagrange. Paris: La Vie Universitaire, 1923, 254 pp.

A detailed French analysis.

THE SAAR QUESTION; A DISEASE SPOT IN EUROPE. By Sidney Osborne. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923.

As the title shows, this work can make no claim to impartiality.

LA RHÉNANIE. By J. Baldensperger et al. Paris: Alcan, 1922, 175 pp.

A historical survey.

GESCHICHTE DES RHEINLANDES VON DEN ALTESTEN ZEITEN BIS ZUR GEGENWART. By H. Aubin et al. Essen: Baedeker, 1922.

A general history of the changing destinies of this era since the earliest period.

THE RUHR. By B. Fillet et al. London: Labour Publishing Co., 1923, 64 pp.

Represents the point of view of British labor.

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DER KAMPF UM DIE RUHR. By Rudolf Cuno. Leipzig: Koehler, 1923, 232 pp.
The author predicts an economic "Waterloo" for France in the Ruhr.

L'ALLEMAGNE À NU. By A. Got. Paris: La Pensée Française, 1923.
An excellent survey of post-war Germany.

DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE WELTPOLITIK, 1871–1914. By Felix Rachfahl. Stuttgart: E. H. Moritz, 1923, Volume I, 820 pp.
Some eight hundred closely packed pages by one of the chief German authorities on Bismarck. The facts are well brought out and the tone is generally moderate.

DIE RATHENAUS. By G. Brinckmeyer. Munich: Wielang-Verlag, 1923.
A study of the careers of Emile and Walther Rathenau in relation to the economic development of modern Germany.

LEOPOLD I OF BELGIUM. By E. S. Corti. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923.
Some new light on the character and diplomatic work of King Leopold.

ROME OR DEATH. By Carleton Beals. New York: Century, 1923, 347 pp.
A vivid impressionistic sketch of the Fascist movement.

FASCISM. By Odon Por. London: Labour Publishing Co., 1923, 270 pp.
The most valuable and objective analysis of the Fascist movement which has yet appeared in English.

THE FASCIST MOVEMENT IN ITALIAN LIFE. By P. Gorgolini. Boston: Little, Brown, 1923, 216 pp.
Premier Mussolini contributes a preface to this immoderate and rhetorical eulogy of his work.

DIE OESTERREICHISCHE REVOLUTION. By O. Bauer. Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1923.
A distinctly superior history of Austria since 1914.

HUNGARY AND DEMOCRACY. By C. J. Street. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923.
An important account of contemporary Magyar propaganda and of the alleged undemocratic nature of the present régime in Hungary.

FROM A TERRACE IN PRAGUE. By B. Granville Baker. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923, 262 pp.
An account of the author's wanderings, historical researches and musings in and about the Bohemian capital.

HISTOIRE DE LA POLOGNE. By H. Grappin. Paris: Larousse, 1923, 446 pp.
A scholarly history from the earliest period to 1922.

MY MISSION TO RUSSIA. By Sir George Buchanan. London: Cassell, 1923, two volumes.
Important for Russian conditions and policies from 1914–1917 and as a defense of the author's own activities. Contains no revelations.

GOD INTERVENTSII. By M. S. Margoulies. Berlin: Grschebin, 1923, two volumes.
Material on Allied activities against Soviet Russia from 1918 to 1920.

BOLSHEVISM IN RETREAT. By S. Farbman. London: Collins, 1923, 312 pp.
An interpretation of Lenin's character, of the economic basis of the Bolshevik revolution, and of Bolshevism's subsequent modifications.

KRESTIANSKAIA ROSSIA. Edited by Argounov, Bochm et al. Prague: 1923.
A collection of essays on agrarian problems in Russia by Russian scholars of the Social Revolutionary group.

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CE QU'IL FAUT SAVOIR DE LA RUSSIE ÉCONOMIQUE. Paris: Dunod, 1923.

A semi-official French compilation which constitutes a remarkably complete and accurate book of reference on the natural resources and industries of contemporary Russia.

The British Empire

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. By Ramsay Muir. Yonkers: World Book Co., 1922–23, two volumes, 824, 814 pp.

Regarded by some critics as the best general history of the British Empire which has yet been produced by a single writer. The second volume is especially valuable as a history of Great Britain's foreign relations and imperial expansion.

FOOD PRODUCTION IN WAR. By T. H. Middleton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 373 pp.

An admirable survey of the food situation in Britain during the war, published by the Carnegie Endowment.

LABOUR SUPPLY AND REGULATION. By H. Wolfe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 422 pp.

A detailed and well documented study of the solution of the problem of mobilizing and controlling labor in England during the war, published by the Carnegie Endowment.

LABOR AND EMPIRE. By T. F. Tsiang. New York: Longmans, 1923, 220 pp.

A welcome historical account of the attitude of the British Labor Party towards British overseas policy in the last forty years.

FACTORY LABOUR IN INDIA. By R. K. Das. Berlin: Gruyler, 1923, 216 pp.

A timely economic analysis.

INDIA IN FERMENT. By C. H. Van Tyne. New York: Appleton, 1923, 252 pp.

An American historian, unsympathetic with the Gandhi movement, makes a clear analysis of the situation and pleads for a gradual solution of Anglo-Indian relations by coöperation.

THE DOMINION OF AFRIKANDERDOM. By Sir J. T. Molteno. London: Methuen, 1923, 257 pp.

Memoirs of one of the leading figures in the public life of South Africa during the last generation.

THE CASE FOR COLONIAL REPRESENTATION. By Lord Strathspey. London: Fleetway Press, 1923, 140 pp.

A concrete proposal for colonial representation in Parliament, based upon historical and legal arguments.

IRISH INDISCRETIONS. By W. B. Wells. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923, 230 pp.

Journalistic impressions and portraits.

The Near East

TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY: A STUDY IN IMPERIALISM. By E. M. Earle. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 364 pp.

A model study in modern diplomacy. Interestingly written.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS SUCCESSORS, 1801–1922. By W. Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923, 595 pp.

A revision of one of the standard English books on the subject.

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SALONIQUE, MONASTIR, ET ATHÈNES. By X. Torau-Bayle. Paris: Chiron, 1922, 136 pp.

A vigorous criticism of British policy as being responsible for the Allied debâcle in the Near East.

L'ISLAM ET LES RACES. By P. J. André (Pierre Redan). Paris: Geuthner, 1922, two volumes, 270, 325 pp.

An historical survey, advocating the collaboration of France and England, and denying the existence of any fundamental unity in Islam.

AN ENGLISHWOMAN IN ANGORA. By Grace Ellison. New York: Dutton, 1923, 344 pp.

A light-hearted account of a recent journey through Asia Minor, full of observations of an interesting if not very profound nature.

THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN JUGO-SLAVIA, ROUMANIA AND NORTH ITALY DURING AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR. By D. Coffey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923, 99 pp.

A succinct economic and sociological survey.

Africa

AFRICAN QUESTIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. By George Louis Beer. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 628 pp.

A series of papers prepared for "The Inquiry" by the late Professor G. L. Beer, the highest authority in America on colonial questions.

LA MÉTHODE DE COLONISATION. By L. Verlaine. Brussels: Denis, 1923, 350 pp.

An introduction to the colonial movement in Africa.

ALGERIA TO-DAY. By B. S. Casserly. London: Laurie, 1923, 262 pp.

An interesting survey of the development of Algeria under French domination.

LE SAHARA. By E. F. Gautier. Paris: Payot, 1923, 172 pp.

A description by the foremost French authority.

THE MAD MULLAH OF SOMALILAND. By D. Jardine. London: Jenkins, 1923, 336 pp.

A detailed account of British activities in this area from 1899 to the final overthrow of the Mad Mullah in 1919.

THE RESULT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA. By M. H. DeKock. Cape Town: Juta, 1923, 187 pp.

Valuable, but slightly unsympathetic in tone.

FORTY SOUTH AFRICAN YEARS. By Barry Ronan. London: Cranton, 1923, 239 pp.

Interesting journalistic reminiscences of South African development between 1870 and 1900.

THOUGHTS ON SOUTH AFRICA. By Olive Schreiner. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923, 398 pp.

Written many years before the death of the author. Valuable as a description of the period before 1900.

THE BLACK MAN'S PLACE IN SOUTH AFRICA. By P. Nielsen. Cape Town: Juta, 1923, 140 pp.

A discussion of the racial problem in this area.

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Latin America

THE REPUBLICS OF LATIN AMERICA. By H. G. James and P. A. Martin. New York: Harper, 1923, 533 pp.

A convenient summary of the political history and international relations of the South American states.

DE AMERICA Y DE ESPAÑA. PROBLEMAS Y ORIENTACIONES. By Hernández-Usera. Prologue by the Count of Romanones. Madrid: Librería de Rivadeneyra, 1922, 197 pp.

The author, a Porto Rican, assumes a friendly attitude towards the United States and seeks to reconcile Pan-Americanism and Pan-Hispanism.

CAUSAS Y CONSEQUENCIAS. ANTECEDENTES DIPLOMATICOS Y EFECTOS DE LA GUERRA HISPANOAMERICANA. By B. Soto. San Juan: La Correspondencia de Porto Rico, 1922, 295 pp.

A careful, unprejudiced account of the Spanish-American War and American rule in Cuba, the Philippines, and Porto Rico, written by a native of the latter country.

THE MEXICAN NATION, A HISTORY. By H. J. Priestley. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 507 pp.

The first comprehensive and up-to-date history of Mexico produced in this country. It is chiefly narrative and descriptive, and rather too brief on the later period.

THE NEW ARGENTINA. By W. H. Koebel. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1923, 276 pp.

Contains a mass of concrete information.

IN QUEST OF EL DORADO. By Stephen Graham. New York: Appleton, 1923, 334 pp.

A vivid description of travels in Spain, the West Indes, Central America, Mexico, and the Southern United States.

The Far East

CHINA YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By E. T. Williams. New York: Crowell, 1923, 613 pp.

An authoritative work on the civilization of present-day China, by one of the Americans who knows China best.

THE OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO CHINA. By M. J. Bau. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 245 pp.

A well documented historical and analytical study.

THE CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1923. Edited by H. G. W. Woodhead. Tientsin: Tientsin Press, 1923, 1,243 pp.

The standard compilation of Chinese data.

CHINESE EDUCATION AND THE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN CHINA. By J. B. Webster. New York: Dutton, 1923, 321 pp.

An excellent study from the historical and sociological point of view.

JAPAN. By H. H. Powers. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 278 pp.

A model descriptive work.

LA SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS-ETRANGERÈS. Paris: Letouzey, 1923, 150 pp.

Excellent for a documentary description of the work of Catholic missionaries in the Far East.

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Miscellaneous

THE NEWSPAPER AND THE HISTORIAN. By Lucy M. Salmon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923, 566 pp.

A work containing much to guide the student of contemporary history and international relations.

GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPAL INVESTMENTS. Edited by M. N. Blakemore. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1923, 1,805 pp.

The first half of this work contains valuable information concerning the public finance of the leading modern states.

DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By J. Viner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923, 343 pp.

An important economic analysis, including a discussion of the bearing of the problem on international relations.

RESTORATION OF THE WORLD'S CURRENCIES. By R. A. Lehfeldt. London: King, 1923, 146 pp.

A compendium of facts relating to contemporary currency problems.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN COMMONWEALTH. By A. N. Holcombe. New York: Harper, 1923, 491 pp.

An excellent analytical study of certain leading problems of modern states, including a good chapter on nationalism.

RACE AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY. By C. C. Josey. New York: Scribner's, 1923, 227 pp.

A psychological contribution to "Hundredpercentism" and the current racial mythology.

THE HUMANIZING OF KNOWLEDGE. By James Harvey Robinson. New York: Doran, 1923, 117 pp.

A brilliant summary of the conditions and technique requisite for an intelligent study of modern problems, among them that of international relations.

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PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

I

By Denys P. Myers

Documents may be procured from the following: United States, Government Printing Office, Washington; Great Britain, P. S. King & Son, 2 Great Smith St., London, S. W. 1; France, Librairie Terquem, 1 rue Scribe, Paris; League of Nations, International Labor Office and Permanent Court of International Justice, World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. For other countries no special references can be given.

Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ARMAMENTS

CONFÉRENCE de Moscou pour la limitation des armements. Edition du commissariat du peuple aux affairs étrangères. Moscou, 1923.

RECOMMENDATIONS of the National and Imperial Defence Committee as approved by His Majesty's Government, upon I—The Relations of the Navy and the Air Force. II—The coordination of the Defence Forces. London, 1923. 15 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1923. Cmd. 1938). 6 d.

REDUCTION of Armaments. Report of the Third Committee to the Fourth Assembly. Part I: Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance; Commentary on a "Case of Aggression." Part II: (1) Limitation of National Expenditure on Armaments; (2) Statistical Enquiry and Exchange of Information; (3) Private Manufacture and Control of the Traffic in Arms; (4) Chemical Warfare; (5) Extension of the Principles of the Washington Naval Treaty; (6) Regional Agreements; (7) Renewal of the Mandate of the Temporary Mixed Commission. 5, 16 pages. 33 cm. (A. 111. 1923. IV.) $.20.

REPORT of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments. 66, 12 p. 32½ cm. (A. 35. 1923. IX. Parts I, II.) $.70.

STATISTICAL Enquiry into National Armaments. 2 vols. 27 cm. (A. 20. 1923. IX.) $1.60.

Part I. Peace-time military, naval & air forces (1923); Part II. Budget expenditure on national defence, 1921–1923.

TREATY between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. Limitation of Naval Armament. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1923. Washington, 1923. 36 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 671.)

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. International Law Documents. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, with notes and index. 1921. Washington, 1923. vii, 392 p. 23½ cm. (At head of title: Naval War College.)

AUSTRIA, FINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

FIFTH REPORT by the Commissioner-General of the League of Nations at Vienna. Period April 15th–May 15th, 1923. 29 p. 32 cm. (C. 384. 1923. II.) $.30.

SIXTH REPORT of the Commissioner-General of the League of Nations for Austria. (Period May 15th to June 15th, 1923.) 40 p. 32 cm. (C. 477. 1923. II.) $.40.

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SEVENTH REPORT by the Commissioner-General of the League of Nations for Austria. (Period June 15th–July 15th, 1923.) 1st month of the second period. 25 p. 31½ cm. (C. 521. 1923. II.) $.20.

EIGHTH REPORT by the Commissioner-General of the League of Nations for Austria. (Period July 15th–August 15th, 1923.) 28 p. 32 cm. (C. 567. 1923. II.) $.20.

CENTRAL AMERICA

CONFERENCE on Central American affairs, Washington, December 4, 1922–February 7, 1923. Conferencia sobre asuntos centroamericanos, Wâshington, 4 de diciembre de 1922–7 de febrero de 1923. Washington, 1923. 403, [1] p. 25 cm. $.40.

Includes also "Minutes of the plenary sessions," December 4, 1922, and February 7, 1923, and "Minutes of the Committee of the whole," December 5, 1922, to February 5, 1923, inclusive.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

ADDRESS of President of the United States on International Court of Justice, at St. Louis, June 21, 1923. 1923. 14 p. 24½ cm.

COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS. No. 1. The S. S. "WIMBLEDON." August 17, 1923. 47 double pages. 24½ cm. $.80. (Publications of the Court, Series A, No. 1.)

REQUEST for an Advisory Opinion concerning the STATUS OF EASTERN CARELIA. TEXT OF THE ADVISORY OPINION given by the Court, on July 23, 1923. [v], 6–29 double pages. 24½ cm. $.50. (Series B, No. 5.)

ADVISORY OPINION on certain questions relating to SETTLERS OF GERMAN ORIGIN in the territory ceded by Germany to Poland, transmitted to the Court in pursuance of a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, dated February 3, 1923. Opinion given by the Court on September 10, 1923. [v], 6–43 double pages. 24½ cm. $.75. (Series B, No. 6.)

ADVISORY OPINION on certain questions, arising out of the application of Article 4 of the POLISH MINORITIES TREATY, transmitted to the Court in pursuance of the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, dated July 7, 1923. Opinion given by the Court on September 15, 1923. [v], 6–26 double pages. 24½ cm. $.50. (Series B, No. 7.)

ELLIS ISLAND

DESPATCH from H. M. Ambassador at Washington reporting on Conditions at Ellis Island Immigration Station. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1923. 12 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Paps., 1923. United States No. 2 (1923). Cmd. 1940.)

FINANCE, PUBLIC

GENERAL. League of Nations. Financial Committee. Memorandum on Public Finance, 1922. Geneva, July, 1923. 202 p. 27½ cm. $2.00

Contents: Financial position of: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States.

FRENCH Government finance; by Charles E. Lyon. August 13, 1923. Washington, 1923. 17 p. (Trade Information bulletin 137; Western European Division.)

GREAT BRITAIN. Proposal, dated 18th day of June, 1923, by His Britannic Majesty's Government to Government of United States regarding funding of debt of Great Britain to United States (and acceptance). (Washington, 1923.) 13 p.

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ITALIAN Government finances; by H. C. MacLean. July 30, 1923. Washington, 1923. 15 p. (Trade information bulletin 130; Western European Division.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Budget for the Sixth Financial Period (1924). Presented by the Fourth Committee to the Assembly. Part I. General Budget: Secretariat and Special Organizations of the League. Part II. International Labour Organisation. Part III. Permanent Court of International Justice. 33, 29, 8 pages. 32 cm. (A. 4, a, b, (2). 1923. X.) $.75.

——— Financial Position on August 31, 1923. 8 p. 32 cm. (A. 49. 1923. X.) $.10.

UNITED STATES. 2d annual report of director of Bureau of Budget to President of United States (fiscal year 1923), containing report of operations of Bureau of Budget, reports of chief coordinator and chairmen of coordinating boards and agencies established by Executive order for coordination of routine business of Government, also special reports of economies effected by Departments and establishments. Washington, 1923. 243 p. $.20.

HAITI

REPORT of American High Commissioner at Port au Prince, Haiti, submitted to Secretary of State, January 1, 1923. Washington, 1923. 25 p. map.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MARITIME LAW

REPORT of delegates of United States to International Conference on Maritime Law, 5th session, Brussels, Belgium, October 17–26, 1922. Washington, 1923. 104 p. 10 cts.

IRISH FREE STATE

Status [Statute] and Constitution. English text with translation into French. (Geneva, 1923.) 46 double pages. 24½ cm. (At head of title: Saorstat Eireann. Irish Free State.)

Subtitle: Documents submitted to the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ASSEMBLY. Journal of the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations. Geneva, 1923. No. 1. Monday, September 3, 1923 (–No. 25. Sunday, September 30, 1923.). 244 p., caption titles. 32 cm. $3.00.

Saturday, September 8, 1923. Financial Reconstruction of Austria. 11 p. 32 cm.

Contains minutes of plenary and committee meetings, and communications for the information of the delegates.

ASSEMBLY. Verbatim Record of the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations. 1st plenary meeting, Monday, September 3, 1923. (–20th plenary meeting, Saturday, September 29, 1923). 20 fascicles. 32 cm. $3.00.

RESOLUTIONS and Recommendations adopted by the Assembly during its Fourth Session (September 3rd to 29th, 1923). 34, 34 p. 24 cm. (*Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 11. October, 1923.) $.60.

MANDATES COMMISSION, PERMANENT

MINUTES of the Third Session held at Geneva from July 20th to August 10th, 1923. 212 p. 32 cm. (A. 19. 1923. VI.) $2.00.

ANNEXES to the Minutes of the Third Session. . . . 213–336 p. 32 cm. (A. 19. (Annexes) 1923. VI.) $1.20.

REPORT on the Work of the Third Session of the Commission. . . . forwarded by the Council to the Assembly. 19 p. 32 cm. (A. 46. 1923. VI.) $.20.

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PACIFIC OCEAN

TREATY between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. Signed at Washington, December 13, 1921. Washington, 1923. 8 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 669.)

AGREEMENT between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan supplementary to the Treaty of December 13, 1921, between the same four powers relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Region of the Pacific Ocean. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922. Washington, 1923. 5 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 670.)

PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

REPORT of delegates of United States to 5th International Conference of American States held at Santiago, Chile, March 25–May 3, 1923. 1923. 37 p. 5 cents.

PEACE CONFERENCE

CONFÉRENCE de la paix, 1919–1920. Recueil des actes de la conférence.... Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1923– . 32½ cm.

This set of the proceedings of the commissions of the Paris Peace Conference in 30 volumes is being suppressed. According to the present plan the printing will not be completed for two more years, but the distribution is confined to the Governments which were represented on each commission.

RELIEF WORK

INTERNATIONAL Federation for Mutual Assistance in the Relief of Peoples Overtaken by Disaster. Documents relating to the scheme of Senator Ciraolo. 14 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations. A. 67. 1923.) $.15.

REPORT on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees presented by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to the Fourth Assembly. 33 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations. A. 30. 1923. XII.) $.30.

WORK of the High Commission for Refugees on behalf of Near East refugees. Report submitted to the Assembly by the Fifth Committee. 3 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations. A. 108. 1923. IV.) $.05.

REPARATION

CORRESPONDENCE with the Allied Governments respecting Reparation Payments by Germany. London, 1923. 63 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1923. Miscellaneous No. 5. Cmd. 1943.) 1 s.

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES relatifs aux Réparations. (Du 26 décembre 1922 au 27 août 1923). Bruxelles, Imprimerie Lesigne, 1923. 81 p. 33½ cm. (At head of title: Ministère des affaires étrangères.)

DOCUMENTS relatifs aux notes allemands des 2 mai et 5 juin sur les réparations. (2 mai–3 août 1923.) Paris, Imprimerie, 1923. 91 p. 31 cm. (At head of title: Ministère des affaires étrangères. Documents diplomatiques.)

DIE DURCHFÜHRUNG des Versailler Vertrags. Vom 10. Januar 1920 bis zum 10. Januar 1922. Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1922. 68 p. 32½ cm.

New edition of a Whitebook issued in the spring of 1921 under the title: Die Erfüllung des Vertrags von Versailles durch Deutschland bis zum 1. April 1921.

DIE ENTWICKLUNG der Reparationsfrage. Chronik des wirtschaftlichen Niedergangs in Deutschland. Berlin, Zentral-Verlag, 1923. 43 p. 29 cm.

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GERMANY'S Economic and Financial Situation. An exhibit of after-effects of the World War. Compiled on the basis of official material by the Statistisches Reichsamt, Berlin, March, 1923. Berlin, Zentralverlag, 1923. 60 p. 25½ cm.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS relative to the Amount of Payments to be effected by Germany under Reparation Account. Second Part. (Memorandum presented by the French Delegation, 15th March, 1922.) London, 1923. 40 p. 24½ cm. (At head of title: Reparation Commission. VI.) 1 s.

REPORT on the Work of the Reparation Commission from 1920 to 1922. London, 1923. 300 p. 24½ cm. (At head of title: Reparation Commission. V.) 5 s.

REPLY of the French Government to the Note of the British Government of August 11, 1923, relating to Reparations. (August 20, 1923.) Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1923. 50 p. 31 cm. (At head of title: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Correspondence.)

SLAVERY

THE QUESTION of Slavery. 15 p. 31½ cm. (League of Nations. A. 18. 1923. VI.) $.15.

Replies of Governments to inquiry respecting the existence of slavery.

TREATIES

INTERNATIONAL. Progress of International Conventions and Engagements. Annex to the Supplementary Report to the Fourth Assembly [of the League of Nations]. 16 p. 32½ cm. (A. 10(a). Annex 1923.) $.15.

RUSSIA. Recueil des principaux traités, accords et conventions conclus par la RSFSR avec les Puissances étrangères, Partie IV. Moscou, 1923.

SIAM'S Case for Revision of Obsolete Treaty Obligations, admittedly inapplicable to present conditions. (N. p., n.d.) 235 p. 25 cm. (Supplement, Siam's Treaties.)

Contains 30 treaties from June 20, 1826, to March 15, 1913.

TURKEY

TREATY OF PEACE with Turkey, and other Instruments signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, together with Agreements between Greece and Turkey signed on January 30, 1923, and subsidiary documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement. (With Map.) London, 1923. iv, 243 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1923. Treaty Series, No. 16. Cmd. 1929.) 8 s.

AGREEMENT between the British and French Delegates at Lausanne regarding Article 34 of the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923 (Egyptian Nationality). Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923. London, 1923. 2 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1923. Treaty Series, No. 18. Cmd. 1947.) 2 d.

NOTES exchanged between the British and French Delegates at Lausanne regarding certain concessions in territories detached from Turkey. Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923. London, 1923. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1923. Treaty Series, No. 17. Cmd. 1946.) 2 d.

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II

By Denys P. Myers

Relations between states are indexed in English alphabetical order under the name of the first state party thereto. All dates are 1923 unless otherwise indicated.

Newspaper references are to the files most widely available. The letters *A. P.* indicate that the document is to be found in an Associated Press dispatch, and that it is probably available in any newspaper which is a member of that association. Abbreviations: *A. J. I. L. Sup.*, American Journal of International Law, Supplement; *Cur. Hist.*, Current History; *int.*, international(e).

AËRIAL NAVIGATION — Convention of Oct. 13, 1919, *A. J. I. L., Sup.*, XVII, p. 195.
Memorandum on relation of British navy and air force, London *Times*, Aug. 3, p. 11.

AMERICAN-OTTOMAN DEVELOPMENT CO.—Department of State defines attitude in letter July 3, N. Y. *Times*, July 20, p. 5.

ARMAMENT — *League of Nations* — TEMPORARY MIXED COMMISSION — Proposal of Col. E. Réquin, May 14, *Société des Nations*, V, p. 403. Text of June, 1923, *ibid.*, V, p. 404.
Draft treaty of mutual assistance, Aug. 8, *Revue de droit int. public*, XXX, p. 309; *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, III, p. 169; *Le Temps*, Aug. 10, p. 2.
Project voted by Fourth Assembly, *Monthly Summary*, III, p. 236.
Great Britain — Labor Party motion in British House of Parliament, July 23 (169 to 286); London *Times*, July 24, p. 7., *Int. Conciliation*, Oct., Bulletin No. 191.
Recommendation of British National and Imperial Defense Committee, London *Times*, Aug. 3, p. 12.

"ARMENIAN REPUBLIC" — Protest against treaty of Lausanne, Paris, Aug. 8, N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 12, p. 3.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

RECENT QUESTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

By Honorable Charles E. Hughes

Secretary of State of the United States

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO VOL. II, No. 2

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The address delivered by the Honorable Charles E. Hughes before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 23, 1924, was of such importance that it is here reprinted as a supplement to the December 15, 1923, issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *for distribution gratis to subscribers.*

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Vol. II SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT No. 2

RECENT QUESTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

An address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, January 23, 1924

By Honorable Charles E. Hughes
Secretary of State

IT IS an especial privilege to appear before the members of the Council on Foreign Relations because of their notable endeavor to facilitate an intelligent appreciation by our people of policies and action in the field of foreign affairs. Not only have you provided a forum, but in establishing a quarterly review under highly competent direction you have made one of the most helpful contributions to a better understanding of our foreign relations that has ever been made by private enterprise. The need is obvious.

I see among you those who have won eminence by sound judgment and exceptional facility in mastering facts, yet you constantly realize, I am sure, what slight opportunity you have for any but the hastiest consideration of the more difficult problems of the day so far as they lie outside your professional activities, and how impossible it is to reach any satisfactory independent conclusion unless you are aided by earlier special studies or by some experience which gives you background and perspective. Even then the old experience may be merely a trap to hold the mind in the clutch of preconceptions when it should be free for new excursions and impressions. If those in our community who are highly favored by training and variety of contacts are encountering such difficulties, what shall be said of the great host of our people—shrewd, fair-minded, but busy, preoccupied with the exigencies of the competitive struggle and living in the midst of strident appeals and multiplying allurements. With countless organizations we especially prize the few, such as yours, that seek the careful opinion, the sober matured judgment—an effort prosecuted, as your editors have said, with

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"a broad hospitality to divergent views" but none the less controlled by a sense of values and of responsibility.

It seems to me that I can make no better use of this occasion than to speak on certain recent questions and negotiations with which I have not been able to deal in other addresses. I shall not confine myself to a single topic and, although the various subjects of my remarks tonight are not directly connected with each other, I trust that taken with what I have previously said they will aid you in obtaining a conspectus of the present state of our foreign relations. The point of view of the responsible officer is not that of the debater or the reviewer; others may discuss, he must act on his best judgment. In most instances, when all the circumstances have been carefully considered, he is likely to feel that there is a certain inevitableness in that action. But I am here simply to report, not to claim agreement or challenge criticism.

QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE SMUGGLING OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS

Foreign nations are naturally tenacious of their rights upon the high seas, and, on the other hand, our Government can not look with indifference upon the attempts of hovering vessels, claiming the protection of foreign flags, illicitly to introduce their cargoes of liquors into the commerce of the United States. This Government must use every proper means to put a stop to this illegal traffic. It should be remembered, however, that authority with respect to the high seas can not be effectively conferred by acts of Congress if these are in contravention of international law, even though such legislative acts as municipal law would govern the decisions of our own courts.

Where international rights and obligations are involved, controversies not otherwise adjusted would naturally come before an international arbitral tribunal whose decisions would be governed by international law and would not be controlled by municipal law. This principle was explicitly recognized in the recent decision by Chief Justice Taft, as arbitrator in the controversy between Great Britain and Costa Rica, where the Chief Justice illustrated the point that, while in our system an act of Congress might for municipal purposes repeal a treaty, the United States could not thus get rid of an international obligation which would

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continue and would be enforced by an international arbitral tribunal. The Chief Justice said:

"This is not an exceptional instance of an essential difference between the scope and effect of a decision by the highest tribunal of a country and of an international tribunal. The Constitution of the United States makes the Constitution, laws passed in pursuance thereof, and treaties of the United States the supreme law of the land. Under that provision, a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. The Supreme Court can not under the Constitution recognize and enforce rights accruing to aliens under a treaty which Congress has repealed by statute. In an international tribunal, however, the unilateral repeal of a treaty by a statute would not affect the rights arising under it and its judgment would necessarily give effect to the treaty and hold the statute repealing it of no effect."

The Government of the United States has repeatedly asserted that the limits of territorial waters extend to three marine miles outward from the coast line. This has been asserted by our Government in making claims upon other governments. With respect to Spain's claim of jurisdiction over the waters adjacent to Cuba, Secretary Seward wrote to the Spanish minister as follows:

"It can not be admitted, nor indeed is Mr. Tassara understood to claim, that the mere assertion of a sovereign, by an act of legislation, however solemn, can have the effect to establish and fix its external maritime jurisdiction. His right to a jurisdiction of three miles is derived, not from his own decrees, but from the law of nations, and exists even though he may never have proclaimed or asserted it by any decree or declaration whatsoever. He can not, by a mere decree, extend the limit and fix it at six miles, because if he could, he could in the same manner, and upon motives of interest, ambition, or even upon caprice, fix it at ten or twenty or fifty miles, without the consent or acquiescence of other powers which have a common right with himself in the freedom of all the oceans. Such a pretension could never be successfully or rightfully maintained. . . .

"In view of the considerations and facts which have been thus presented, the undersigned is obliged to state that the Government of the United States is not prepared to admit that the jurisdiction of Spain in the waters which surround the island of Cuba lawfully and rightfully extends beyond the customary limit of three miles."

Secretary Fish, writing to the British Minister in 1875, said: "We have always understood and asserted that, pursuant to public law, no nation can rightfully claim jurisdiction at sea

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beyond a marine league from its coast." And Secretary Evarts, in a communication to the Minister of Spain, concerning the visitation and firing upon certain American vessels near Cuba in 1880, said: "The Government must adhere to the three-mile rule as the jurisdictional limit, and the cases of visitation without that line seem not to be excused or excusable under that rule." The general principle was thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of the Cunard Steamship Company *v.* Mellon (262 U. S. 100, 122): "It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, and other inclosed arms of the sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles."

In the Bering Sea arbitration it was held that the United States had no jurisdiction in the Bering Sea fisheries beyond the three-mile limit and in the case of the British schooner *Sayward* the United States was required to compensate Great Britain for interfering with its sealing operations outside the three-mile limit. The American-British Claims Arbitration Tribunal in December, 1920, awarded damages against the United States on account of the interference by officers with the British vessel *Coquitlam* because of transfer of cargo off the Pacific coast outside the three-mile limit.

It is quite apparent that this Government is not in a position to maintain that its territorial waters extend beyond the three-mile limit and in order to avoid liability to other governments, it is important that in the enforcement of the laws of the United States this limit should be appropriately recognized. It does not follow, however, that this Government is entirely without power to protect itself from the abuses committed by hovering vessels. There may be such a direct connection between the operation of the vessel and the violation of the laws prescribed by the territorial sovereign as to justify seizure even outside the three-mile limit. This may be illustrated by the case of "hot pursuit" where the vessel has committed an offense against those laws within territorial waters and is caught while trying to escape. The practice which permits the following and seizure of a foreign vessel which puts to sea in order to avoid detention for violation of the laws of the State whose waters it has entered, is based on

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the principle of necessity for the "effective administration of justice." (Westlake, Part I, p. 177.) And this extension of the right of the territorial State was voted unanimously by the Institute of International Law in 1894.

Another case is one where the hovering vessel, although lying outside the three-mile limit, communicates with the shore by its own boats in violation of the territorial law. Thus Lord Salisbury said, with respect to the British schooner *Araunah*, that Her Majesty's Government were "of opinion that, even if the *Araunah* at the time of the seizure were herself outside the three-mile territorial limit, the fact that she was, by means of her boats, carrying on fishing within Russian waters without the prescribed license warranted her seizure and confiscation according to the principles of the municipal law regulating the use of those waters." A case similar to this was that of the *Grace and Ruby* (283 Fed. 476).

It will be noted that in the case of the *Araunah* it was the vessel herself that was deemed subject to seizure outside the three-mile limit, and not simply her small boats, and this was manifestly because of the direct connection between the conduct of the vessel and the violation of the law of the territory. It may be urged with force that this principle should not be limited to the case of the use by the vessel of her own boats, where she is none the less effectively engaged, although using other boats, in the illegal introduction of her cargo into the commerce of the territory. Such a case was that of the *Henry L. Marshall*, recently decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit (292 Fed. 487–488). The *Marshall*, a vessel sailing under British registry, in 1921 obtained clearance from the Bahama Islands laden with a cargo of intoxicating liquors. She had two clearances, both dated the same date, signed by the same collector of revenue, one of which stated that she had cleared for Halifax with the cargo in question and the other that she had cleared for Gloucester, Mass., in ballast.

The same collector furnished two bills of health, simply differing as to destination. It was abundantly proved that the real object and only business of the *Marshall* was to peddle liquor along the coast of the United States and particularly did she pursue her vocation while lying from nine to ten miles off Atlantic City and sent liquor on shore pursuant to previous arrangements made in the United States by motor boats. She was seized out-

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side the three-mile limit and condemned. Circuit Judge Hough, speaking for a unanimous court, after referring to the case of the *Grace and Ruby*, said: "The difference between the facts there presented and those at bar is that, instead of arranging to unload and deliver the cargo of the schooner by, through, or with some assistance from the schooner's crew or equipment (as in the case cited), the whole matter was performed by a previous arrangement with those controlling the *Marshall* but with small boats that did not belong to the schooner and were not even partially manned by men from her crew. But it is just as true in this case as it was in the case of the *Grace and Ruby*, that 'the act of unloading, although beginning beyond the three-mile limit, continued until the liquor was landed.'"

The vessel was thus found to be engaged, not in the exercise of her admitted rights upon the high seas, but in unlawfully unloading her cargo into the territory of the United States, in "an actual introduction of a part thereof into the commerce of the United States" contrary to its laws. It should be added that while the British Government originally made a protest in this case, it was finally withdrawn upon the ground that the vessel was not of *bona fide* British registry, and it should be said that in this withdrawal the British Government did not acquiesce in the principle of the ruling. In view, however, of the historic practice of nations in the protection of their territory from the violation of their laws by hovering vessels, the United States Government can not admit that the accepted rules of international law preclude such action as that taken in the circumstances of the *Marshall* case.

But it is apparent that, whatever measures this Government may believe that it is free to adopt in accordance with the principles of international law, these, so far as they are practicable, are far from adequate to meet the exigency; and, further, the diplomatic history of the United States reveals the fact that maritime powers, including the United States itself, are highly sensitive to attempts by foreign authorities to seize their vessels on the high seas in time of peace. In each case of seizure there are likely to be serious questions of fact and law, and at any time there may be collisions of authority which would be embarrassing to friendly relations. It is precisely in matters of this description, where the sense of grievance and resentment are so easily aroused, that the effort should be made to reach an international

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agreement suited to the case. We need to put the measures that are required for the adequate enforcement of our laws on an impregnable basis and to invite and secure the friendly cooperation of the maritime powers.

Again, foreign powers have complained of what they regard as a departure from international comity through the maintenance of the present restrictions of law under which their vessels are not permitted to enter our waters or call at our ports if they have cargoes of liquors on board, although these may be kept under seal and are not to be delivered within the territory of the United States. Nations who fully appreciate our authority, and our right to enforce our own policy, can not understand such a restriction which interferes with their trade with countries other than our own. They can not understand why a ship from a foreign port with a cargo consigned to another foreign port is unable even to traverse our waters, or to visit our ports, because the cargo on board, which is destined for other countries, is of the sort we do not wish for our own. In this situation there is the plainest opportunity for a fair agreement not in derogation of our principles but to aid in their proper enforcement—not only without the slightest departure from, but with a manifest increase in, the safeguards required for our protection against the introduction of intoxicating liquors.

Accordingly, negotiations have been undertaken to reach an appropriate international agreement upon this subject and I am happy to say that such an agreement has been concluded with Great Britain today. There are other Powers which I believe are quite ready to act in a similar way. This will be a long step toward removing causes of irritation and it is precisely as we remove such causes that we shall really make progress in furthering the interests of peace.

It is hardly necessary to observe that there is no intention on the part of this Government to violate, in the negotiation of such agreements, the provisions of the Constitution. The purpose is to facilitate their enforcement. I know there are some who have expressed doubt whether such an international agreement can be made under our Constitution. This doubt I do not entertain. As the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "It is not lightly to be assumed that in matters requiring national action, a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government is not to be found." (*Missouri v.*

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Holland, 252 U. S. 415, 433.) It would be most extraordinary if the United States were in such a situation that such causes of international friction could not be removed by an exercise of the treaty-making power which in no way impaired the efficacy of our policy, but, on the other hand, greatly aided in preventing the illicit introduction of intoxicating liquors.

But, viewing the question in its technical aspect, it is quite sufficient to point out that the eighteenth amendment has expressly confided to the discretion of Congress the determination of penalties and forfeitures, and it is manifest that this discretion can be competently and wisely exercised in maintaining the morale of enforcement and in providing that just and adequate enforcement which does not interfere with the appropriate freedom of commerce, an interference with which would serve no interest of the United States, but would be to its most serious injury. Congress in the exercise of its discretion is undoubtedly entitled to protect the substantial interests of the country. Congress has already appreciated this authority and has acted accordingly in excepting from penalties and forfeitures transit through the Panama Canal, an exception which the Supreme Court in its recent decision has fully recognized as being within the competency of Congress. What Congress has thus done can equally be accomplished through the treaty-making power, which, under adequate restrictions, may put such cargoes as those to which I have referred, not destined for our ports or to be delivered within the United States, in the same status as those passing through the Panama Canal.

MEXICAN RELATIONS

Recently, in connection with the centenary of the Monroe doctrine, I have had occasion to review our policy with respect to the Republics of this hemisphere, and I wish at this time merely to add a word as to our relations with Mexico. It is unnecessary for me to describe the difficulties of the past thirteen years. Turmoil and internecine strife produced political and economic instability and disregard of international obligations. We had the friendliest feelings for the people of Mexico and were sensible of their desire for social and political betterment, but revolutionary tendencies and chaotic conditions made it impossible to find a sound basis for intercourse. At last, under

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General Obregon's administration there was a restoration of stability; commerce and industry began to regain confidence; there was a hopeful endeavor to put the finances of the country on a better footing; provision was made for the payment of the foreign debt. When it appeared that there was a disposition to discharge the obligations which are incident to membership in the family of nations, this Government was glad to recognize the existing Government of Mexico and to resume diplomatic relations.

Two claims conventions were at once concluded—a special convention relating to claims arising from revolutionary disturbances, and a general convention dealing generally with the claims of the respective States and their nationals. Diplomatic relations were resumed and these conventions were concluded last September; the special convention has received the assent of the Mexican Senate and the general convention is about to be acted upon by that body. Both conventions have been submitted to the Senate of the United States.

After this happy result had been achieved, and as we were looking forward to a period of quiet and to opportunities of advantage to both peoples, suddenly there was an attempt to overthrow the established Government of Mexico by violence. It is plain that the purpose of those engaged in this enterprise of arms is simply to determine by forcible measures the succession to President Obregon. It is not a revolution instinct with the aspirations of an oppressed people; it is a matter of personal politics. It is an effort to seize the presidency; it means a subversion of all constitutional and orderly procedure. The contestants, seeking to overthrow the established government, have taken possession of certain portions of the Mexican territory and either are claiming tribute from peaceful and legitimate American commerce or are attempting to obstruct and destroy it.

In these circumstances the established Mexican Government asked the Government of the United States to sell to it a limited quantity of arms and munitions. The request was one which could not be ignored; it had to be granted or denied. This Government had the arms and munitions close at hand; it did not need them and could sell them if it wished. If the request had been denied, we should have turned a cold shoulder to the government with which we had recently established friendly relations and, whatever explanations we might make, we would in

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fact have given powerful encouragement to those who were attempting to seize the reins of government by force. The refusal to aid the established government would have thrown our moral influence on the side of those who were challenging the peace and order of Mexico, and we should have incurred a grave responsibility for the consequent disturbances. In granting the request, there is no question of intervention, no invasion of the sovereignty of Mexico, as we were acting at its instance and were exercising our undoubted right to sell arms to the existing government. Nor was there any departure from the principle involved in President Harding's policy as to the sale of arms.

That particular declaration was simply a feature of our well-known general policy as to the limitation of armaments. It is our fixed purpose that our surplus war equipment should not be employed in encouraging warfare by fostering militarism and the building up of the competitive armaments that threaten the peace of the world. It in no way precludes us from furnishing arms to aid in the putting down of insurrectionary attacks upon public order in a neighboring State whose peaceful development is especially important to us. Indeed, one of the grounds upon which, under President Harding's administration, this Government declined to become a party to the convention of Saint Germain relating to the traffic in arms was that the convention not only left the signatory governments free to supply each other with arms *ad libitum* but prevented the sale of arms to governments not signatory, and it was then pointed out that this would prevent our Government from selling arms to our neighboring republics not parties to the convention, however necessary that course might be to the maintenance of stability and peace in this hemisphere.

As the question is obviously one of expediency, each case rests on its own facts. So far as precedents are concerned, we have followed rather than departed from them. In standing for constitutional procedure and frowning upon attempts to conduct political campaigns by force of arms we create no precedent that embarrasses us. Many of our people are solicitous with respect to the contribution of the United States to the cause of peace. That duty and privilege begin at home. In aiding stability in this hemisphere, in throwing our influence in an entirely correct manner in favor of the development of constitutional government and against unwarrantable uprisings, in protecting the

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legitimate freedom of commerce, we are making the greatest contribution directly within our power, and in accord with our established traditions and manifest interest, to the cause of world peace. This hemisphere should be the exemplar of peace, and we look with confidence to the creation of a unity of sentiment of the American Republics against resort to the brutal arbitrament of force in political controversies. To this end the United States gladly gives its cooperation.

THE NEAR EAST

Turkey—Let me now direct your attention to affairs in the Near East. The events of the past few years have created a new situation, and the difficulty in clarifying present problems is largely due to the fact that so many of our people discuss them in terms which belong to the past. While there was some consideration of Turkish questions in 1919, and certain inquiries were prosecuted, it was not until 1920, after the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties had been disposed of, that the Allies definitely took up the Turkish treaty. This treaty, called the treaty of Sèvres, was signed in August of that year. Its terms were severer than those of the European peace treaties, not only depriving the Turks of vast territories but imposing upon them an even greater measure of foreign control than had been the case before the war. In spite, however, of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland, and the French occupation of Cilicia, the Turks refused to ratify the treaty. The Allies were not in a position to compel them to do so.

As one of the results of the Great War, a new spirit of nationalism and a desire for freedom from outside control had made itself felt in the Near East. Nowhere had the evangel of self-determination found a more eager response. The nationalistic movement was particularly significant in Turkey. That this movement had often been accompanied by violence is not to be wondered at, although it is none the less to be regretted. The outcome of the movement in Turkey was the establishment of a government which claimed the right to be dealt with as sovereign and which by its military achievements made good that claim.

As early as January, 1920, the so-called Turkish National Pact had been voted by the Ottoman Parliament which was then

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assembled at Constantinople. This pact set forth the aspirations of the Turks and later was adopted by the National Assembly at Angora as summarizing the object of the Turkish Nationalist movement. Among its provisions was the following:

Article VI. "It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

"For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters."

In March, 1921, the Allied Powers clearly appreciated that it would be impossible, short of armed allied military intervention in Turkey, to impose the treaty of Sèvres. It would seem that at no time was such armed allied intervention seriously considered, although from time to time certain of the Allied Powers gave a measure of support to the Greek forces in the hope that the latter would be able, through their victory over the Turks, to make possible the realization of the Sèvres treaty at least in part. There were unsuccessful attempts to revise the treaty. At last the total defeat of the Greek forces and the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia completely changed the situation to the advantage of Turkey and effected the elimination of the treaty of Sèvres as a basis for negotiation. A victorious Turkish army being in complete control of Anatolia and threatening Constantinople, the Allied Powers intervened to bring about an armistice between Greece and Turkey which was signed at Mudania in October, 1922. The Lausanne conferences of 1922 and 1923 followed.

The Allies frankly recognized that the situation of 1918 no longer existed and that after the stubborn resistance of the Turks, culminating in their recapture of Smyrna, it was impossible to dictate the terms of peace. A treaty was therefore negotiated in which the Turks ceded very considerable territories and for the first time in their history agreed to open the Straits not only to merchant ships but to foreign warships, but in which the Allies, on the other hand, agreed to renounce their historic capitulatory rights in Turkey.

In 1919 and 1920 the question was directly presented to the Government of the United States as to the nature and extent of

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its participation in the political and territorial readjustments of the Near East. At that time the spokesmen for the Allied Powers at Paris suggested that the United States assume a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia. The former proposal was never presented for the consideration of the Congress, as it was clear as early as 1919 that the American people would not favor the assumption of a mandate over Constantinople, which would immediately and directly involve this Government in one of the most vexing political and territorial problems of the world—the storm center of historic rivalries and bitter contests.

When the question of an Armenian mandate was formally presented in 1920 as a result of the action of the Allied representatives meeting at San Remo, the Congress declined to sanction it. It thus again became apparent that the United States Government was not prepared to intervene in Near Eastern affairs to the extent of assuming any obligations of a territorial character. This course was in accord with our traditional policy. The United States had taken no part in the Turkish settlements which were embodied in the treaties of Paris in 1856, of Berlin in 1878, or in those which followed the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Even during the World War we did not declare war on Turkey or take the initiative in breaking relations with that country, notwithstanding the serious provocation, from a humanitarian standpoint, of the extensive Armenian deportations. Presumably it was felt that the policy then adopted was better calculated to enable the United States to exert its influence and to protect its interests so long as this country was not to join the military operations on the Near Eastern front.

If there ever was a time when we could have successfully intervened and have backed up our intervention by armed forces, it was early in 1919 when we had a large army abroad and were in a position to prosecute such a policy if deemed advisable. But this opportunity passed. It should be added that, contrary to an impression which is somewhat widespread in this country, this government, while it has always exerted its influence in a humanitarian way, has not assumed political obligations with respect to the Armenians or other Christian minorities in the Near East. Treaties concluded by other powers undertook, however, to deal with such questions. This Government took no part in the negotiation of the treaty of Sèvres.

Such, then, was the situation prior to the year 1921. In de-

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veloping our relations with the Near East subsequently, it was necessary to take into account the established policy of the Government and at the same time to serve American interests and humanitarian ends. It should also be remembered that a large part of the distress in the Near East has been caused by encouraging action which failed of adequate support. At various times the Armenians and Greeks have been encouraged to take up arms, later to be left to their own devices. This Government, however, would not be justified in promoting such a policy on the part of others which it was not prepared itself adequately to sustain. It has no mandate from the people to intervene by arms and thus to impose by force a solution of the problems of the Near East. And, for this very reason, it could not essay the rôle of a dictator in order to determine how others should solve these problems.

This, however, did not prevent this country from cooperating in a spirit of helpfulness and from bringing, as it has brought, its moral influence to aid in dealing with a situation of the utmost difficulty. This influence was brought to bear at the Lausanne Conference, where the efforts of the American representatives undoubtedly contributed in no small degree to the final agreement upon provisions regarding the protection of minorities, the recognition of charitable, educational, and philanthropic institutions, the appointment of judicial advisers and the maintenance of equality of opportunity. As I have said, a state of war had not existed between the United States and Turkey, and the course of events following the German War had reaffirmed the historic policy of refraining from intervention in political and territorial readjustments. Turkey had severed diplomatic relations with us in 1917, however, and these had not been resumed. But the formal conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey, entailing as it would the resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations, would leave the United States, unless appropriate action were taken, in a relatively disadvantageous position. Accordingly, negotiations were undertaken between American and Turkish representatives which resulted in the treaty of amity and commerce and the extradition treaty signed on August 6 last.

The treaty of amity and commerce followed very closely the Allied treaty without its territorial, political, and financial features. The United States gained the same general rights and

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privileges as the Allies, including the freedom of the Straits,and like the Allies consented to the abrogation of the capitulations, that is, of the exercise of the ex-territorial rights in Turkey which the Turks regarded as in derogation of their sovereignty.

In making this important decision the American representatives were obliged to take account of the following considerations. It was quite apparent that the only basis upon which negotiations could be conducted was that of most-favored-nation treatment and reciprocity. Either the Turks were to be dealt with on this footing or not at all. In these circumstances three courses were open to us: (1) To compel the Turks by force to give us better terms than the Allies; (2) not to negotiate at all; or (3) to negotiate with the Turks on equal terms as with a State enjoying an unqualified sovereignty.

The first course was out of the question. However desirable the maintenance of ex-territorial rights hitherto enjoyed might be, it was obvious that the public opinion of this country would not countenance a war for the purpose of maintaining them. Neither did it appear to be practicable to forego negotiations, in an attempt to maintain the status quo. After the armistice of 1918, we sent to Constantinople a high commissioner, with a naval detachment under his command, and in spite of his unofficial status in relation to the Turkish authorities he has succeeding in affording American interests appropriate protection. But this anomalous situation could not continue indefinitely. When the treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey comes into effect, and diplomatic and consular officials of the Allied Powers return to Turkey, we should find ourselves in an extremely difficult position if action meanwhile had not been taken to regularize our own position, and in the absence of a treaty American interests in Turkey would be without adequate safeguards. In this event, the humanitarian interests which are closest to the American heart would suffer. It was also perfectly clear that no period of waiting would avail to secure for us ex-territorial rights which on their part the Allies surrendered.

In these circumstances, the only practicable course was to negotiate a treaty as with a fully sovereign state. If such a treaty falls short of expectations, especially in that it acquiesces in the abrogation of the capitulations, it should not be forgotten that the only way to maintain the capitulations was to fight for

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them. It should also be borne in mind (1) that the Lausanne treaty is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state, (2) that it gives us the same rights as other countries will enjoy under the new régime, and (3) that by regularizing our relations with Turkey, now interrupted for nearly seven years, it will provide safeguards for American educational, philanthropic, and commercial interests in Turkey.

Let me emphasize a further point. At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door or equality of commercial opportunity; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company owned by foreign interests because it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest. Opening the door for American nationals we give them impartial and appropriate diplomatic support in the assertion of what appear to be their legal rights, but without otherwise involving this Government.

During the course of our recent negotiations, the Department of State was in frequent consultation with those whose interests in Turkey it is its privilege and duty properly to protect, particularly those whose humanitarian enterprises have long been established. They have clearly indicated their accord with the position that the present situation in Turkey should be frankly faced and that the Turkish authorities should have an opportunity to show that their expressed desire for American friendship and help and their willingness to protect American interests are sincere. It is on this basis that our policy toward Turkey is being developed. Let it be understood that Turkey, while insistent upon unqualified sovereign rights, does not reject the international obligations which are correlative to such rights. Let it also be appreciated that Turkey is not endeavoring to undermine our institutions, to penetrate our labor organizations by pernicious propaganda, and to foment disorder and conspiracies against our domestic peace in the interest of a world revolution.

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No one is more competent to speak on the subject of the treaty than Dr. James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Permit me to quote from his recent letter (November 24, 1923):

"To say that I have followed with keen interest the making of this treaty and its fate up to the present time is to express but mildly my own feeling as well as the feeling of the American board and its friends. While the treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the officers of the American board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both on the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the treaty will be ratified by the Senate and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best treaty that could be secured under the circumstances, but that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered in the treaty.

"If the treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey, with their large invested interests, would be jeopardized. Under the treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. I refer to educational, religious, medical, industrial, and philanthropic enterprises hitherto carried on by Americans, representing large American investments in Turkey. There are indications that the government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tarsus, and at some other points."

Let me add to this the statement of the distinguished educator, Dr. Caleb F. Gates, president of Robert College of Constantinople. After referring to the views of objectors, he says:

"Let us ask for a moment why it is that we have not made a treaty more in conformity with the wishes of so many of the American people. Is it because the American representatives were not skillful and allowed themselves to be outwitted by the Turks? The American representatives acquitted themselves exceedingly well; they gained the respect of their opponents as well as of the representatives of the Allied Powers. They came out of the conference with a reputation enhanced by the ability and fairness they had shown, and they gained for their country fully as much as the representatives of the Allied Powers gained for theirs. * * * The Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain, and they were willing and prepared to fight in order to obtain this sovereignty while the Allies were not. Even those Americans who now denounce this treaty as unsatisfactory were determined that their country should not go to war

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over these questions. * * * It is the only kind of a treaty which could have been made under the circumstances, when one party knew exactly what they wanted and were ready to fight to obtain it, and the other party was not willing to fight, but still wished to retain the former conditions. * * * As to the treaty itself, what does it give to us? It gives the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they may possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey and it gives to business men a field for their legitimate activities. * * * The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening."

In order to accord adequate protection to American interests in the Near East during the period following the Great War, the Department of State has maintained its representatives throughout this area and a naval force has been stationed in Near Eastern waters since 1919. Until October, 1922, this force consisted of from three to nine destroyers with various other craft from time to time. When news was received of the Smyrna disaster twelve additional destroyers were immediately dispatched, arriving in Turkish waters during October of that year. These vessels have been of inestimable service to the representatives of the Department of State and to all American interests in the Near East. Through their radio they have furnished communication when no other means were available. They have transported American missionaries, philanthropists, relief workers, and business men, saving days and weeks of time when no other adequate means of transportation were available. They have assisted in the evacuation of refugees and they have been instrumental in serving manifold humanitarian purposes. It is a pleasure to commend the admirable work that has been performed by the officers and men of these vessels.

Mandated Territories—Under the recent peace settlement between the Allied Powers and Turkey, the Arab portion of the former Turkish Empire is detached from Turkey. In Syria a mandate is being exercised by France and in Palestine by Great Britain, while in Mesopotamia a native kingdom is being developed under British guidance. These territorial changes have made it incumbent upon the United States to readjust its treaty

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relations which, with respect to these territories, were formerly controlled by our treaty with Turkey. In its correspondence with the British and French Governments in relation to these territories, this Government has made clear its position that the changed situation is a consequence of the common victory of the Allied and Associated Powers over Germany, and that in view of its relation to this victory the United States is entitled to insist that no measure could properly be taken which would subject the United States to discrimination, or deprive its nationals within these territories of equality of treatment with the nationals of any other power.

The rights of States which are members of the League of Nations are set forth in the terms of the French mandate for Syria and of the British mandate for Palestine, respectively. As the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, separate agreements are being negotiated with Great Britain and France under which the United States is to secure in these territories all rights and privileges enjoyed by States which are members of the League of Nations. Under these treaties American interests would be adequately safeguarded. There has been a development in Mesopotamia along slightly different lines, in view of the establishment of an Arab Government with which Great Britain has concluded a treaty, and as soon as this situation has been further clarified this Government will not fail to take proper steps to regularize its relations with the appropriate authorities of Irak with a view to the protection in Mesopotamia, as in Syria and Palestine, of American interests.

Persia—The Persian Government more than a year ago sought the aid of American experts in the reorganization of their finances. While this Government could not assume any responsibility in this matter, it was glad that the services of competent American citizens could be secured, and a financial mission accordingly proceeded to Persia and for the past year has been rendering important expert aid, as Persian officials, to the Persian ministers in reorganizing the financial administration of the country. While this is not an official mission of this country in any sense, it has helped to cement the relations between the two countries, making more firm the ties of mutual friendship and esteem.

Greece—The death of the late King Alexander of Greece was followed in December, 1920, by the return to Athens of Constantine. In accordance with the usual practice in the case of

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monarchical countries, the Greek representative in Washington tendered new letters of credence the acceptance of which would have constituted formal recognition of the new government. In view of the special circumstances which attended Constantine's return to Athens, it was deemed important, before according recognition, to take into account not only the part that Constantine had played in the war but also the policy of the new régime with regard to the acts and obligations of its predecessor and the attitude of the associates of the United States in the war. With respect to Constantine's attitude toward the engagements of the former government, there was for a time an uncertainty whether Constantine considered the government of King Alexander as a *de jure* government. This was important, for if the Government of the United States had extended recognition it might have put itself in a position of acquiescing in a possible review of the acts of King Alexander's Government which had borrowed substantial sums from the United States. It will also be recalled that none of the principal Allied Powers recognized Constantine subsequent to his return.

So far as the records indicate, these considerations controlled the policy of the United States Government during the period subsequent to Constantine's return and prior to March, 1921. Upon the change of administration the question arose whether there was a sufficient reason for changing this policy and for taking a course of action different from that followed by the Allied Powers. Other considerations had intervened making affirmative action in the matter of recognition undesirable. Constantine developed a militaristic policy in Asia Minor, in which Greece was already engaged, by which he desired to justify his hold upon the throne.

Separate action by the United States at this time could hardly have been interpreted otherwise than as an expression of sympathy and support by this Government for this policy of Constantine and as an indirect participation in the politics of the Near East which it was desired to avoid. The wisdom of refusing recognition was indicated by the overthrow of Constantine when Greek military plans in Asia Minor failed, an overthrow which was attended by a complete revolution. It will be recalled that Constantine fled the country and that his prominent supporters and cabinet ministers were arrested and after summary trials were executed. The British Government, which previously

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had maintained a chargé d'affaires in Athens, although not recognizing Constantine, withdrew this representative, while the representatives of other powers, including that of the United States, took occasion to interpret to the Greek authorities the unfortunate impression which the execution of the Greek ministers had caused.

The régime which succeeded that of Constantine was frankly based on military power and did not regularize its position by holding elections. Meanwhile the negotiation of a treaty of peace between the allied powers, Greece and Turkey, was undertaken at Lausanne, and it seemed undesirable, pending the conclusion of these negotiations, for the United States to take separate action in the matter of recognition.

The situation has now materially changed. The Lausanne negotiations have been concluded, peace has now been ratified by Greece and Turkey, and elections were held in Greece on December 16, 1923. These elections, it is hoped, will result in the establishment of a government which will enable this Government to extend formal recognition. The fact that recognition has not been extended during the past three years does not indicate an attitude of unfriendliness toward the Greek people. What American agencies have done in assisting the refugees in Greece is clear evidence to the contrary, and this humanitarian work could not have been carried out more effectively even if formal relations had been resumed, thanks to the initiative of American agencies and the helpful cooperation of the Greek authorities.

Egypt—I should not omit the mention of the recognition of Egypt, where we have had a minister for a considerable time, and whose minister in turn we are now receiving. We have a deep interest in the most cordial relations with Egypt and it is interesting to note that the Egyptian Government has been anxious to take advantage of the facilities offered in this country for perfecting the technical education of Egyptian students, particularly along lines of trade and engineering. A group of students came to the United States a year ago and other similar student missions are now on their way.

In conclusion, I may say that the new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome interventions, but by candor, directness, and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a

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firm but friendly insistence upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the Orient and the Occident may find ground for cooperation and for the maintenance of peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.

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